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1. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

2. Next steps for the US-China strategic nuclear relationship

Author:
David Santoro, David C. Logan, Vahid Brown, Heather Williams, and Duyeon Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Conducted with the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, this study seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of strategic nuclear issues of significance to the bilateral relationship to pinpoint the challenges to, and opportunities for, improving the current state of affairs between Washington and Beijing. The study, in other words, aims to propose an assessment of key issues and, insofar as possible, solutions or mitigation measures to address US-China strategic nuclear problems, including those that are seemingly intractable. It is motivated by the idea that even (or perhaps especially) when stark pessimism dominates, it is essential to be clear about what is in “the realm of the possible” to improve the situation, and to act on it.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

3. Americans Positive on South Korea Despite Trump’s Views on Alliance

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump presidency has strained relations with several Asian allies, including South Korea. But the 2020 Chicago Council Survey results show that President Donald Trump’s repeated threats and bullying tactics on defense and trade issues with Seoul have done little to soften support among the American public for the alliance with South Korea. In fact, favorable views of South Korea are now at an all-time high.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

4. Parameters VOL. 48 NO. 3 Autumn 2018

Author:
Antulio J. Echevarria II, Eric B. Setzekorn, Richard G. Malish, Kelly A. Grieco, Vinay Kaura, Paul E. Vera Delzo, Richard Milburn, and Brandon T. Euhus
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The Autumn issue of Parameters opens with a forum featuring two contributions that highlight some important Challenges for USCivil-Military Relations. The first contribution, “Policy Revolt: Army Opposition to the Korea Withdrawal Plan” by Eric Setzekorn, argues senior US Army leaders adopted a Fabian strategy of indirect resistance to Carter’s desire to reduce the number of troops stationed in Korea. The strategy worked. But the author leaves us wondering whether that success was a positive development for US civil-military relations. The second article, “The Walter Reed Scandal and the All-Volunteer Force” by Richard Malish, provides intriguing evidence that the American public might have put the AVF on a pedestal high enough that it harms civil-military relations. Our second forum, On Alliances and Coalitions, offers three essays addressing the importance of integrating disparate perspectives under a common strategy. The first article, “Fighting and Learning in the Great War: Four Lessons in Coalition Warfare” by Kelly Grieco, describes the key insights the United States and its allies drew, or ought to have drawn, during the First World War. All of these, as Grieco shows, have immediate relevance today. The second contribution to the forum, Vinay Kaura’s article “India-US Relations: From Distant Partners to an Alliance” suggests American and Indian interests are converging in a manner that makes an alliance between them, hitherto inconceivable, now a worthy objective. Paul Vera Delzo’s “Toward a Whole-of-Government Approach: Revamping Peru’s Strategy Process” describes how Peru can obtain greater efficiency and effectiveness from its strategies by integrating all government agencies. The final forum, On Clausewitz, presents two articles that challenge nontraditional interpretations of On War. Richard Milburn’s “Reclaiming Clausewitz’s Theory of Victory” takes on Emile Simpson’s “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict” (Parameters Winter 2017–18). Milburn rejects Simpson’s view and maintains Clausewitz’s theory of victory remains relevant in the twenty-first century. Brandon Euhus’s “A Clausewitzian Response to ‘Hyperwarfare’ ” urges military planners to remember the human dimension of war, as expounded upon by military writers from Thucydides to Mao Zedong, is ultimately the decisive one.
Topic:
Security, International Affairs, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:
India, North America, Korea, and United States of America

5. Concerning and Anticipating: A Struggling Korea for The Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Feng Zhu, Haibao Wu, and Li Yue
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pangoal Institution
Abstract:
The Belt and Road Initiative refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, firstly proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in late 2013. During Boao forum for Asia 2015, on March 28th, the Chinese government officially issued Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, in which the Chinese government advocates peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, and mutual learning and benefit. The Belt and Road Initiative is a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity amongst all the countries it spans. It is a road towards peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all-round exchanges. It promotes practical cooperation in all fields, and works to build a community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility featuring mutual political trust, economic integration and cultural inclusiveness.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, Korea, and United States of America

6. The Case for Kaesong: Fostering Korean Peace through Economic Ties

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Kaesong Industrial Complex, closed since 2016, was the most successful joint economic venture undertaken by North and South Korea. Reopening the manufacturing zone, with improvements to efficiency and worker protections, could help broker wider cooperation and sustain peace talks on the peninsula. What’s new? In 2016, South Korea shuttered the Kaesong Industrial Complex, breaking a modest but productive connection between the two Koreas. Crisis Group’s analysis sheds new light on the economic performance of firms operating at the Complex, demonstrating that the benefits for the South were greater than previously understood. Why does it matter? Beyond helping restart the stalled peace process, a deal to reopen the Complex in exchange for a proportionate step toward denuclearisation by North Korea could produce mutual economic benefits that help sustain South Korean support for talks and encourage Pyongyang’s commitment to peaceful relations. What should be done? As part of any deal to reopen the Complex, Seoul and Pyongyang should take steps to address problems that previously kept it from reaching its potential. The more efficiently, profitably and fairly it works, the better the Complex can help foster and maintain stable, peaceful relations between the Koreas.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

