May 3 rd, Russia’s COVID-19 infection rate resembled that of the United Kingdom. This situation has the potential to significantly impact the country’s financial situation, influencing the country’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. By the beginning of the lock-down period, the most optimistic forecasts for 2020 predicted a fall in the Russian economy by 4-6% of GDP.1 However, after four weeks of confinement, a decline of 6-8% was considered to be the most positive scenario, provided that it is possible to avoid a second wave for the epidemic in the autumn as predicted by the Higher School of Economics forecast.
The Russian situation is complicated by the fact that the outbreak of COVID-19 coincided with the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices. The federal budget’s breakeven price for 2020 was set at $42.4 per barrel.3 However, prices by the end of March and the beginning of April went significantly lower. This means that Russia may not be able to match the predicted government spending for 2020. Moreover, its leadership may not be able to spend money as generously to advance projects serving the country’s foreign policy.
Moscow, short on revenue, will unlikely take foreign policy and domestic political adventures. Foreign policy projects, primarily those that require significant budgetary expenditures in the Middle East and specifically in Syria, will be frozen. A passive Russian international engagement is expected to dominate until the end of 2020. The exception to this policy will be when a response is unavoidable. Domestic policy is likely to be just as reactive. The baseline will likely be to maintain the current state of affairs and absorb any shocks to stability given the scarcity of financial resources.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
Moderate Syrian opposition includes some natives from Russia’s North Caucasus, although they are a minority. Caucasian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) natives were, in large part, members of the Islamic State (IS) or in some way linked to the forces formally led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and later by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight can be roughly divided into two generations. The first one includes Caucasus Emirate members who responded to the call of Salafi sheikhs from Arab-Islamic centres. Natives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenistan (migrant workers, for the most part) were mainly recruited for jihad in Russia or within various diasporas across Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Opposition
The town and province of Daraa in southwest Syria is known for being a “cradle of the Syrian revolution”. Six years after the start of the Syrian uprising, it has been included in one of the four de-escalation zones that Russia established in Syria striking deals between different opposition armed groups and Damascus, with the consent of external actors. The southwest de-escalation zone is comprised of three provinces – Daraa, al-Suwaida, and al-Quneitra – whose proximity to Israel has been a crucial factor in Moscow’s strategy in the region.
The southwest Syria de-escalation zone has several peculiarities that make it distinct from the other zones, in particular its geography, i.e. its proximity to Israel, which has defined Russia’s very special and nuanced approach to it. At the same time, the Russian approach to dealing with the armed opposition groups within the zone was similar to the groups in other de-escalation zones. So, what makes Russia’s approach different?
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests