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  • Author: Yuri Nazarkin
  • Publication Date: 08-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The starting point for this paper is the National Security Blueprint of the Russian Federation approved by Presidential Decree No. 1300 dated 17 December 1997. As the Blueprint itself clarifies, it is "a political document reflecting the aggregate of officially accepted views regarding goals and state strategy in the sphere of ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state from external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, man-made (technogennyy), ecological, information or other nature, in the light of existing resources and potential." It is a conceptual document of a general nature which is intended to be the basis for the elaboration of specific programmes and organisational documents in the sphere of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe
  • Author: Fred Tanner
  • Publication Date: 08-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The dynamics of European security has become considerably more difficult to comprehend in recent years. This is due primarily to two sets of developments. First an "amorphous threat-free post-Cold War security setting" has replaced the distinct Alliance-wide threat from the Soviet Union. Second, new risks and threats have increasingly affected European security from regions immediately adjoining Western Europe. Conflicts and notorious instability loom in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Mediterranean region, including North Africa and the Middle East. As a consequence, security cooperation in Europe currently struggles to cope with these risks of non-military nature and ambiguous threat scenarios from the "out-of-area".
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe
  • Author: William C. Wohlforth
  • Publication Date: 08-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The most important security threat Russia faces, and the main threat it poses to the rest of the world, is its own implosion. If traditional security has to do with the manipulation and managment of the use of military force by states, then Russia's major contemporary problems must be understood under the "new security" rubric. Because the world has never before had to deal with the breakdown of a nuclear superpower, the security challenges Russia presents are certainly novel. But if "new security" is supposed to encompass problems that are transnational in nature and challenge state-centric analysis, then it too does not capture today's Russian question. For at the root of Russia's security problems is the absence of an effective government. To be sure, all of these problems are made more complicated by globalization. Many of them would continue to pester world politics even if Moscow had a capable government. But the root of these problems and the reason they present such great potential dangers is the absence of a capable state in Russia.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe
  • Author: Greg Hansen
  • Publication Date: 01-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University
  • Abstract: Humanitarian action in the Caucasus is shaped by the political, social, and security contexts of the region which, in many ways, constitute a case study in the lasting legacies of forced migration and social engineering. Without discounting the historical underpinnings of conflict that often date back several centuries, fears of persecution and deeply-rooted feelings of injustice are contemporary sources of tension and have been overlaid and complicated in the past decade by profound upheaval in the economic, social, and political spheres. The collapse of the Soviet system left the economies of the region in tatters.
  • Topic: Security
  • Political Geography: Russia, Soviet Union
  • Author: Rodney W. Jones, Michael Nacht, Sergei Rogov, Kenneth Sr. Meyers, Steve Pifer, Nikolai Sokov, Alexei Arbatov
  • Publication Date: 06-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: In his introductory remarks, Jones pointed out that key Russian interests in the terms of START II, which the United States shared and helped address in the early 1990s -- the denuclearization of Ukraine and the decoupling of Russian strategic forces from dependence on missile production plants in Ukraine -- faded into the background after START I entered into force and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in December 1994. Russian criticism of START II thereafter focused on U.S. missile defense developments that could affect the ABM Treaty, on the heavy costs to Russia of implementing reductions, and on the unequal U.S. and Russian reconstitution potential under START II ceilings. By 1996, reactions to NATO expansion had become a further obstacle to START II ratification in Moscow.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Ukraine
  • Author: Brad Roberts, Richard Speier, Leonard Spector, James Steinberg, Hank Chiles, Rüdiger Hartmann, Harald Müller, Leonard Weiss, Ben Sanders, Valery Tsepkalo, Shai Feldman, Phebe Marr, Riaz Kokhar, Virginia Foran, Dennis Gormley, Michael Moodie, Gennady Pshakin, Wendy Frieman, Shah. Prakash, Munir Akram, Michael Krepon, Alexei Arbatov
  • Publication Date: 06-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: It is a great pleasure to welcome you to this conference on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Enhancing the Tools of the Trade." Each year, preparing the agenda for this meeting and preparing my opening remarks, provides me the opportunity to survey our field, to take stock of recent accomplishments and set backs, and to anticipate the challenges ahead. In many respects the news in our field has been good. Since we met last, in February 1996: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opened for signature. The South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has entered into force for the regional parties, and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has been opened for signature. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been upgraded and the way opened for further enhancements, under the second part of the 93+2 program. In the area of export controls, multilateral regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, have added several new members and refined their rules... and China has strengthened its non-proliferation commitments by pledging not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear installations. In addition, there have been no new stories of significant leaks of nuclear materials from Russia or the other Soviet successor states, and U.S. cooperative programs to enhance security over such materials have gained considerable momentum. Reinforcing the norm of non-proliferation, the two nuclear superpowers continue to dismantle nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, and there are reasonable prospects for further reductions under the pending START II treaty and an anticipated START III accord. Looking at the threshold states... Pakistan is continuing its freeze on the production of fissile material, although Israel and India are apparently adding to their plutonium stockpiles. The North Korean nuclear weapons effort appears to remain frozen, as the result of the October 1994 Agreed Framework understanding with the United States. Finally, Iran's nuclear weapons program, according to recent testimony by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, has not progressed in the past two years, while Iraq's nuclear activities are being suppressed by UNSCOM, and Libya's nuclear program appears to be languishing.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Pakistan, Africa, Russia, United States, Iran
  • Author: Bjørn Moller
  • Publication Date: 04-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: The author argues that NATO membership is worth much less than assumed by the potential new members, hence that it should also cost less than demanded by NATO. Even though an enlargement of NATO is thus not particularly desirable, it is probably going to happen rather soon. Unless accompanied by various measures to ensure Russia of NATO's peaceful intentions, however, this enlargement will be viewed as a hostile move by Moscow, especially by the 'Eurasian' groupings. Eventually, Russia may take reciprocal steps that would negate whatever immediate security gains could be achieved through NATO membership. It is thus in the best interest of both present and future members of NATO to 'sweeten the pill' by taking Russian security concerns into account. A number of suggestions are made to this effect.
  • Topic: Security, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, Europe, Asia, Moscow
  • Author: Rick Hermann
  • Publication Date: 02-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Mershon Center
  • Abstract: My first cut at the hierarchy of driving forces ranks Israeli-Palestinian bilateral factors as the most important and regional and global factors as secondary. Competition between global powers (USA, Russia, China) is currently not intense. None of them see the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian conflict as instrumentally critical to their broader strategic competition with each other. None see their security as centrally tied to this conflict, and, consequently, while interested not even the United States will commit enough resources at this point to overturn the forces driving the bilateral bargain. Competition among regional states is substantial, but the conflicts that do not involve Israel do not involve states powerful enough to project their competition into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Iranian v. Turkish, or Iranian v. Saudi Arabian, or Syrian v. Iraq, or India v. Pakistan might tangentially connect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, mostly in the realm of rhetoric and symbol manipulation. None of these states, however, are strong enough to see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an instrumental regional manifestation of their broader strategic conflict. The primary determinants of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process in the short-term are the conflicting ambitions and calculations made by Israelis and Palestinians. Forces at the global and regional level will affect these bargaining calculations, (affecting both relative coercive leverage and positive reassurance) but they will not impose additional sources of conflict. My examination of global and regional forces, will follow my construction of the primary bilateral dynamic. I do not think global and regional factors will upset the short-term prediction I will make for the bilateral Palestinian-Israeli relationship. They may play a big role in shaping longer-term predictions.
  • Political Geography: Russia, China, Iraq, Middle East, Israel, Syria
  • Author: Alexander Pikayev, Alexei Arbatov, Richard Speier, Rodney W. Jones, John Pike, Michael Nacht, Linton Brooks, Stephen Cambone, Seth Carus, Robert Einhorn, Ronald Lehman II, McCarthy Tim, Yuri Nazarkin, Keith Payne, Henry Sokolski, Mikhail Streltsov
  • Publication Date: 02-1996
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: The first panel focused on the U.S. and Russian stakes in strategic arms control, the prospects for START II ratification in Russia, the status of START III issues, and the possibilities for cooperative approaches to the issues of strategic offense-defense interaction. The Russian panelists, Ambassadors Yuri Nazarkin and Mikhail Streltsov, and State Duma member Alexei Arbatov, explained Russia's START II reservations, steps in the ratification process, and expected implementation problems in eliminating Russia's multiple warhead (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). On balance, they agreed that START II serves Russia's basic interests, in lower levels of strategic arms, eventual economic savings, and political and military parity with the United States. They acknowledged that the ball is now in Russia's court, and ventured that parliament's approval probably would occur eventually.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States
  • Author: Alexander A. Sergounin
  • Publication Date: 07-1996
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and its Marxist ideology, and the re-emergence of the Russian Federation as a separate, independent entity have compelled Russia to redefine its national interests and make major adjustments in the spheres of both foreign policy and international relations theory (IRT). These enormous tasks, together with an attendant polarisation of opinion on how to deal with them, have pitted Russia's policy makers and experts against one another in a fierce battle of world views. This debate is far from at an end. Neither a new security identity nor a coherent foreign policy strategy have yet been found.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Environment, Government, Politics, Religion
  • Political Geography: Russia, Europe, Asia