7. North Korea’s Military Strategy, 2018

Author:
Chun In-bum
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
As the focus shifted from North Korea’s military advances in 2017 to its diplomatic offensive in 2018, we should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind gaining the maximum time to develop the capacity to extend its military threat. At present North Korea needs time to perfect its nuclear strike capability. It has been very successful in developing missile capabilities, but it needs additional time to achieve its goals. Starting with high-level North-South talks on March 5, 2018, the DPRK has just gained what it needs most: time. Whenever the first talks begin with the United States and the DPRK, there should be no surprise if the DPRK comes with an improved capability to threaten the alliance. Thus, for an extended period in 2018, as diplomacy proceeds, we should expect a subdued North Korean approach: not flaunting its nuclear weapons and missiles, while striving to boost capabilities for the struggle ahead. In the seven years since Kim Jong-un officially inherited the leadership of the DPRK, his stated policy has been byungjin ( 병진, 竝進), the pursuit of both economic and military development. In conjunction with purges and efforts to eliminate rivals, byungjin may, in part, derive from Kim’s efforts at the outset of his tenure to consolidate political power. Through it, Kim displayed moderate economic flexibility, thereby gaining favor with the North Korean people through facilitating an improvement in living standards. It is tempting to see byungjin as a sign of the regime’s weakness, or as an indication of moderation, either of which would prompt the eventual collapse of the Kim regime. Correspondingly, one might see it as a reflection of Kim’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of political and strategic acumen. These viewpoints reflect mirror imaging more than a sophisticated understanding of North Korea. Byungjin may be more of a political device and a strategic communications element of a grand strategy, as opposed to the regime’s strategy. It may be a significant instrument in the regime’s effort to maintain elite cohesion and focus the energies of the North Korean people toward productive pursuits that likewise add to the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. It by no means suggests any diminishing of the priority of making advances in nuclear and missile development in order to pose a more serious threat. Since taking power, Kim’s regime has fired close to one hundred missiles of wide variety and range compared to thirty-one for his father and grandfather combined. He has also conducted four nuclear tests, boasting of a thermal nuclear capability. During his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un proclaimed that the DPRK had perfected its nuclear and intercontinental missile capabilities, supporting North Korea’s constitutional claim to be a nuclear power. Despite an upsurge in diplomacy after this address, we should keep our eyes on its military advances.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Security, Military Strategy, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Korea

8. North Korea’s Economic Strategy, 2018

Author:
William B. Brown
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter takes the perspective of North Korea’s leadership as it confronts difficult economic problems in the remaining months of 2018. The major current and potential issues are listed and prioritized. Short and longer-term remedies are presented, each with trade-offs that affect other economic and policy issues. Given the absence of direct reporting from North Korea, the issues and debates presented are speculative, designed to give the reader a more comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s current problems than is ordinarily presented in western media. Kim Jong-un’s recent diplomatic offensive, reaching out to South Korea, China, and the United States is, in this view, suggestive of these internal economic troubles in addition to the nuclear security issues. The troubles are both short-term—the collapse in trade with China in just the past few months—and long-term, the slow-motion collapse of the communist country’s “command” economy. And much more than in the past, the problems relate to the regime’s unusual and dangerous monetary system, money being a normal issue for most governments but a relatively new one for this still partially rationed, or planned, oriented system. The leadership may have little choice but to let the domestic economy move further from the plan—allowing decentralized market and private activities more sway—than ever before. This would help cushion the central government from losses due to the sanctions and open the door to a much more prosperous future. Without major moves in this direction, inflation and unemployment may cascade into social crisis. It should be noted, that the recent Assembly Meetings, which annually focus on the economy, gave little official indication of policy changes, only a sense of digging in further to protect the regime from outside forces. But just a week later, Kim may have telegraphed an upcoming sea change when, in his address to the Party Central Committee plenum, that he is instituting a new Party Line, socialist economic construction, as the total focus of the Party and the country. Major changes, if they are to occur, will likely come after the upcoming important summits with South Korea and the U.S.1 There is little doubt that the economy in 2018 is in very poor condition, delivering one of the worst productivity rates—productivity in terms of labor and of capital—in the world, but it is important to recognize that this is due not to natural circumstances but to decisions the government has made over the years, and trade-offs it has already made. This suggests that astute government policy can create solutions and restore growth. Remedies of the sort expressed here, for example in liquidating, that is selling or leasing state assets to private buyers, raising fixed prices for state delivered electricity and for water and other utilities, and giving large pay raises to the millions of state workers who now rely on rations, while culling their numbers, would require difficult economic and social trade-offs; one might say there is no free lunch for Kim and his regime although no doubt they are looking for one, even in these summits. The chapter discusses just what kinds of decisions might be made and the likely consequences. Negotiations being set with South Korea and with the United States, and likely more discussions with China, may weigh heavily in how far Pyongyang will be willing to go in these respects. In my view the regime will be looking for: outright aid, payments for pushing back the nuclear weapons program, and premature relief from sanctions, which would only give the regime time to avoid the hard choices needed to permanently fix the broken economic system.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Sanctions, Services, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and Korea

9. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

10. North Korea’s Public Relations Strategy, 2018

Author:
Eun A Jo
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Tension on the Korean Peninsula had reached a boiling point by the time Kim Jong-un delivered his New Year’s address—a tradition set by his grandfather that he had revived in 2013. Beyond the talk of a “nuclear button,” which triggered another round of fiery exchanges with Donald Trump, Kim devoted a considerable segment of his speech to calling for improved inter-Korean relations. Though signaling an ambiguous friendly overture to the South has become an annual exercise for Kim, this year’s speech was uncharacteristically specific in that he offered to send a delegation to South Korea’s highly anticipated Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. But sports diplomacy is hardly new to Kim; an avid sports fan himself, Kim is acutely aware of its propaganda value and utility as a channel for diplomacy. For Kim, the Pyeongchang Olympics presented a timely opportunity to remake the regime’s flailing image at home and abroad. In this chapter, the Pyeongchang Olympics are used as a case study to understand Kim’s public relations strategy. Before exploring the strategic intentions behind Kim’s diplomatic campaign, both the old and new features of his image-making efforts are examined, focusing in particular on his use of sports diplomacy. How Kim’s charm offensive in Pyeongchang is communicated internally and received externally is then analyzed, yielding important insights about the prospects of reconciliation between the two Koreas post-Olympics.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Weapons, Public Relations, Olympics, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

11. Japan in the Driver’s Seat? Reshaping the Regional Trade Order without the United States

Author:
T. J. Pempel
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
On January 28, 2018 representatives from eleven countries, following the strong leadership of Japan, agreed to a modified version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This new pact —renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP), or TPP-11—was formally signed in Chile on March 8. The treaty will take effect once ratified by at least six member countries. Japan is planning to push the treaty through the Diet within 2018 and anticipating that it will come into force sometime in 2019. The agreement represented a major recovery by the eleven countries following initial expectations that TPP was dead after the election of Donald Trump. Trump, as an early follow through on his xenophobic and unilateral campaign promises, signed an executive order pulling the United States out of the TPP within one hundred hours of his inauguration. With that stroke of his pen, Trump wiped out 10 years of work on the so-called “Pacific” route to regional trade integration, anchored on the U.S. market. It also defied multiple analyses demonstrating the strong economic benefits that TPP would provide for the United States. Turmoil immediately prevailed among the remaining eleven signatories. Japanese prime minister Abe, for example, only weeks after Trump’s election announced, “TPP is meaningless without the U.S.” Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong argued, “if the TPP does not go ahead, it would be a great loss for the rest of the member economies.” The National Interest was typical in its skepticism about both the survival of TPP and the long-term implications for the Asia-Pacific. In an article entitled “TPP is Dead; Now What?” it observed: “The United States’ withdrawal not only throws away the potential for a trade agreement but may cause countries that expended significant political capital for the TPP to retreat from free trade for the foreseeable future.” That China will be the primary beneficiary of Trump’s withdrawal was a widespread conclusion.5 In fact, as the signing of the CPTPP indicated, all eleven countries were prepared to recommit themselves to the deal and to continue to advance the goals of a liberal trading order in the region.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

12. Advancing the Regional Trade Order in East Asia with a Less Engaged United States

Author:
Korea Economic Institute of America
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election and immediate pullout from the TPP, a scramble ensued over how to proceed with constructing a regional trade order centered on East Asia. For China this brought closer scrutiny of its pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the case of Japan, questions followed about what to do with the residue of TPP. Others, notably countries in Southeast Asia, were left contemplating the balance between eastern exclusive regionalism and the western presence in regionalism. In the background were efforts in South Asia aimed at advancing economic integration with East Asia. A kind of free-for-all was in progress without the moorings that had been lost after the paradigm of competition between a U.S.-led TPP and a China hub-and-spokes BRI no longer was guiding the strategic calculations of Asian countries. Then, in March 2018 came Trump’s disruptive tariffs, threatening to set a trade war in motion. Four chapters explore the challenge of advancing a regional trade order in East Asia in the new circumstances of 2017-18. Tu Xinquan in Chapter 10 questions whether BRI is a path toward regionalism, delving deeply into the Chinese strategy for BRI. T.J. Pempel follows in Chapter 11 by exploring Japan’s thinking about TPP and the process of refocusing on TPP- 11 following the U.S. withdrawal. Chapter 12 by Sanchita Basu Das offers a hopeful ASEAN perspective on economic regionalism. Finally, in Chapter 13 Pradumna Bickram Rana traces thinking about re-energizing economic integration between South Asia and East Asia. With no finality to the RCEP talks and the recently concluded TPP-11 pact still taking shape and Trump’s “America First” trade policy casting a dark shadow, we aim to capture signs of a new trade order at a time of flux.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Integration, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, China, East Asia, Asia, and Korea

13. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Author:
Kirk W. Larsen
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In July 2014, Ambassador Qiu Guohong in preparation for Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul stated that the “relationship between South Korea and China couldn’t be any better.”1 Among the many reasons for this—economic, geostrategic, cultural—was a shared sense of history. China and Korea, officials and commentators in both nations claimed, were close because of their agreement regarding the significance of their experiences as victims of foreign, particularly Japanese, imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. History, that constellation of memories, stories, and notions about the past, has often been deployed to reinforce conceptions of identity, to support certain courses of action, and to demarcate between the in-group and the other. But history is ever malleable and protean. Not only do individuals, institutions, and ideas change but so does the understanding of them. When one draws on the past, one inevitably focuses on a limited set of events or narratives that best serve one’s interests—to the exclusion of potentially equally valid candidates. Their utility can vary over time; one need only think of how figures such as Zheng He or Confucius have been imagined and re-imagined over the last century. This has been the case with the history of relations between China and Korea from the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For many Chinese, Korea has served first as a subject of contestation as China’s position in Korea was challenged by both Western and Japanese powers. Then, when it became increasingly clear that China (or the Qing Empire) was losing this contest, Korea became an omen of China’s own fate absent significant course changes. As Japan’s growing empire engulfed Korea and subsequently threatened parts of China, resistance served to bring China and Korea closer; many in China celebrated what they saw as courageous resistance to Japan—such as when An Chunggun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Shared status as victims of Japanese imperialism in an age of “humiliation” brought the two closer, and the mutually shared memory of “humiliation” has been deployed by contemporary Chinese and South Korean leaders—Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye—to foster greater levels of cooperation. However, past conceptions of China, Korea, and the Sino-Korean relationship have sometimes ranged far afield from the cherished tropes of humiliation and the struggle for independence. Even seemingly universally agreed upon symbols, such as An’s heroic 1909 assassination, find themselves subject to changing interpretations such as recent emphasis by some on his pan-Asian vision of Sino-Korean-Japanese cooperation rather than his bold anti-Japanese act. As interests and priorities change, so does the utility of any particular historical narrative.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Imperialism, and History
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

14. Chinese Views of Korean History to the Late 19th Century

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the tradition of imperial China and communism, Chinese publications see history as a morality tale. In the case of Korean history to the late decades of the nineteenth century there are essentially three actors: virtuous China, evil Japan, and variable Korea. There are three critical periods which receive the bulk of attention: the 7th century, the late 16th century trailing into the 17th century change of dynasty in China, and the last decades of the 19th century. The narrative advances the notion of competing visions of regional order, contrasting Chinese and Japanese frameworks and examining Korean policies in light of the choices made between these options. Official Chinese narratives couch today’s opportunities in historical context. A battle rages between socialism and capitalism, offering China a unique prospect to tip the balance. This is not only a present-day challenge; it is a struggle over consciousness of history—a campaign against “historical nihilism” that disagrees with orthodoxy in support of communist party legitimacy and the rectitude of Chinese civilization. A speech given by Xi Jinping in July 2010 at the Central Party School and only recently made available leaves no doubt about the tight censorship imposed on publications about history. South Korea’s history is especially sensitive as the poster-child for the benevolence of the imperial Chinese regional order, the battleground for the key war fought by China to maintain its surroundings against capitalist encroachment, and a chief testing grounds for the rejuvenation of China against U.S. hegemonism and Western civilization. Premodern history is an inseparable part of this agenda.
Topic:
Imperialism, Politics, History, Capitalism, and Socialism
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

15. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral: Better at Deterrence than Diplomacy?

Author:
Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Once more, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have confronted a crisis with North Korea. The pattern is now well established. First, there is a provocation—a missile test, a nuclear test, and even worse, the use of force. Next, the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia muster their forces, strengthen their trilateral policy coordination, and sanction the belligerent Pyongyang. The three nations advocate for the accompanying effort by the United Nations Security Council to condemn North Korea’s behavior. Setting aside their political differences, Seoul and Tokyo intensify their military cooperation and Washington calls for greater trilateral unity in confronting a shared security challenge. In 2017, policymakers in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo found themselves in a similar cycle but with the threat of war ever more real. The dramatic escalation of tensions between President Donald J. Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seemed to bring the region to the brink of a second Korean conflict. But today, just as dramatically, an accelerated series of high-level summits suggests that the Korean Peninsula could be on the brink of peace. President Moon Jae-in met with Kim at Panmunjom, and both Kim and Moon stepped across the line of demarcation at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. The two leaders have embraced a “new era of peace,” with the promise of ending the state of war on the peninsula. Trump has also said he is willing to meet Kim to discuss denuclearization. CIA director Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang on April 1 to test out that proposition, and as secretary of state, Pompeo had the lead in setting the stage for a meeting in Singapore. The Moon-Kim meeting set up the premise of a negotiated denuclearization process. Trump and Kim will define the contours of that path forward.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Peace
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

