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Begin New Search Political Geography United Kingdom Content Type Policy Brief

1. Facing Pressure: Iran executes former Defence Minister

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iran executed on January 14, 2022, a British-Iranian national who once served as its deputy defence minister, defying calls from London and Washington for his release. Alireza Akbari was arrested in 2019 and accused of spying for Britain. He served as a defence minister between 2000 and 2005 under former President Mohammad Khatami, and he fought during the Iraq-Iran war. He also served in other high-ranking positions in the navy and the ministry of defence’s research centre, and was appointed as the general secretariat of the national security council.
Topic:
Security, Elites, and Capital Punishment
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Iran, and Middle East

2. Building a Mature UK Trade Policy

Author:
David Henig
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Global Britain has not delivered according to the hopes expressed by supporters of leaving the EU. Trade with the rest of the world has not grown to make up for leaving a bloc with seamless trade, early Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand are of minor economic significance, and it is hard to discern much of a strategy beyond completing a few more similar deals. Meanwhile the world of trade policy is transformed since 2016, negatively. The US has essentially declared its national interests to be more important than global rules, while the EU wants to act unilaterally as the global regulator. In both, the climate crisis is being used as an excuse to reintroduce protectionist measures threatening economic damage and global stability. Expectations of what a UK outside of the EU could achieve were exaggerated, but nonetheless the country could be doing a lot better in its trade policy. There is no good reason for such tensions as exist with a broad range of frustrated stakeholders, the absence of clear purpose on UK strengths such as services, or the defensiveness that seemingly takes pride in secrecy and resistance to proper scrutiny. Adjustment time was inevitable, but six years should have been enough.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

3. British Nuclear Policy

Author:
Peter Watkins
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia

4. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation

Author:
Alice Billon-Galland and Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Franco-British Summit on March 10th, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation Download 1.38 Mo Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables. As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation. Lessons needs to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects. The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe. This Briefing is part of a joint Chatham House-IFRI research project, the "Cross-Channel Strategic Dialogue", investigating prospects for UK-France defence and security cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and High Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, and France

5. Assessing the Risk of Foreign Influence in UK Search Results

Author:
Bret Schafer and Peter Benzoni
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the de facto gateway to the vast troves of information available online, search services play a critical role in the modern information ecosystem. They are often the starting points for people’s questions about the world around them, from the innocuous to the deeply consequential. The results generated by search algorithms can therefore influence everything from consumer behavior to people’s political and social preferences, often in ways that are imperceptible to users of those systems. Given this significant power, search services are also targets of those who seek to manipulate information to advance a particular, and at times malign, agenda. This includes those working for or on behalf of autocratic foreign governments, who can attempt to leverage search results to whitewash human rights abuses, attack opponents, or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The threat is particularly acute with well-resourced states that operate global state-backed media outlets, troll farms, and other state-aligned information outlets that allow them to exploit search services through strategic content production, search engine optimization, or intentional manipulation. DOWNLOAD PDF To evaluate this potential risk, we analyzed data over a 30-day period across six search products on four search services (Google Search, Google News, Microsoft Bing, Bing News, Yandex Search, and Baidu Search) to assess the prominence of foreign state-linked websites, or those that reproduce content from those websites, in search returns for queries related to topics of national importance to the United Kingdom. Importantly, we could not assess, nor was it our intention to assess, whether the prominence of any state-linked sources in search results was the result of deliberate manipulation by those states or merely the product of search algorithms determining that the content produced by those sites was relevant to a given query. We also did not assess the relative quality of any individual state media outlets. We recognize that state-backed information sources exist on a broad spectrum in terms of their authoritativeness and journalistic standards, and that a connection to a foreign state is not necessarily problematic and should not be viewed by search services as an inherent risk. In short, our efforts to understand the prominence of state-linked sources in search results should not be viewed as an attempt to document wrongdoing, either by the sources themselves or by the search services that surfaced those sources. In addition, although we attempted to select topics that were important to UK interests instead of those that favored the interests of any one foreign government, some of the chosen queries—notably those related to the war against Ukraine—were more likely to be the focus of messaging from certain countries. Results from this study should therefore not be used as comparative data points to suggest that any one state is more influential in UK search results than any other. Instead, the goal of this research was simply to gain a better understanding of how and how often content from websites with direct or indirect links to foreign states—primarily state-backed media outlets but also websites directly or indirectly linked to foreign governments or foreign intelligence services—surfaced in search results in the four constituent countries of the UK. Though we offer several illustrative examples highlighting specific vulnerabilities uncovered by our research, the bulk of this report is focused on assessing a potential risk of foreign interference by identifying the types of variables—from the topic searched for to the language used—that regularly generated search results from state-linked websites, without assessing whether the content of those search results is potentially illegal under the UK’s newly created Foreign Interference Offense included in the National Security Act 2023. We did, however, pay particular attention to the presence of content produced by media outlets currently sanctioned by the UK government, namely Russian state media outlets that were sanctioned after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

6. A Reliable Global Cyber Power: Cyberspace and Germany’s National Security Strategy

Author:
Valentin Weber
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Germany’s major allies have declared their roles in shaping cyberspace. The United States sees itself as a democratic, values-driven cyber power ready to impose substantial costs on adversaries engaged in nefarious conduct. The United Kingdom strives to be a responsible cyber power that eschews reckless behavior. France aims to operate as a stabilizing power that counters a destructive Russia and other malicious actors. But what kind of cyber power is Germany to be? As it draws up its first national security strategy, the country can rectify its lack of vision and narrative for its domestic and international cyberspace efforts. This policy brief proposes that Germany espouse a sober focus on reliability that links its cyberspace strategy to those of its allies, thereby providing a vital anchor for Western cybersecurity. To do this, Germany should:
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Stability, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

7. Germany and the UK: Perspectives for Deepening the Bilateral Dialogue on Development Policy

Author:
Niels Keijzer and Ina Friesen
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are the second- and fourth-largest providers of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and are key actors in driving international policy discussions on global development in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G7, the G20 and other key groupings and platforms. The development policies of both countries witnessed important convergence and detailed cooperation during the first decade of this millennium – a period when Western countries understood development cooperation as a source of considerable soft power, which was demonstrated in rising budgets and like-minded policy directions. The austerity policies that followed the global economic and financial crisis, and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, have challenged the bilateral relationship in the development policy area between Germany and the UK. The UK’s departure from the EU has reduced the number of joint interactions and corresponding opportunities for identifying cooperation initiatives. Halfway through the period envisaged for the completion of the 2030 Agenda, both countries are adjusting their development policies, seeking to determine their future European roles and global development ambitions, but they remain key partners in global development. Both the UK and Germany have recently revised or are in the process of preparing development policy strategies as part of their integrated foreign policies – a reflection process which in recent months has been challenged to adjust to the implications of the war in Ukraine. The case remains strong for regular exchanges and cooperation on development policy between both countries, including by intensifying dialogues and resuming formal secondments between the FCDO and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Two areas in particular offer good prospects. First of all, the UK and Germany should closely work together to deliver on the current G7 Presidency agenda – including the key focus on infrastructure investment, as initiated during last year’s UK Presidency. Other key opportunities for cooperation include gender and climate action, as well as the provision of global public goods. Secondly, Germany and the UK should seek to engage in and harness the role of the OECD as a provider of key standards for international development policy and as an important forum for peer learning. As key providers of global development finance, the legitimacy of its reporting system is essential to both countries’ influence and contribution to global development.
Topic:
Development, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Development Assistance, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

8. France and AUKUS: Bouncing Back to Live Up to Pacific Challenges

Author:
Jérémy Bachelier and Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Back in September 2021, the announcement of AUKUS – the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) was a shock to Paris. Not only it meant the brutal conclusion of a submarine deal signed in 2016, but it also provoked a major breach of confidence in France’s relations with its three key partners – shedding crude light on the divergences of approaches regarding the best way to salvage the rules-based order and address the China challenge. This initiative, intended to be a coordinated response to the Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific, called into question France’s strategic positioning in the region. One year after, however, AUKUS does not seem to have marked a major turning point regarding the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Pacific. After an immediate aftershock, France's bilateral relations with Washington, Canberra and to an extent London gradually recovered. Political and strategic discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, the recent visits of the Australian Prime minister and minister of Defense in France and numerous bilateral calls at the end of Summer between French and Australian political and military leaders have pointed to a positive dynamic for an improved strategic cooperation in the region. Rather than prompting a radical change in the France's Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS highlighted a fault line between the strategic/political rhetoric level and the operational level of defense cooperation regarding the French engagement in this region. The multiple maritime security and climate change challenges in the Pacific Islands region require France to cooperate closely with its regional partners, starting with Australia, and continue to promote effective multilateralism. In addition, the growing risks of high-intensity conflicts in the vicinity of the Pacific Islands region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and/or in the South China Sea, require for France to speed up the strengthening of its interoperability with its regional allies in the coming years and probably to decide on the role it would like to - and be able to - concretely support its own interest and allies.
Topic:
Security, Maritime, AUKUS, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, France, Australia, United States of America, Pacific Ocean, and Pacific Islands

9. Estimating the UK's Return on Investment from an Ambitious Program to Incentivize New Antibiotics

Author:
Rachel Silverman and Adrian Towse
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Anti-microbial drugs form the backbone of modern medicine. Yet their lifespan is naturally limited; over time, use of these drugs selects for mutations that survive exposure those same drugs, driving “anti-microbial resistance,” or AMR. Already, drug-resistant infections kill an estimated 7,600 citizens of the United Kingdom (UK) every year. In the absence of sufficient research and development (R&D) investment for new antimicrobials, deaths from drug-resistant infections could increase dramatically in the coming decade. To address this growing crisis and solve market failures that prevent the development of new antibiotics, the UK has set up “subscription models” for purchasing antibiotics; this has been applied to two drugs thus far, and the model is under consideration for a broader rollout. In this note, we present the results of a modelling exercise to estimate the likely return on investment (ROI) from an expanded program to incentivize new antibiotics, assuming it is paired with complementary and proportionate efforts from the UK’s G7 partners. The results are necessarily imprecise due to several uncertain parameters, but nevertheless provide evidence of a very high expected ROI that is robust to different inputs and assumptions.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, and Medicine
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

10. The Case for Cooperation: The Future of the U.S.-UK Intelligence Alliance

Author:
Jake Harrington and Riley McCabe
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past 75 years, the United States and the United Kingdom have built the deepest intelligence alliance in the world. Despite decades of cooperation, however, there exists today a significant misalignment between the strategic prioritization of this “special relationship” and the regulations, policies, organizational cultures, and technologies that facilitate its day-to-day activities. This report’s recommendations are designed to encourage the adoption of policies, procedures, and tools that will enable the United States and the United Kingdom to achieve the deep level of collaboration they have repeatedly committed to in bilateral agreements, national security strategies, and intelligence guidance. If allies and partners are an indispensable pillar of both nations’ strategies to challenge rising and revanchist authoritarianism and other threats, then the U.S. and UK intelligence communities should jointly pursue robust interoperability that appropriately balances risk with opportunity.
Topic:
Intelligence, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, North America, and United States of America