16. The Candlelight Mandate & Moon Jae-in’s Inter-Korean Dilemma

Author:
John Delury
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The question of the proper relationship between domestic sentiment and foreign policy is a vexed one. Historically, statesmen and strategists have tended to distrust or disparage the role of the demos in the elite enterprise of foreign affairs. In the immortal words of the then vice president Richard Nixon: “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.” Yet from even the most condescending foreign policy establishment perch, it is hard to dispute the significance of securing public support for key foreign policy moves. Nixon as president was fully aware of this, carefully stage-managing his most dramatic maneuver, the visit to China in February 1972, in a way that would maximize support back home. And of course, Nixon’s loss of public trust over the Watergate scandal brought about the abrupt end of his influence on everything, including foreign affairs. Nixon’s impeachment, after years of public opposition to the war in Vietnam, strengthened the view in the United States that unsupervised elites were in fact the worst possible stewards of the instruments of national power, and that popular, democratic checks were critical ingredients in wise and prudent foreign policy. Once the public is accorded a decisive role in foreign affairs deliberation, we have to grapple with the problem of determining what “the public” thinks in the first place. Who represents “the public”? How can we assert “it” thinks one way or another? What do we mean by expressions such as “the public seems to have changed its mind”? French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, challenged the validity of statistical representations of “public opinion” based on polling data. Bourdieu argues that public opinion so constructed is an “artefact” of the pollsters, rather than a reflection of an actual thing in the world. Polling data creates a false sense of certainty about public preferences—the illusion of a static and knowable thing, “the public,” where one does not exist. Despite the epistemological limitations and political biases embedded in the art of polling, public sentiment must be brought into the equation of foreign policy analysis. Particularly in a South Korean context, given the highly participatory nature of political culture, it would be foolish to adopt an elitist premise that the public factor can be ignored. South Korean president Moon Jae-in, for one, emphasizes the critical importance of democratic legitimacy and public input in all aspects of governance, including foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Governance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

17. Doubling Down on the U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Olympics Diplomacy Did Not Breach Trust, but TrumpMoon Confidence Is in Jeopardy

Author:
Leif-Eric Easley
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The U.S.-ROK alliance faced a quickening pace of North Korean provocations in 2016-17, with Pyongyang violating UN Security Council resolutions dozens of times. Those violations included a fourth nuclear test in January 2016, fifth in September 2016, and sixth in September 2017, as well as numerous missile tests of various trajectories from different platforms. North Korea tested intermediate-range missiles overflying Japan and missiles of intercontinental range on lofted trajectories, while developing road-mobile and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles. As policymakers in Seoul and Washington coordinated responses to those provocations, changes in national leadership and domestic political preferences brought into question the bilateral trust the alliance needs to deter conflict, reassure publics, and promote regional cooperation. Elections have consequences, even before votes are cast. Enduring international security alliances are based on shared national interests and a track record of diplomatic commitments and military cooperation. For allies with highly integrated defense policies, such as the United States and South Korea, it is natural for policymakers and citizens to keenly observe the national elections of the other country. Will the next government be a reliable partner, or will it fail to honor existing agreements? Will the incoming leadership improve relations, or will it downgrade cooperation? These questions were being asked before Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in were elected. The search for answers inevitably involves speculation, feeding expectations that are often overly optimistic or pessimistic. Ahead of Trump’s election, his campaign rhetoric questioned the terms and intrinsic value of the alliance to an extent not seen since Jimmy Carter’s 1976 campaign promise to withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. President Moon came to power on the heels of conservative president Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal for corruption. Moon’s politics are notably more progressive than Park’s or Trump’s, including a record of pro-engagement policies toward North Korea. Against this backdrop, Kim Jong-un delivered his 2018 New Year’s Day address claiming that North Korea has the ability to hit any U.S. city with a nuclear-armed missile, but that Pyongyang is ready to re-engage Seoul via participation in the Winter Olympics.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Alliance, Olympics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

18. Salvaging the Sunshine Policy

Author:
David Straub
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Shortly before his election as South Korea’s president in May 2017, candidate Moon Jaein issued his most detailed North Korea policy statement. As president, he declared, he would “inherit” the engagement-based, inducements-oriented Sunshine Policy approach of Korea’s only other progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moohyun (2003-2008)1. Moon judged the North Korea policies of his immediate predecessors a failure; Presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017), both conservatives, had disagreed with key aspects of the Sunshine Policy and suspended the major inter-Korean projects undertaken by Kim and Roh. Moon’s emphasis on incentives to Pyongyang contrasted with United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted during the preceding decade; far from offering inducements, the UNSC had imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on the regime in response to its accelerating pursuit of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Moon also struck quite a different tone than the new Trump administration in Washington, which had only recently concluded a North Korea policy review and characterized its approach as one of “maximum pressure and engagement. This chapter assesses Moon’s North Korea policy, its implementation during his initial year in office, and its prospects under difficult circumstances. It begins by reviewing the Sunshine Policy concept, its practice by previous progressive governments, and the significantly different approach of South Korea’s succeeding conservative administrations. It then argues that Moon and many progressives continue to believe in the basic Sunshine Policy approach, even though, unlike when the policy was first formulated, North Korea now already has a limited nuclear weapons capability and may soon be able to credibly threaten the United States homeland with nuclear attack. It reviews how Moon, as president, has attempted to salvage the policy and how North Korea and other concerned countries have responded. The chapter concludes by considering the prospects for Moon’s North Korea policy and offering recommendations to modify it to maximize the interests of both the ROK and the international community as a whole.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Governance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

19. South Korea's Diplomatic Options Under Moon

Author:
Korea Economic Institute of America
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During his first year as president, Moon Jae-in faced a challenging strategic environment and divergent advice on how to manage it. He could cater to his progressive base and act in accord with his political lineage by renewing the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. Alternatively, he could strive for consensus at home by reconciling the differences with conservatives in foreign policy. In diplomacy with the great powers, he also had important choices to make. He could double down on the U.S. alliance or, going further, he could agree to trilateralism with Japan. Yet, he also could be tempted by the option of balancing dependence on the United States with a closer relationship with China. Impacting all of his choices was the question of how Kim Jong-un would focus in 2018, shifting from provocations aimed at military leverage to diplomacy linked to his outlook on Moon’s policies. In the following five chapters authors explore each of these options. This introduction reviews some of their findings and points to linkages among them as part of an overall assessment of how Moon has navigated among the choices he was facing. The following chapters set forth the options that Moon Jae-in has before him. Chapter 1 by David Straub seeks to grasp the appeal of a renewed Sunshine Policy to Moon, while spelling out the implications of taking that route, warning of a breach in trust with the United States if not a temporary welcome from Donald Trump eager for a Nobel Peace Prize. Leif Eric-Easley’s analysis in Chapter 2 assesses the prospects of Moon doubling down on the ROK alliance with the United States and argues that, so far, trust between allies has been sustained, including in 2018 as diplomacy intensified with summitry on the agenda. In Chapter 3 John Delury examines the domestic political environment, pointing to the impact of the Candlelight movement, which offers opportunities for Moon as well as constraints on policies he might adopt. Chung Jae Ho in Chapter 4 explores Sino-ROK relations and the prospects of Moon drawing closer to China with consequences for relations with the United States. A fifth chapter by Sheila Smith focuses on Japan-ROK relations, newly strained by different approaches to diplomacy with Kim Jong-un. Each chapter views Moon’s policies and proclivities in the context of the dynamics of bilateral ties, while following closely what has been happening to those ties during the tumultuous course of Moon’s first year in office, notably in the first third of 2018 as diplomacy intensified.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Korea

20. Advancing the U.S.-Korea Economic Agenda

Author:
Wendy Cutler and Hyemin Lee
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
For nearly 70 years, the United StatesRepublic of Korea (hereafter, Korea) alliance has remained strong, built mainly on shared strategic and national security interests. While the North Korean nuclear threat has long dominated political discussions and media headlines, today the economic pillar of the relationship is no less important. Economic engagement and cooperation have been strengthened since the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) went into effect in 2012, which in turn helped solidify the overall bilateral relationship.
Topic:
International Political Economy
Political Geography:
America and Korea

21. A View from China on Triangular Relations

Author:
Wang Dong and Sun Bingyan
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
What will it take to jump start trilateral talks among Beijing, Seoul, and Washington over the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including the denuclearization of North Korea? If this subject has been on the minds of South Koreans in 2016-17 with some approaching their counterparts in Beijing and Washington, DC in the hope that such triangular talks can be launched—the more official, the better—not many Chinese have addressed what would be necessary to enlist their country in this endeavor. This chapter argues that, at present, China is unprepared to take this route. A major factor is the sense that there are imbalances that complicate the triangle. Beyond the substance of what would be on the agenda, Chinese are concerned by South Korea’s alignment and how it would affect the course of the discussions.
Topic:
International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:
China, America, and Korea

22. A View from the United States on Sino-U.S. Relations

Author:
Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, the candidates reached a bipartisan consensus on one issue: how to deal with North Korea. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both called for China to do more to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program once and for all. Candidate Trump said that China has “absolute control” over North Korea and promised to do whatever it takes to convince Beijing to use that leverage, including imposing penalties on Chinese firms. As president, however, Trump will have to navigate the reality of China’s extreme hesitance to use the only type of pressure likely to divert North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—the threat of regime-endangering punishment. If and how China should continue to fit into U.S. strategy for dealing with North Korea will thus be a key issue facing Trump and his advisors
Topic:
International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Korea

23. A View from the United States on ROK-U.S. Relations

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
For the proverbial visitor from Mars, the political situation in Northeast Asia is inexplicable. Sitting amidst a group of relatively stable, wealthy, and powerful countries, is a small, poor, belligerent nation that all agree is a threat to regional stability. Furthermore, the rogue state has been sanctioned and its behavior condemned by the United Nations for its weapons programs and its human rights abuses. Why can the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, the United States, Russia, and China not combine their considerable leverage to do something about North Korea?
Topic:
International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Korea

24. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-Japanese Relations

Author:
Yinan He
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Sino-Japanese relations have been in another volatility cycle since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes flared up again in summer 2012. The downward trend seems to have bottomed out in November 2014 when the two leaders Xi Jinping and Abe Shinzo finally held their first meeting since entering office. However, the anticipated recovery has proved tenuous; the momentum toward further improvement has halted since early 2016 when confrontation escalated in both the South China Sea and East China Sea. While acknowledging the role of realist power shift and geostrategic rivalry in causing Sino-Japanese tension, this paper argues that a widening gap between their national identities is also highly relevant. The current Xi government has promoted a national reinvigoration campaign emphasizing Chinese history and culture, the socialist model, and defense of core interests, which runs counter to that of Abe’s Japan, a democratic and historically revisionist country. This national identity conflict has exacerbated mutual distrust, denied chances of reassurance, and generated domestic popular objections to diplomatic compromise between the two countries.
Topic:
International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Korea

25. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-South Korean Relations

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How do Chinese national identity narratives affect Sino-South Korean relations? The Koguryo history war more than a decade ago was a turning point in bilateral relations since diplomatic normalization in 1992, generating enduring competition over representations of history. In 2010, China’s commemoration of its entry into the Korean War raised early warnings in South Korea over Beijing’s hostile foreign policy orientation under Xi Jinping. Contrary to such expectations, however, the earliest summit agreements between presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye after both took office in 2013 were on history cooperation as common victims of Japanese colonialism. Most notably in 2015, Park’s participation in Beijing’s 70th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II consolidated joint claims of what was called the best period in bilateral relations. This chapter assesses the impact of Chinese national identity on China-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations under the Xi and Park administrations since 2013. It examines Chinese constructions of national identity and their implications for the security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Sino-South Korean relationship. Rather than promoting partnership, competing identities across these dimensions reinforce enduring differences over the region’s political, economic, and cultural order. These differences surfaced most saliently in 2016, following an initial period of engagement that corresponds with the downward trend in China-Japan relations since 2012. Managing them requires the very trust-building that both Beijing and Seoul have prioritized since 2013.
Topic:
International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Korea

26. U.S-Rok economic relations left uncertain amid leadership changes

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
While the other parts of this book bring China fully into the coverage—diplomacy, national identities, and sanctions—here we narrow the focus on U.S.-ROK relations with an eye to the current uncertainty about the future of the KORUS FTA, the five-year old bilateral trade agreement. Donald Trump has assumed the presidency critical of trade imbalances in goods, including assertions about the negative impact of the FTA with South Korea. It appears that the U.S. side will insist on renegotiating the agreement. In order to assess what this could mean, we take a close look at what the impact of KORUS has been and at how the debate in Washington has been unfolding under Trump’s watch. The three chapters were written in the early spring of 2017; so they could capture only the initial impact of Trump at a time when South Korean leadership was paralyzed between impeachment and the election of a new president without any serious bilateral engagement over economic issues. Yet, as tensions over economics are expected to rise, our objective is to inform the discussion with relevant economic background and with awareness of what Trump has been saying and how it may shape the political debate.
Topic:
International Cooperation and International Affairs
Political Geography:
America and Korea

27. What Lies Ahead? Korea's Long- and Short-Term Challenges

Author:
Edda Zoli
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
For decades Korea has had a remarkable track record of economic performance. But growth has now declined, and Korea may find it difficult to move quickly to the OECD income frontier. Moreover, Korea faces serious structural challenges, many of which will imply a further decline in potential growth. These include demographic shifts, export dependence, structural weakness and corporate vulnerabilities, and the labor market. With the economy facing major structural headwinds, a comprehensive set of measures are needed in a number of areas, including corporate restructuring, labor market reform, and productivity enhancement.
Topic:
Demographics, Labor Issues, Economy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
South Korea and Korea

28. Corporate Debt Market in Korea

Author:
Paul Moon Sub Choi
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This report conducts an analysis of the corporate bond market in Korea and the changes in interest rates and term structure since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The potential risks and solutions for stabilizing the corporate debt market are discussed. Corporate bonds not only play an important role in financing long-term corporate investments but also have a positive and persistent influence on enhancing the capital markets. Thus, the authorities in Korea have attempted to increase the proportion of corporate bonds, which is a means of direct financing, rather than bank loans. Implementing specific plans to stabilize the corporate debt market that are mentioned in this report are critical to sustaining the Korean capital markets as a means towards continued economic growth and prosperity.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Financial Crisis, Economy, and Investment
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Korea

29. Progress and Implications of the China-Korea FTA

Author:
Li Si-qi, Tu Xin-quan, and Liu Bin
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The article focuses on the China-Korea FTA, analyzing the background of China-Korea bilateral economic relations, the characteristics of the China-Korea FTA and more importantly, the implications and future prospect of this free trade pact. So far, the China-Korea FTA is considered to be the most comprehensive compared with China's previous FTAs and may be the largest in trade terms among all the FTAs concluded by Korea and China, playing a positive role in advancing economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. However, with lots of exceptions to tariff elimination and market access, as well as a 20-year transition period, the present version of the China-Korea FTA is far from the best in terms of the depth of liberalization and the scope of obligations on trade and investment rules. The recent bilateral diplomatic tensions due to the decision of deploying the THAAD missile system by the Korean government may also jeopardize bilateral economic ties between China and Korea, and further increase uncertainties of the China-Korea FTA. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese and Korean governments will handle this issue smoothly under the present sensitive political atmosphere and achieve substantial progress in follow-up FTA negotiations on services and investment.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

30. Korea's Economic Relations with Japan

Author:
Kim Gyu-Pan
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Korea's economic relations with Japan, which were re-established as a result of the diplomatic normalization between the two countries in 1965, have transformed from dependent to interdependent. The extraordinary economic growth that Korea accomplished during the post-war period was largely due to intermediate goods imported from Japan, and technical cooperation and joint ventures with Japanese enterprises. However, in the 21st century, the dependence of Korean firms on Japanese technology has somewhat declined as global enterprises have appeared in Korea. In contrast to the post-war economic boom, Japanese companies now prefer to cooperate with their Korean counterparts, resulting in joint business ventures between Korean and Japanese firms being continuously developed. This reversal in the economic ties between Korea and Japan can be attributed to several reasons including: the rise of China; Japan's two lost decades; and Korea's push for domestic structural reform as well as economic globalization after the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. Nonetheless, the issue of Korea's trade imbalance with Japan, which was established during the post-war period, still remains thereby serving as a serious impediment to FTA negotiations between Korea and Japan as well as Korea's TPP negotiations.
Topic:
Economics, History, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

31. Korea-Mongolia Economic Relations: Current Status and Cooperation Measures

Author:
Lee Jae Young
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990, Korea and Mongolia have broadened cooperation in various areas such as politics, economy, society, and culture given their geographical proximity and cultural similarities. However, the progress of economic cooperation which has been identified as one of the pillars of Korea-Mongolia cooperation is still weak in comparison with other areas. Thus, it is important to analyze achievements and limitations of economic cooperation with Mongolia, which has emerged as a burgeoning new market of Eurasia, and find new measures to elevate their economic relations to a new high moving forward. In this context, the main objective of this research lies in looking back upon the past 26 years and developing a new strategy on economic cooperation measures. Korea needs to formulate a new strategy that provides a coherent, systematic framework for cooperation with Mongolia and implement it consistently. Holding bilateral summit meetings and Korea-Mongolian forums on a regular basis, strengthening high-level networking, and concluding free trade and visa exemption agreements are necessary.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Mongolia, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

32. Strategies for Development of Transport Infrastructure in North Korea for Unification and Beyond

Author:
Kwon Young-in, Na Hee Seung, and Kim Kyoung-Sik
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
It has been reported that passenger transport and logistics between regions in North Korea are very difficult due to deterioration and imperfect maintenance of transport infrastructure and limited investment in the facilities for several decades. If South Korea and North Korea are unified, massive investment in the development of transport infrastructure is inevitable. This investment would mainly be supported by South Korea as well as through cooperation with Multilateral Development Banks such as the World Bank Group (WBG), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In addition, special and efficient plans for transporting people and goods need to be established in case of reunification considering the current transport environment in North Korea. Thus, well-prepared strategies should be in place for short, mid, and long-term perspectives.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Banks, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

33. Present Conditions of North Korean Industry and Possible Reconstruction Plans

Author:
Lim Soo-ho and Hong Seok-ki
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the collapse of industry during the 'Arduous March' (1995-1997), Pyongyang has continuously launched reconstruction plans but has failed to see a rebound. The key is to restore industrial linkages; however, the DPRK allocated a majority of state investment to the defense industry under the 'Military First Economic Policy.' As long as the 'strategic sector' retains priority, a sound outcome seems to be out of reach. In reality, North Korea's comparative advantage lies on labor-intensive business, with abundant labor forces at a low cost. After unification, such industries will have bright prospects with technology and capital not only from South Korea, but also from China and Japan. The economic integration scenario of the two Koreas -- whether radical or gradual -- will decide industrial policies for the upper half of the peninsula in the post-unification era.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, History, Reconstruction, and Industry
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

34. History, International Relations, and Public Health - The Case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1953-2015

Author:
John Grundy
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The historical legacy of North Korea is characterized by occupation and conflict, and economic rehabilitation and then collapse, with tragic and widespread consequences for population health. From the standpoint of the historical determinants of health, this paper reviews the health system in North Korea between 1953 and 2016. Ideology and political relations have been dominant forces in determining the evolution of the health care system and population health. Despite the development of an extensive primary health care system in the country from the early 1960s following the establishment of the DPRK state in 1948, the public health system experienced a major decline in the 1990s, with catastrophic implications for the health and survival of the population. In recent years, evidence has emerged of some important public health gains, particularly through immunization, women's and children's health, and communicable disease control initiatives. This experience demonstrates that, within the overall policy context dominated by the historical and political determinants of health, there remains the capacity for implementation of public health programs that can yield both tangible health benefits for the population in North Korea, as well as assist the health system to edge closer to a regional standard.
Topic:
International Relations, History, Ideology, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea