Author: / Content Type: Policy Brief / Political Geography: Iran

1. Iran’s New Budget Perpetuates Economic Challenges

Author:: Henry Rome
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The president is proposing de facto cuts to salaries and subsidies as well as more money for the military, while avoiding the tough reforms Iran’s economy needs. On January 11, President Ebrahim Raisi submitted his budget proposal to the Majlis for the Iranian year 2023/24. Drafted amid the most severe protests the Islamic Republic has faced since its establishment in 1979, the proposal includes no economic olive branches to the people and avoids structural reforms that could help rein in inflation and fuel growth.
Topic:: Economics, Reform, Budget, Democracy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

2. Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for atrocity crimes

Author:: Celeste Kmiotek, Alana Mitias, and Nushin Sarkarati
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: With little to no prospect for accountability within Iran’s domestic courts, victims and survivors of serious violations of international law are turning toward an increasing number of foreign jurisdictions—most commonly in Europe and North America, but also in Latin America, Africa, and other regions—to pursue justice for human rights violations carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, certain domestic justice systems allow prosecutions in national courts for crimes committed abroad, regardless of the victim’s or perpetrator’s nationality. Universal jurisdiction stems from the concept that certain crimes are of such gravity that they harm the international community as a whole, so national courts outside the country where the violations took place may prosecute them to protect the international order. Although the crimes subject to universal jurisdiction provisions differ by state, they generally include crimes against humanity, torture, war crimes, and genocide. Limitations on universal jurisdiction also vary between states, however, as do the processes for filing complaints and procedures for investigations, trials, and appeals. As was shown by the trial and conviction of Hamid Noury in Sweden for his involvement in the massacre of Iranian political prisoners in 1988, national prosecutions of international crimes can be a fruitful avenue to justice for victims of the Islamic Republic. To this end, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project has compiled a guide to aid practitioners and independent investigators in navigating the legal systems of European states with the highest likelihood of prosecuting Iranian human rights violators. Focusing on five states—France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—this manual outlines the crimes and violations subject to universal jurisdiction, best practices for investigating and documenting crimes, and processes for requesting investigations and participating in prosecutions as a victim, witness, or NGO. For information that is beyond the scope of this manual, the annex includes printed resources to consult and organizations to contact for additional assistance.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Human Rights, Politics, Rule of Law, Accountability, Norms, Atrocities, Resilience, and Society
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

3. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. A Bid to Contain Pressure: What are the motives behind Iranian President's East Africa tour?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi went on a trip to Africa from July 11 to 13, 2023, during which he visited Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on invitations from the leaders of the three countries, President William Ruto, Yoweri Museveni and President Emmerson Mnangagwa, respectively. Raisi led a high-level delegation including First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Health Minister Behrouz Aghaei, and Minister of Agriculture Seyyed Javad Sadati Nejad, and several other high-ranking officials and businessmen.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Uganda, Kenya, Iran, Middle East, Zimbabwe, and East Africa

5. The Israeli ThreatL What is driving the renewed escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Ministry of Interior, Security Agency, and Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan announced in a joint statement on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, that nine individuals were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government by force, assassinate prominent figures and senior Azerbaijani officials. The statement indicated that they had connections to Iranian intelligence agencies, and that the cell was composed of a person named Ruhollah Akhoundzadeh and his son Mursal, along with seven others working under his supervision. On his part, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, rejected the accusations in a statement on May 18, denying any official or unofficial relationship between these individuals and Iran. He affirmed that imprisoning individuals on the pretext of their connection to Iran is unacceptable.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

6. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

7. Second Meeting in Beijing: China-Facilitated Iran-Saudi diplomatic reconciliation efforts amid US apprehensions

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On April 6, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his Saudi Arabian counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, signed a joint statement in Beijing announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which follows a tripartite agreement signed under China's auspices on March 10.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Reconciliation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

8. Nuclear Threshold: Implications of Iran’s enriching uranium to 84% purity

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Bloomberg News, citing two unidentified senior diplomats, on February 19, reported that international atomic monitors, a week earlier, detected that Iran has enriched uranium to 84% purity, just below nuclear weapons-grade, a proof that Iran’s nuclear activities do pose a threat. A purity of 90% is needed to produce nuclear weapons.
Topic:: JCPOA, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

9. Facing Pressure: Iran executes former Defence Minister

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iran executed on January 14, 2022, a British-Iranian national who once served as its deputy defence minister, defying calls from London and Washington for his release. Alireza Akbari was arrested in 2019 and accused of spying for Britain. He served as a defence minister between 2000 and 2005 under former President Mohammad Khatami, and he fought during the Iraq-Iran war. He also served in other high-ranking positions in the navy and the ministry of defence’s research centre, and was appointed as the general secretariat of the national security council.
Topic:: Security, Elites, and Capital Punishment
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Iran, and Middle East

10. Encircling Damascus: Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

11. Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran

Author:: Mona Saif
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate (in part) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due to the growth of its relation with the Houthi.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Houthis, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Yemen

12. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:: Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

13. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:: Nate Sibley
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

14. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

15. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:: Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

16. An Heir and a Spare? How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah” Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Since October 27, the Houthis have launched three medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, a first since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles into the country in 1991. The Yemen-based jihadists have also launched at least eight salvos of cruise missiles and long-range explosive drones focused on the southern port of Eilat. Moreover, they have attacked U.S. assets directly during the Hamas-Israel war, shooting down one MQ-9 Reaper drone and routing numerous missiles near Navy vessels. If Iran continues to develop the group’s capabilities, the Houthis may provide the broader “axis of resistance” with a potent new chess piece. In this timely Policy Note, Michael Knights assesses the rising Houthi threat and explains how the United States and its allies can respond more assertively and effectively. A revamped policy would recognize the intimate alliance between the Houthis and Iran—which has never been a “marriage of convenience,” as some analysts have imagined—and seek to counter the group’s aggression with the goal of securing U.S. interests and providing a better future for the Yemeni people.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Deterrence, and Houthis
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

17. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses

Author:: Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

18. The Regent of Allah: Ali Khamenei's Political Evolution in Iran

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: During his lengthy tenure as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei has shown a knack for consolidating power by creating layers of bureaucracy in military, economic, and religious affairs. In turn, he has liberally purged officials who have hinted at disloyalty to him, the Islamic Republic, or its governing doctrine, velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent). But Khamenei does not lack for personal complexity. As a younger man, he dressed casually, flaunted his love of literature, and composed poetry. And as a leader, he has often demonstrated flexibility—coined as “heroic flexibility” in the case of the 2015 nuclear deal—at times of national risk or strained social cohesion. He has likewise blessed the rise of relatively moderate presidents such as Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani when he thought their leadership would reinforce national stability. In this wide-ranging study, former Qom theologian Mehdi Khalaji details Khamenei’s political ascent, from his role as an influential cleric in Mashhad to his presidency under Ruhollah Khomeini and his surprising appointment as Supreme Leader. Whoever succeeds him, the author makes plain, will inherit an infrastructure designed to preserve Iran’s authoritarian system and suppress rumblings of internal dissent.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Islam, and Ali Khamenei
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

19. Arming the Revolution: Trends in Iranian Defense Spending, 2013–23

Author:: Henry Rome
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The Islamic Republic boasts a large and expanding nuclear program, the most capable missile and drone force in the Middle East, and a broad network of proxies that threaten U.S. interests. Nevertheless, scholars have devoted little attention to a key area: Iran’s defense spending. Although the data is publicly available, tabulating it is more difficult than one might assume, and three particular hazards await: (1) conversion of Iranian rials to dollars at unrealistic rates, (2) reliance on spending plans as opposed to actual spending, and (3) undercounting. Thus, any attempt to understand Iran’s military spending must scrupulously avoid such traps. In this Policy Note, Iran expert Henry Rome offers the most detailed public accounting yet of Tehran’s recent defense spending, illustrated by charts showing domestic trends and comparisons with regional rivals. The findings show how spending surged following the 2015 nuclear deal and plummeted following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018. They also suggest that a new nuclear accord with Washington will likely prompt another increase, demanding a broader strategy to counter Iran’s military ambitions alongside its nuclear ones.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Economy, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

20. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?

Author:: Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

21. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:: Michael Singh
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

22. Striking Back: Iran and the Rise of Asymmetric Drone Warfare in the Middle East

Author:: Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Iranian drone strikes, as exemplified by the September 2019 attack against Saudi Aramco facilities, have jolted Middle East leaders and revealed Tehran’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The regime’s large and growing drone force, which can be used for reconnaissance or strike missions, now poses an existential threat to the Gulf states and a direct threat to Israel, as does its formidable missile force. Moreover, Iranian drones transferred to Russia have had a significant impact on Moscow’s war against Ukraine. In the bigger picture, advances in drone technology have produced an inflection point in aerial warfare—comparable to the introduction of manned flight more than a century ago—that has ended the guarantee of U.S. air superiority over its forces and bases. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. explores the contours and consequences of Iran’s drone activities in this timely Policy Note. To counter the Islamic Republic, the former CENTCOM commander recommends an approach centered on clearer U.S. communication about its goals for the region, tighter collaboration with partners and allies, and enhanced efforts to counter Iran’s drone fleet, along with its ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Drones, Military, and Asymmetric Warfare
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

23. Components of Industry Resilience to Maintain Sustainable Economic Growth under COVID-19 Within the Knowledge-Based Economy Frame-work: A Comparative Study Between Iran and South Korea

Author:: Marzieh Asaadi
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: COVID-19 was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and spread rapidly across the globe. Then on March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, causing more than 600 million confirmed cases and 6.49 million deaths around the world so far. The effects of the pandemic on societies can be examined mainly by two criteria: 1) the number of lives lost due to the disease (Mortality Rate), and 2) the number of jobs lost due to social distancing rules (fall in GDP). Both have a wide consequence for economic growth and other key macroeconomic indicators. An important explanatory factor for the significant difference between Case Fatality Rate (CFR) for Iran and Korea can be related to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) components (Daliri and Asaadi 2021). The WGI is a composite index consisting of six measurement factors, including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption. Furthermore, another critical factor is COVID-19 governance which can be monitored by calculating Government Stringency Index. This index is a composite measure based on several indicators which monitor the state of lockdowns and social distancing and range to values between 0-100, while 100 presents the most restrictive. In addition to the governance of COVID-19, from the perspective of public health and lives saved, maintaining jobs and supporting the resilience of industries to achieve SEG has been another important concern for nations and governments worldwide. As stated by Bernanke (2020), it is widely believed that the global economic crisis caused by COVID-19 is different from past crises in terms of cause, scope, and severity that suddenly disrupted economic activity. These necessitate research on the potential determination factors influencing the response of countries, companies, and individuals to the COVID-19 crisis. The key to ensure Business Continuity and SEG is to identify factors that increase the resilience of businesses under COVID-19 circumstances and other potential public health crises. Theoretical and empirical studies confirm that three main explanatory factors are at play: 1) macroeconomic structure and governance, 2) financial resilience of companies which is traced by available capital (i.e., the physical and human capital), and firms' adopted strategies and 3) digital evolution state and momentum and the adaptation of countries to technological innovations and Digital Intelligence, which is an indicator of transmission to KBE. By examining these components, it is possible to evaluate the structure and response of countries to the pandemic and post-COVID era. Thus, the report seeks to contribute to the literature on sustainable economic growth under crisis through a comparative study of Iranian industries with South Korea. The main research question here relates to the components of successful covid-19 governance from the perspective of SEG and business continuity within a KBE environment.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Industry, Resilience, COVID-19, and Knowledge Economy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Asia, and South Korea

24. Korea's Economic Presence in Iran under Trump and Its Prospects during the Biden Presidency

Author:: Shirzad Azad
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: On July 14, 2015, when Iran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany) ultimately agreed over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Republic of Korea (ROK) was practically one of the top three trade partners of the Persian Gulf country. In early May 2016 and only a few months after the nuclear deal was carried through, the then Korean President, Park Geun-hye, made an official visit to Iran where the two countries vowed to ratchet up their economic relations from roughly $6 billion to more than $18 billion in the years to come. Accompanied by “the largest business delegation in the history of Korean presidential trips,” Park’s high-profile trip to Iran persuaded many interested experts and observers to believe that the East Asian country was really determined to shore up its economic weight in Iran by drawing certain policies relevant to the long-term presence of Korean businesses in the Middle Eastern country (Choi 2016). Despite all those upbeat expectations about the ROK’s future economic and technological role in Iran, however, various data and statistics coming out indicate that over the past several years nearly all well-known Korean brands and products have increasingly lost their market share in the Mideast country to brands and goods supplied by other competitors. As a matter of fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the East Asian nation emerged as one of the Persian Gulf country’s top trading partners in the world, outstripping a number of Tehran’s traditional trading partners from the West. And while Korea managed to even expand its economic presence in Iran in the heydays of sundry international sanctions levied against the Middle Eastern country over its contentious nuclear program a couple of years before the JCPOA was eventually agreed in 2015, the ROK has been doing relatively poor in Iran during the past years (Azad 2018). Such lackadaisical performance, epitomized by abandoning the long-established pattern of significant trade in energy with Iran, has critically influenced a sharp decline in the total volume of two-way commerce between the two countries. While the plummeting share of Korean brands and goods in Iranian markets had indubitably something to do with certain policies pursued by the Moon Jae-in-led Korean government, however, the main culprit turned out to be the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018. The crippling sanctions which Washington under Trump subsequently imposed on Iran played a pivotal role in reshaping the scope and size of Korean commercial connections to the Persian Gulf country, though some unprecedented diplomatic and political troubles involving Seoul and Tehran during the past years have also had a lot to do with those punitive economic and financial measures targeting the Iranians. How did then the Koreans respond to those unique circumstances rendered largely by Trump’s approach toward the Persian Gulf country? What are going to be the prospects of a Biden administration’s policy shift for Korea’s economic performance in Iran? This study seeks to shed some light on Trump’s Iran policy with regard to Korea, its repercussions for the East Asian nation’s economic relationship with the Middle Eastern country, and potential solutions to chip away at those impediments under a Democrat administration in Washington led by Joe Biden.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Donald Trump, JCPOA, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Iran, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

25. Afghanistan: Where US-Iranian interests may yet intersect

Author:: Borzou Daragahi
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: A new issue brief, Afghanistan: Where US-Iranian Interests May Yet Intersect, authored by Atlantic Council senior fellow Borzou Daragahi delves into the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and how the swift collapse of the US-backed government in Kabul last summer not only shocked the United States and its allies in the 20-year struggle in that country, but also Afghanistan’s influential neighbor, Iran. As refugees continue to stream into Iran, the government in Tehran has still not recognized the Taliban regime and remains worried about a further deterioration in Afghanistan’s economy and social cohesion, as well as the growing presence of Sunni Jihadi militants. As Iran-Afghan relations evolve, will US concerns about Afghanistan’s fragile state provide a basis for tacit cooperation between Washington and Tehran, similar to what existed when the Taliban was last in power?
Topic:: Government, Taliban, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and United States of America

26. How Iran’s Protests Differ from Past Movements

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The unrest has shown that many young people are not only rejecting the regime, but also steering away from long-time actors such as the clergy, reformers, and dissident politicians inside and outside the country. Since erupting on September 16, Iran’s latest wave of street protests has begun to pose a serious security and political challenge to the Islamic Republic, placing regime leaders in a uniquely puzzling situation. Interestingly, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has not commented on the turmoil, which was ignited by the torture and death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, at the hands of the regime’s morality police (Gasht-e Ershad, or Guidance Patrol), reportedly for disrespecting regulations on wearing a hijab. Yet he and his circle are no doubt concerned about the movement’s novel aspects. Anti-regime protests are nothing new in the Islamic Republic. The largest one was sparked by massive fraud in the 2009 presidential election, bringing millions of people to the street until authorities cracked down on the movement’s leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi (Mousavi is still under house arrest to this day). The most recent round of widespread protests took place in 2019, after the government’s sudden decision to raise gasoline prices. At the time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and police forces killed more than 1,500 people, a shocking record even by the regime’s brutal standards.
Topic:: Social Movement, Reform, Democracy, and Protests
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

27. Scoring Iraq’s New Government: Metrics for Preserving U.S. Interests

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The protracted post-election process has been a step backward for Iraqi democracy, so Washington will need to closely monitor the new leadership’s actions and hold Baghdad to measurable benchmarks. Iraq’s stalled government formation process finally lurched forward on October 17, with new president Abdul Latif Rashid taking office more than a year after the 2021 election. Incoming prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will now try to ratify his cabinet during a parliamentary session on October 22. If he succeeds as expected, Baghdad will finally close perhaps its most troubled electoral cycle yet—a chapter in which a clear popular vote nearly failed to produce a peaceful transition of power, and the losing factions spurred the biggest winner to abandon parliament through corrupt judicial rulings. Under these sad circumstances, the U.S. government and its partners need to quietly but insistently push for early, inclusive elections to restore legitimacy to the democratic process. Simultaneously, all of Iraq’s friends must watch the new government like a hawk to ensure that militias and corrupt politicians do not attempt to purge technocrats, conduct witch hunts against Western-leaning officials, cover up past graft, or initiate a new wave of “asset-stripping” via state institutions. After many false alarms, the survival of Iraq’s close relationship with the West is truly at stake right now, and only firm expectation-setting can ensure that the partnership continues.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Military
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

28. Snapback Sanctions on Iran: More Bark Than Bite?

Author:: Henry Rome and Louis Dugit-Gros
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Threatening to reimpose old UN sanctions would likely have little practical effect on Tehran’s ability to trade oil and export drones, while the plethora of other potential complications suggest that it should be treated as a tool of last resort. In recent weeks, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany have argued that Iran’s sale of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the backbone of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These allegations, combined with ongoing diplomatic deadlock over reviving that 2015 nuclear agreement, have led some to suggest pursuing “snapback,” a provision that would reimpose terminated UN resolutions on Iran and essentially scrub the JCPOA from the books. How would snapback work, and what political, economic, and security consequences would it have?
Topic:: Security, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

29. A Stabilizing Factor: Oman’s Quiet Influence amid Mounting Uncertainty in the Gulf

Author:: Jeonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Based on its sound reputation as a conflict mediator and talks facilitator, Oman is well-positioned to tone down flaring rivalries in the Gulf and prevent tensions from spiraling out of control. After a timid thawing of tensions, the Gulf region is witnessing a renewed phase of uncertainty. Despite being a skillful master at navigating turbulent waters, Oman is eyeing the revamping of tensions in its immediate neighborhood with growing apprehension. The failed attempts to review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the revamping of Iran’s outward-looking incendiary rhetoric as well as localized military retaliations amid recent mass protests, and the failure to extend the U.N.-brokered ceasefire in Yemen do not bode well for the region’s precarious stability. Muscat has a vested interest in preventing at-sea incidents from escalating and harsh infighting among rival Yemeni factions from reaching alarming proportions, especially given its coasts looking out on the Strait of Hormuz and much of its southwestern frontier bordering Yemen.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Oman, and Gulf Nations

30. Big brother is watching: Evolving relations between Iran and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Author:: Kamal Chomani
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The relationship between Iran and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will remain securitised in the short term due to the unresolved business of a return to the nuclear deal and its possible aftermath, the gradual reduction of the US military footprint in Iraq and the strengthening hold on power of Iran’s conservatives. Iran’s response to the Iraqi Kurdish referendum for independence in 2017 and its suppression of the revival of armed activity by Iranian Kurdish parties operating from Iraq makes it clear that Tehran does not hesitate to intervene to defend its security interests either. Iran is also likely to seek to counter growing Turkish intrusiveness in northern Iraq. Because the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is currently weak and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stuck between Turkey, dissatisfaction with its own rule and pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) sentiments among segments of Kurdish public opinion, the KRI is more vulnerable to Iranian and Turkish pressure than it used to be. In other words, dependency and dominance will continue to characterise the Iran-KRI relation to Tehran’s benefit for the foreseeable future. Ironically, deeper integration of the KRI into a federal Iraq could reduce this risk in the medium-term.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

31. Lost in transition: The Muslim Brotherhood in 2022

Author:: Matteo Colombo
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Hamstrung by decades of repression, mistrust and a lack of governance experience, Muslim Brotherhood-linked parties were ultimately unable to navigate the post-2011 tensions between the need to deliver on the popular demands of the Arab uprisings and maintain ideological coherence. Similarly, they struggled to retain their revolutionary credentials and at the same time compromise with ruling elites in order to govern. While this was always a tall order, the consequence has been that decline and crisis followed the organisation’s initial ascent between 2011 and 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood gradually lost its ideological influence over parties it had inspired following the 2013 military takeover against Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. From this year onwards, growing repression, marginalisation and factionalism accelerated the movement’s decline. The arrest and exile of leading Muslim Brotherhood individuals created a leadership void and opened up space for internal strife. Today, the Muslim Brotherhood is a shadow of its former self and in crisis. In parallel to the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood, the legitimacy and relevance of jihadism, political Salafism and Iran’s model of religious rule also appear to have weakened, respectively due to the ‘defeat’ of Islamic State, Saudi modernisation and the poor to mediocre governance provided by Tehran’s partners. This raises the question what major religiously inspired sources of political renewal and mobilisation remain across the Middle East and North Africa that are capable of offering credible prospects for better governance.
Topic:: Governance, Islamism, Legitimacy, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

32. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:: Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

33. A new climate for peace: How Europe can promote environmental cooperation between the Gulf Arab states and Iran

Author:: Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The process of de-escalation between Iran and Gulf Arab states is fragile and could collapse if efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal fail. A platform for dialogue on climate and environmental security may be one of the few politically feasible ways to strengthen and sustain diplomatic channels between Iran and Gulf monarchies. The Middle East is very exposed to climate change and faces challenges including water scarcity, air pollution and sandstorms, rising temperatures, and extreme weather events. Europeans should proactively support a regional platform to address climate issues as a means of advancing their interests in de-escalation, asserting their influence in an increasingly multipolar region, and fulfilling climate and environmental security commitments. European initiatives should highlight the merits of regional cooperation, focusing on diplomacy, joint scientific research, capacity building, and strategic investment.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Environment, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, and Gulf Nations

34. Additional Losses: Examining the severity of the protests' impact on Iran's economy

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Widespread protests broke out across Iran after the death of Mahsa Amini in a hospital in Tehran in September 2022 while in the custody of the country's morality police. While the current protests differ from previous protests in that protestors demanded women's rights be respected. Later, the protests spread, and the protesters demanded regime change. Yet, the economy's deterioration is one of the main drivers of the spread of the angry protests. As social unrest is likely to further exacerbate across Iran, the protests are likely to incur financial and trade losses, further complicating the economic situation.
Topic:: Economy, Domestic Politics, Protests, Inflation, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

35. Mutual Aims: Turkish-Iranian targeting of Iraq’s Kurds

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Turkey and Iran, in recent months, have increased their strikes on areas occupied by Kurds in Iraq. The Turkish Air Force, on November 20, announced intense airstrikes, dubbed Operation Claw-Sword, targeting Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian Army positions in Northern Syria and against Kurdistan Workers’ Party positions in Northern Iraq. Iran, at the same time, intensified its missile and drone strikes on locations that belong to Kurdish opposition parties, which Tehran claims to have been supporting the latest demonstrations across the country since September this year. The timing of these strikes raises questions about the intention of both regimes and the timing of their targeting of Kurdish rebels in Iraq.
Topic:: Minorities, Kurds, Strategic Interests, and Military Alignment
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

36. Iran Protests: Limitations of foreign support to protests

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: National Council of Resistance of Iran has said more than 400 Iranians have been killed and over 20,000 arrested since the breakout of nation-wide protests in Iran. Popular unrests and violence have been sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, three days after she was being detained by ‘morality police’ for claims of violating hijab laws.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Protests, Foreign Interference, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

37. Stalling: Analysing Iran’s written response to EU nuclear deal draft

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: EU’s high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, said on August 15 that both the EU and US were studying Iran’s written response and hoping to restore the tattered nuclear deal. There was no timeline given on when the world powers would respond, but Iran’s official media said Tehran expected a reply in two days.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

38. Holding the Hard-line: What is behind Iran’s seizure of Greek ships in Arabian Gulf?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On May 27, Iran seized two Greek tankers, named “Prudent Warrior” and “Delta Poseidon”, in the Arabian Gulf. Forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) descended on the tankers and ordered them to sail to Bandar Abbas port. Onboard the tankers were 49 crew members. Greece described the operation as ‘piracy’. The seizure seems to be a reprisal for Greece’s role earlier in the month assisting the US impounding a Russian-flagged tanker transporting Iranian oil and carrying 19 crew.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Maritime, and Shipping
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Greece

39. Targeting Financial Entities outside Iran to Counter Tehran’s Economic Strategy

Author:: Yair Albeck
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Tehran is stringing out the nuclear negotiations endlessly with the expectation that President Joe Biden will not admit that the talks have failed. After such an admission, the public would likely pressure the administration to stop offering Iran stealth economic relief through the lax enforcement of sanctions. Rigorous enforcement would, the White House fears, remove Iranian oil from the market and contribute to the global energy crisis that Russia’s war against Ukraine sparked. Meanwhile, Iran is benefitting doubly—strategically and economically—from the war, selling missiles and drones to Russia and oil to China. Given this advantageous situation, Tehran wants negotiations to continue. Can the United States escape from this conundrum? In fact, it can impose severe economic costs on Tehran without removing oil from the market.
Topic:: Corruption, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Democracy, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

40. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:: Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

41. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:: John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

42. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:: Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

43. 2020 Country Brief: Iran

Author:: Third Way
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario. Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program, because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies were shocked—and for the first time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations in August of this year. Now it will be more difficult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the future. President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a difficult choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia, and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity. Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would include. Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a responsible global player.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

44. Creativity Wanted: Countering the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions

Author:: Clara Portela
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Scarcely familiar with sanctions as a policy tool, much of the European public has followed the headlines about international sanctions with some puzzlement. After the UN lifted sanctions on Iran following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), why was it necessary to create a channel for bilateral trade, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), following the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018? Why is Iran insisting that the US lift sanctions ‘in practice, not verbally or on paper’? How did the US Senate approval of new legislation targeting Nord Stream 2, a pipeline under construction between Russia and Germany, bring work to an immediate standstill in late 2019? Why do European banks and private companies fear the US Department of the Treasury’s sanctions enforcement agency, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)? If sanctions regimes are endowed with humanitarian exemptions, why do humanitarian agencies report difficulties in getting aid to places like Syria ? As it turns out, these are ramifications of the same phenomenon: the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions. The present Brief examines these effects, describing why they pose a challenge to the EU. It then outlines the responses that have been activated or are being contemplated to counter them, explaining why an effective remedy remains elusive. The Brief concludes by indicating possible ways forward.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, United Nations, Sanctions, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Syria, and North America

45. Potential Cooperation: Iranian Possible Cooperation with Taliban to Curb Threats

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The situation in Afghanistan, after the Taliban took over the country, is the second key issue that the new Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi’s, foreign policy agenda, after reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Taliban, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and Middle East

46. Limited Repercussions: Implications of the Emergence of Afghan-US Armored Vehicles in Tehran

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Wednesday, September 1, Afghan media published pictures of a number of US Humvee tanks and military vehicles affiliated with the Afghan government, transported by an Iranian army truck from Afghanistan to Iran. This came in conjunction with the publication of pictures of US-made armored vehicles in Iran on another Afghan Telegram channel. The vehicles were in the possession of the dissolved Afghan government.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Media, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and United States of America

47. The 7th Round of Talks: Iran’s foot-dragging over the return to nuclear talks

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: French President Emanuel Macron, on September 6, held his sec-ond official phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi since his ascent to presidency, to discuss the future of the Vienna talks aiming to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. Six rounds of talks have been held so far In Vienna.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

48. Mutual Concessions: Did al-Kadhimi’s visit to Tehran achieve its objectives?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On September 12, 2021, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, led a high-profile government delegation on an official one-day visit to Tehran that came upon invitation from Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Besides Raisi, al-Kadhimi also met Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and other senior officials.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Domestic Politics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

49. Iran’s Resistance Axis Rattled by Divisions: Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s Leader Rejects the Ceasefire in Iraq

Author:: Jacob Lees Weiss
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 20, 2020, 21 Katyusha rockets struck the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, breaking an Iranian-sponsored ceasefire in Iraq for a second time (U.S. Central Command, December 23, 2020). The Iraqi security forces later arrested a member of the Iraqi political and militant organization Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Hussam al-Azirjawi, after finding conclusive evidence of his involvement in the attack (al-Hurra, December 26, 2020). Following al-Azirjawi’s arrest, multiple widely-shared clips on social media appeared to show a large mobilization of armed AAH militants in East Baghdad. A further clip showing masked AAH gunmen threatening to attack Iraqi security forces on command from AAH leader, Qais al-Khazali (al-Arabiya, December 25 2020). These arrests and video clips reveal that AAH has begun to show increasing signs of dissent from the party line set by Iran and its most loyal proxy in Iraq, Kata’ib Hezbollah.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Conflict, Militias, and Resistance
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

50. Toward an Inclusive Security Arrangement in the Persian Gulf

Author:: Trita Parsi
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: • Abandon dominance. For many of the United States’ security partners, even a dysfunctional Pax Americana is preferable to the compromises that a security architecture would inevitably entail. The preconditions for creating a successful security architecture can emerge only if the United States begins a military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and credibly signals it no longer seeks to sustain hegemony. • Encourage regional dialogue, but let the region lead. The incoming Biden administration’s hint that it will seek an inclusive security dialogue in the Persian Gulf is a welcome first step toward shifting the burden of security to the regional states themselves. For such an effort to be successful, the United States should play a supporting role while urging regional states to take the lead. • Include other major powers. The regional dialogue should include the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and major Asian powers with a strong interest in stability in the Persian Gulf. Including them can help dilute Washington’s and Beijing’s roles while protecting the region from inter–Asian rivalries in the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, United Nations, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Military Affairs, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Iran, and Persian Gulf

51. The Ahvas Protests Are the minorities' demonstrations a reflection of a crisis in Tehran?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On July 15, Khuzestan in South West Iran witnessed a range of protests against the disintegrating economic and living conditions in the country, particularly the lack of water within the province, which was called ‘water protests’ or ‘thirst protests’, This was extended to other Iranian cities outside Khuzestan. The protesters' demands evolved to demand the overthrow of the regime itself raising slogans of ‘Death to Khamenei’.
Topic:: Economics, Water, Minorities, and Protests
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

52. The New Rules of the Game: Unfolding the targeting of an Israeli oil tanker in the Arabian Sea

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Friday, July 30, Iran targeted the Mercer Street oil tanker in the Northern Arabian Sea off the Omani port of Duqm, which was on its way from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Fujairah in the UAE, killing two crew members: a British and a Romanian. The Israeli ship was attacked by one or more drones. The attack came in two waves. The first wave was the bombing of the tanker with missiles carried by a normal drone. As the damage was limited, a larger suicide attack was launched on the dormitories of the ship's crew, with the aim of causing casualties, which actually resulted in the deaths of a British and a Romanian. The oil tanker belongs to the London-based Zodiac Maritime company, which is part of the Zodiac company owned by Israeli businessman Eyal Ofer. This is the second attack within the month of July, as the first one took place on July 3, targeting Csav Tyndall, which is also owned by Eyal Ofer.
Topic:: Oil, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Trade
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Persian Gulf

53. Moscow's Central Role: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed in Syria after the recent Israeli Strikes?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On July 19, 22 and 25, Israel carried out three strikes in less than one week using surface-to-air missiles against Syria. These strikes are considered the first of their kind executed by the new Israeli "Bennett-Lapid" government. Although this type of strikes is not novel, the Russian reaction to it was different this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense engaged in the scene for the first time, sending indirect messages to Israel. This made analysts refer to a possible shift in the rules of engagement in Syria. The understandings between Moscow and Tel Aviv were based on Moscow turning a blind eye to Israeli fighters launching airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, in return for Israel not targeting Syrian regime forces or Russian forces, which provide direct support to the Syrian army against the armed opposition. The Russian position reflected a clear desire to weaken the Iranian military presence in Syria, particularly with the escalation of rivalry between Moscow and Tehran over economic and military influence there.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

54. Pragmatic Adaptation: American Surrender and Regional Acceptance After Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Ousted Afghan president Ashraf Ghani left Afghanistan on August 15th when the Taliban reached the outskirts of the capital Kabul. At the time, a source close to Taliban stressed that the two sides reached an agreement whereby Ghani should step down and hand over power to a transitional administration. While the United States and the European Union might well consider the use of sanctions as a weapon against the Taliban, if the movement does not live up to its commitment not to target US and European citizens leaving Afghanistan, it should be noted that most of Afghanistan’s neighbors expected the collapse of the Afghan government – although not this fast- and even began to open up to the Taliban. Irreversible US Withdrawal The United States defended its decision to pull out of Afghanistan rebuffing criticism both at home and abroad. It reiterated that kept forces in Afghanistan twice as long as the Soviets. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said remaining in Afghanistan is “simply not in the national interest.” He added that the US succeeded in the mission of reducing attacks on its soil and interests. The US withdrawal will leave wide repercussions both regionally and internationally.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Taliban, European Union, Refugees, Humanitarian Crisis, Adaptation, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, South Asia, Turkey, India, and United States of America

55. The Attack on Karaj: Analysis of the attack on an Iranian atomic energy agency facility

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The ‘shadow war’ between Iran and Israel continues. The sabotage operations remain, evident in the attacks on Natanz, the most famous uranium enrichment facility in Iran in July 2020 and in April 202, and assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in Tehran. This is in addition to the mutual targeting of ships in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea between the two sides.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Violence, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

56. Curtailing Tehran: Breaking down the validation of Israeli conjectures if Damascus is constraining Iranian military activities

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Israeli ‘Walla’ news website published a report that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has reorganized the deployment of military forces in Syria, and has restricted the movement of Iranian forces internally in order to prevent internal frictions and achieve peace and stability. Walla deems the change in Damascus’s stance towards Iran to be in response to the political, economic and military pressures implored on the former. The website has also indicated that the Iranian presence in Syria has also weakened for other reasons, including the continuous Israeli and US pressures on Iranian presence there. While there were no sources confirming such notions, considering the policies of regional and international powers’ concerning the Syrian crisis, there might be some truth to this notion, pushing Damascus to embrace such tactics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

57. Deferred Precession: Why was Iran so quick to enrich uranium by 60%?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On April 16, the Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced Iran's hourly production of 9 grams of uranium enriched to 60%. This step provoked Western countries participating in the Vienna talks.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Uranium, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Iran, Vienna, and United States of America

58. The Battle of Time: Why is Washington showing little interest in Iran's presidential elections?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Biden administration has been keen on sending several messages implying that it shows little interest in the results of the Iran presidential elections due to take place on June 18. Washington believes that the identity of Iran's next president will not change the decision-making trends in Tehran or the potential course of the relations between Iran and the US over the next phase. On March 11, Robert Malley, the US envoy to Iran, said that “Iran's elections in June are not a factor in the Biden administration’s decision-making for how to proceed with nuclear talks” adding that “the pace will be determined by how far we can get consistent with defending U.S. national security interests”. He continued saying, “we won’t rush or slow things because of the Iranian elections”. This reflects several indicators relevant to the new strategy adopted by the Biden administration in dealing with Iran during the current phase, which can be addressed as follows:
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Iran and Washington

59. Mounting Turmoil: Is Lebanon witnessing a deterioration of the influence of Hezbollah and Iran?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Lebanese internal arena is experiencing escalating instability. This is clearly reflected in the influence of political forces, especially Hezbollah, which is under internal and external pressures as a result of the faltering formation of the government. The balance of power is drawing more to be in favor of the Bashar al-Assad regime over the past few years. In addition to its continued involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah identifies with the Iranian public discourse on many regional and international issues, particularly during the escalation of tensions with the US and Israel.
Topic:: Politics, Conflict, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:: Iran, Lebanon, and Syria

60. The Concurrent Approach: Is Iran changing its policy regarding the nuclear deal?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, has proposed the possibility of settling disputes over the nuclear deal by adopting the ‘simultaneous’ approach, meaning that Iran will once again comply to the deal in return for US lifting sanctions imposed on it. On February 2, during his interview with CNN network, Zarif responded to the question by Christian Amanpour, about whether Iran is still demanding that the US act first, saying that the necessary steps can be synchronized. He also suggested the EU mediate to settle the disputes and remove any obstacles against Washington's return to the agreement. This may imply that Iran made early concessions in its position, regarding the adherence to strict conditions, similar to: the US returning to the agreement first, lifting sanctions and providing compensation for the losses incurred. However, these may not be major concessions impacting the general attitudes of the Iranian leadership, nor may they necessarily indicate Iran's intention to make significant changes in its policy regarding the nuclear deal. To be precise, this new approach announced by Zarif may simply be a tactical change in the Iranian policy aiming to enhance the access to understandings and to avoid early problems with the US administration, at a time when Iran appears to be in dire need of lifting US sanctions.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Elections, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

61. In the Service of Ideology: Iran's Religious and Socioeconomic Activities in Syria

Author:: Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Observers of the decade-long Syria war understand the indispensable role Tehran has played in ensuring the Assad regime’s survival. But they may be less familiar with its stunning breadth—or its historical roots. The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s, when the shah was still in power in Iran and then president Hafiz al-Assad, a member of the marginalized Alawite sect, sought religious legitimacy to lead his majority-Muslim country. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Lately, Tehran’s relationship with Damascus can be described as one of strategic dominance. In this deeply researched Policy Note, analyst Oula Alrifai, a former Syrian asylee, lays bare the extent of Iranian infiltration of Syrian religious and socioeconomic life. She details the spread of Twelver Shia ideology through seminaries, congregation halls, and academic institutions, while demonstrating Iran’s massive economic clout in Syria through initiatives such as the Marota City housing project. For Washington, only a determined effort to blunt Iranian influence can help deliver much-deserved peace for the Syrian people and enduring stability for the region.
Topic:: Religion, History, Authoritarianism, Ideology, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Syria

62. Syria at the Center of Power Competition and Counterterrorism

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on the Assad regime’s culpability, they also face a complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. After a decade of civil war in Syria, the core antagonist remains the Assad regime, which in 2011 ruthlessly suppressed peaceful protestors and has since tortured and executed tens of thousands of detainees. The regime also bears responsibility for fostering the growth of the Islamic State, in part by releasing Syrian jihadists at the start of the war. Yet even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on Assad’s culpability, they also face a highly complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. In this Policy Note, expert Aaron Zelin details how the world’s counterterrorism and Great Power challenges converge in Syria, and how they must be addressed holistically. To this end, he proposes policies on the diplomatic, humanitarian, legal, economic, and military fronts that can calm the fears of U.S. allies such as Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, and perhaps inspire a more robust opposition, backed by a diverse set of local and diaspora activists.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Syrian War, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

63. The 2021 Iranian Presidential Election A Preliminary Assessment

Author:: Albert B. Wolf
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Whoever wins, the result will intimate deeper trends in Iranian society, such as public support for the regime and the Supreme Leader’s intentions for the country’s future. The Washington Institute has been sponsoring a series of discussions about sudden succession in the Middle East. Each session focuses on scenarios that might unfold if a specific ruler or leader departed the scene tomorrow. Questions include these: Would the sudden change lead to different policies? Would it affect the stability of the respective countries involved, or the region as a whole? What would be the impact on U.S. interests? Would the manner of a leader’s departure make a difference? The discussions also probe how the U.S. government might adjust to the new situation or influence outcomes. This essay, thirteenth in the series, assesses the situation in Iran, where a June election will determine the successor to President Hassan Rouhani. An IRGC-backed candidate such as Majlis speaker Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf or former defense minister Hossein Dehghan could ultimately prevail—but a history of election surprises in the Islamic Republic suggests no outcome is certain. Whoever wins, the result will offer clues about deeper trends in Iranian society, such as public support for the regime and the Supreme Leader’s intentions for the country’s future.
Topic:: International Relations, Government, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

64. The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks: Openings and Obstacles

Author:: Dennis Ross
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A reimagined approach to Iran nuclear talks could extend the country’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen American alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. In the first in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining policy challenges across the Middle East, esteemed diplomat and policymaker Dennis Ross provides an innovative approach to reengaging Iran in nuclear diplomacy. His ideas have the potential to extend Iran’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen U.S. alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. Ross explains: “If regime change is not a realistic or advisable goal, the objective must be one of changing the Islamic Republic’s behavior. While this would be difficult, history shows that the regime will make tactical adjustments with strategic consequences when it considers the price of its policies to be too high.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

65. Greece and Israeli-Turkish relations

Author:: George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This essay by Dr. George Tzogopoulos, focuses on the multidimensional nature of Greek-Israeli relations. The understanding of the depth of these relations can explain why the two countries – along with Cyprus – are interested in coming closer. On the other hand, the effort of Israel and Turkey to normalize bilateral ties – already under way since 2016 – is a logical development that deserves attention. However, it is not related to the future evolution of Greek-Israeli collaboration. The evolution of Greek-Israeli relations in the last decade and trilateral Greece-Israel-Cyprus summits outline the common interest of the three countries to enrich their cooperation. Israel and Turkey have started since 2016 to normalize their relations. This is an ongoing process that has evolved in a period during which Greece, Israel and Cyprus charted a joint course in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel and Turkey are expected to find a modus vivendi by agreeing on some issues and disagreeing on others. A potential Turkish-Israeli collaboration against Iran in Syria might pave the way for new synergies between Israel and Turkey. This is a highly controversial and complicated matter that entails risks for Ankara.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Syria

66. Renewing transatlantic strategy on Iran

Author:: Ellie Geranmayeh, Barbara Slavin, and Sahil Shah
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The election of former Vice President Joe Biden in the United States presents the prospect of major changes in US foreign policy, especially toward Iran. These changes cannot begin to be implemented until after Inauguration Day in January of the new year, while an urgent need exists for other players to bridge the gap. None are better suited to this task than the US’s closest allies in Europe which have already played a significant role in the negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Britain, France and Germany – the E-3 – and the European Union have also worked tirelessly to keep the JCPOA alive in the face of the unilateral US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018, the imposition of draconian sanctions by the Trump administration and escalating tensions in the Middle East. A new report by Ellie Geranmayeh, Barbara Slavin, and Sahil Shah presents a series of recommendations for the E-3 and the EU to preserve the JCPOA, promote regional peace and development and boost people-to-people contacts with Iran in concert with the new US administration. Taken together, these steps would amount to a renewed transatlantic diplomatic agenda through which the United States and European allies can stabilize the nuclear file and then build on the resulting diplomatic momentum to address other concerns with Iran.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

67. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:: David Levine
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:: Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

68. Iran’s Authoritarian Playbook: The Tactics, Doctrine, and Objectives behind Iran’s Influence Operations

Author:: Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: According to a 2013 indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice, hackers backed by a foreign power gained access to the controls of the Bowman Avenue Dam, a small dam in the New York City suburb of Rye, New York. Cyberattacks on infrastructure have long been a concern in the United States: Russia has targeted the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure in the past—at times successfully.1 Hackers backed by the People’s Republic of China have targeted U.S. utilities companies.2 However, neither of these strategic adversaries was behind this bold foray into U.S. suburbia: the culprit, according to the indictment, was the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 Over the past decade, Iran has emerged as an important national security challenge for the United States. A novel part of the regime’s effort—facilitated by the advent of the information age and new technology—is its development of a playbook and toolkit designed to undermine the United States at home just as, in the eyes of Tehran, Washington does in Iran. This makes the current Iranian challenge more subtle and nuanced than has been the case for most of the Islamic Republic’s existence. Iran has gradually expanded its capabilities to compete against the United States for influence within the region, and it is now also taking this competition into the United States and even Europe. One hundred days before the 2020 U.S. elections, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence put a fine point on this threat when National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director William Evanina released a statement noting that, “at this time, we’re primarily concerned with China, Russia and Iran,” who are all looking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”4 The statement characterized the Iranian threat as follows: “Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and divide the country in advance of the elections. Iran’s efforts center around online influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-U.S. content.”5 The Islamic Republic’s authoritarian toolkit is unlikely to become as sophisticated as that of China or Russia in the near-term. After all, Iran’s economy is in shambles, its capacity restrained, and the model of society and governance it tries to offer profoundly limited in its appeal. And even the flagship tool used by Iran to interfere in democracies, namely its online influence operations, continues to suffer from such basic shortcomings as misspelled names, the repeated use of the same tactics and techniques, and a lack of proper research into the target and familiarity with its behavior.6 However, a perceived existential threat posed by the United States, an inability to match the conventional capabilities of the United States and its allies, and a strong desire to compete with the same, have encouraged Iran to double down on efforts to develop a set of asymmetric tools allowing it to overcome its shortcomings. In this sense, Iran is not dissimilar to Russia. “Authoritarian learning” (including partnerships with both Beijing and Moscow) has likely helped Tehran to overcome challenges and to develop its toolkit quickly and effectively. The result is that Iran is becoming a significant authoritarian actor challenging democracy in the United States and Europe. Tehran’s influence operations span traditional and digital media. The regime has built a sprawling web of traditional media outlets, as well as networks of accounts on all major social media platforms (even as it bans and limits access to these websites at home), allowing it to reach millions of users abroad. The content Iran creates, distributes, and amplifies is multilingual and seeks to adapt to democracies’ social, cultural, and political contexts—with fairly mixed results. Among the objectives of Iran’s information manipulation efforts are sowing tensions in democracies, dividing democratic nations internally and from each other, and alleging hypocrisy in democratic states’ foreign policies, undermining democratization in Iran and elsewhere. Iranian hackers routinely target U.S. persons, academic institutions, companies, non-profit organizations, and government agencies and departments. And Iran’s illicit finance schemes are considerable; although, they are currently focused on sanctions evasion and support of information operations, rather than used as a standalone vector to undermine democracies. Some of these tools and the tactics used by Iran are similar to those employed by both Russia and China—and both Beijing and Moscow have lent Tehran a hand in developing some of its capabilities,7 particularly in the realm of information manipulation. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese state media and associated social media accounts echo and amplify each other’s messaging. But there are also some differences in how Tehran deploys these tactics. This is in part due to differences in the political culture and structure of the country, the Islamic Republic’s own ideology and worldview, and the country’s status in the international system. Another significant set of differences arises from Iran’s shortcomings vis-à-vis both its adversaries (including the United States) and its authoritarian partners in Russia and China. For example, Russia and China can leverage their vast nuclear arsenal and enormous economic weight, respectively, to compete directly with the United States. Iran is ill-equipped to compete with the United States in either of those domains and, as such, sees this set of tools and efforts to undermine democracy as a means to elevate its level of competition rather than an end in itself. Hence, Tehran’s toolkit is more limited than those of Beijing or Moscow, leading the Islamic Republic to be more deliberate and selective in the programs it develops and, perhaps, more forceful in how it deploys them. As a result, though Iran’s growing efforts to undermine democracy should not be ignored and should be addressed adequately, for now, the Islamic Republic remains a lesser threat than China and Russia. This report tries to make sense of these activities and provide a framework for understanding Iran’s intentions and capabilities. It provides one of the first comprehensive discussions of Iran’s authoritarian toolkit, doctrine, and objectives. It must be noted that unlike other key Iranian initiatives—such as its nuclear program, missile activities, support for non-state actors, and regional interventions—Iran’s authoritarian toolkit remains scarcely studied in the academic literature. Understanding Tehran’s objectives in undermining democracy and the means it leverages to do so is important for a few reasons. First, Iranian activities over the past few years have shown that the regime is increasingly active in this space. And as Iran’s objectives and the tools it employs are different from those of other key malign actors, understanding their strengths and weaknesses and developing specific responses to them is a worthy exercise. Second, authoritarians learn from each other, and observing the Iranian case allows us to better identify the trends and comprehend the ways in which less powerful malign actors (as opposed to Russia and China, for example) may engage in similar activities designed to undermine democracy.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, Cyberspace, and Influence
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Global Focus

69. Prospects for European and U.S. Policy toward Iran

Author:: Ariane Tabatabai and Edgar P. Tam
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: President Donald Trump’s views on Iran have centered on dismantling the landmark nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed in 2015. He made it clear early on that he believed he could negotiate a better deal with Iran that would not compromise the interests of the United States as much and that would also address far more issues of concern to its partners in the Middle East. However, to date the Trump administration has not come any closer to achieving this goal. Instead, the United States and Iran have come close to war. Although European countries share objectives on Iran with the United States—for instance, limiting Iran’s ballistic-missile activities and seeking its return to compliance with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA—they disagree strongly with President Trump’s approach to achieving these. His approach has made Washington the proverbial bull in a china shop for U.S allies in Europe, forcing them to put on hold long-desired objectives such as expanding economic ties with Iran and bringing it closer into a community of responsible stakeholders. Therefore, the result of the U.S. presidential election will have a significant impact on Europe’s relations with the United States when it comes to dealing with Iran. There are several ways in which a Trump reelection could affect Europe’s calculations. A second Trump administration that maintains a hard-line policy toward Iran would lead Europe to double down on encouraging Iran to negotiate by offering incentives as a demonstration of its good faith to Washington. Alternatively, no longer having to think about his reelection, Trump may pursue a less hard-line approach to secure negotiations, thus solidifying his presidential legacy. Germany and France in particular might seek additional leverage to temper and perhaps even counter Trump’s hard-line Iran policy to limit what they view as the damage caused by his administration. For its part, the United Kingdom may align more with the United States, causing a rupture in European unity. However, a “hybrid” scenario is most likely, in which Europe would continue its attempts to be perceived as independent while seeking a greater role in leading a quiet international effort to get Iran back in compliance with the JCPOA and at the negotiating table. If Joe Biden becomes president, he would return the United States to the JCPOA if Iran returned to compliance—which Europe also wants—while trying to negotiate additional commitments from Tehran on other areas of concern, such as missile testing and U.S. hostages. If this plan is complicated by the Trump administration’s pursuit of a unilateral sanctions snapback before it leaves office, however, a Biden administration may find itself facing a scenario in which there is no JCPOA to rejoin. This could be further complicated by a withdrawal by Iran from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it has threatened to do. Even if there is a change in U.S. administration, European countries would still have to overcome differences among themselves on many aspects of Iran policy. A post-Brexit Europe may see the United Kingdom more aligned with U.S. objectives than European ones and acting more as an occasional “+1” to a remaining E2 of France and Germany. European countries also disagree on how to approach Iran’s malign activities, such as terrorism—with Germany having outlawed all of Hezbollah’s activities while the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries distinguish between the organization’s ostensibly political arm and its militant wing. These intra-European divisions, despite the European Union trying to establish a united front, make it easier for Iran’s propaganda efforts to sow division among European countries and in the transatlantic relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, and United States of America

70. Gulf of difference: How Europe can get the Gulf monarchies to pursue peace with Iran

Author:: Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The Gulf monarchies face a core dilemma: advancing their security interests through deterrence or through promoting a new diplomatic process. The arrival of the Biden administration in Washington, and the perception of US disengagement from the region, offers an opportunity for Europeans to help de-escalate tensions between GCC states and Iran. The European interest lies in supporting a return to the Iranian nuclear deal and a regional dialogue between the Gulf monarchies and Iran, an approach that is more likely to promote lasting stability. Europeans can support this process by strengthening their own regional security posture and confronting head-on the geopolitical tensions at the heart of regional rivalries.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

71. Sanctions and the End of Trans-Atlanticism: Iran, Russia, and the Unintended Division of the West

Author:: Rawi Abdelal and Aurélie Bros
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the United States and other Western states, especially the European Union, since the end of the Cold War. But the systematic use of this instrument may produce unintended and somewhat paradoxical geopolitical consequences. The sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in the field of energy are particularly illustrative of this phenomenon.
Topic:: Economics, Energy Policy, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Secondary Sanctions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

72. Centering Iraq Policy on Human Rights and Fair Elections Michael Knights

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The surest way to counter Iran’s malign influence is to proactively focus on human rights issues that the new prime minister can actually affect, such as organizing free elections and preventing further violence against protestors. On February 1, a plurality of Iraqi parliamentary factions gave President Barham Salih the go-ahead to nominate Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi as the new prime minister-designate. The mild-mannered Shia Islamist nominee will now attempt to form and ratify his cabinet in the next thirty days. As he does so, political blocs will probably rally behind him while limiting his mandate to organizing early elections next year, having struggled through a long and fractious process to replace resigned prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi. For the first time since the dramatic events of the past two months, Iraqis and U.S. policymakers alike can catch their breath and consider their medium-term options.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Protests
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

73. Europe Is Creating an Opportunity for Iran Talks, and Washington Should Take It

Author:: Charles Thépaut and Elena DeLozier
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table. In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear program and other regional issues.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

74. Idlib and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout

Author:: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: During the war years in Syria, the northwest, specifically Idlib, has become a site of heavy internal displacement. Observers on the ground recognize the green buses traveling to Idlib carrying migrants who have refused reconciliation agreements with the Damascus regime. Since around 2014, a range of jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi actors have wielded control in the area, the most recent being the al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has ruled—ineffectively and brutally—through its so-called Syrian Salvation Government. But the group's reign is unlikely to last long if current trends persist. The regime's recent move against the town of Maarat al-Numan suggests plans for a broader takeover in the northwest, aided by Russian firepower and other allies such as Iran. In this Policy Note filled with local insights, jihadism expert Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi presents the current scene in and around Idlib province, the last Syrian outpost still run by independent rebels. Absent an intervention by Turkey, the Assad regime will likely prevail in a campaign that quashes the insurgency at a high humanitarian cost.
Topic:: Al Qaeda, Displacement, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

75. Iranian Succession and the Impact of Soleimani’s Death

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The general’s peerless domestic stature would have served a crucial mediatory role during the eventual transition to Khamenei’s successor, so his death brings significant uncertainty to that process. Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, much attention has been focused on the foreign operations conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force. Yet his organization also played a major role at home, one whose future is now unclear. In particular, Soleimani himself was well positioned to be a unifying, steadying figure once Iran faced the challenge of determining a successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Topic:: Politics, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

76. Eight Reasons Why the United States and Iraq Still Need Each Other

Author:: David Pollock
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A host of crucial multilateral interests are baked into the U.S. presence, from keeping the Islamic State down, to protecting vulnerable regional allies, to preventing Iran from taking Iraq's oil revenues. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani has brought the tensions in U.S.-Iraqi relations to a boil, with militia factions strong-arming a parliamentary resolution on American troop withdrawal and various European allies contemplating departures of their own. Before they sign the divorce papers, however, officials in Baghdad and Washington should consider the many reasons why staying together is best for both them and the Middle East.
Topic:: Oil, Bilateral Relations, Islamic State, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Jordan, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

77. Iran’s Supreme Leader Responds to the Soleimani Assassination

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Khamenei and other regime officials have been quick to swear revenge, but for now they may focus more on stoking patriotic and militaristic sentiment at home. A few hours after Iran confirmed that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani had been killed in Iraq, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a statement describing those who shed his blood as “the most wretched of humankind.” Calling Soleimani the international symbol of “resistance,” he then announced three days of public mourning in Iran. He also declared that “severe revenge awaits the criminals” who killed Soleimani—an act that the United States had claimed credit for by the time he spoke. Other highranking officials echoed this sentiment, including President Hassan Rouhani, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, and Defense Minister Amir Hatami, who explicitly promised “revenge” on “all those” involved in the assassination. Despite this rhetoric, however, and despite Soleimani’s unmatched role in carrying out Iran’s regional policy of adventurism and asymmetric warfare, the regime may avoid major, immediate retaliation if it sees such a move as too costly or as a potential trigger for serious military conflict with the United States. On January 1, amid escalating tensions in Iraq but before Soleimani’s assassination, Khamenei stated, “We would not take the country to war...but if others want to impose something on this country, we will stand before them forcefully.” In response to President Trump’s assertion that Iran played a role in the December 31 riot at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, Khamenei told listeners he had two messages for Washington: “First, how dare you! This has nothing to do with Iran. Second, you should be reasonable and understand what is the main cause for these problems. But of course they are not [reasonable].”
Topic:: Politics, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

78. Establishing a Response Ratio for Iranian and Proxy Attacks

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Enhancing deterrence and protecting Americans in Iraq and Syria requires a more formalized system for rationing out retaliatory strikes at the proper intensity, time, and place. When U.S. airstrikes targeted Kataib Hezbollah militia personnel and senior Iranian military figures on December 29 and January 3, they were releasing long-pent-up retaliation for a range of provocations by Iraqi militias. Yet while these powerful blows may have injected some caution into enemy calculations, such deterrence is likely to be a wasting asset. The most proximal trigger for the strikes—the killing of an American civilian contractor during Kataib Hezbollah’s December 27 rocket attack on the K-1 base in Kirkuk—was just one in a series of increasingly risky militia operations against U.S. facilities. Only good fortune has prevented more Americans from dying in attacks conducted since then, including January 8 (when Iranian ballistic missiles struck the U.S. portion of al-Asad Air Base, causing more than a hundred nonlethal traumatic brain injuries), January 26 (mortar strike on the dining hall at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), January 31 (rockets fired at the U.S. site at Qayyarah West), February 10 (explosive device thrown at a U.S. logistical convoy south of Baghdad), and February 13 (rocket attack on U.S. site at Kirkuk). The United States has seemingly communicated to Tehran that it will strike Iraqi militias and Iranian targets if any Americans are killed, but this redline has opened up a dangerous gray zone in which Iran and its proxies are emboldened to continue their nonlethal attacks. Besides the fact that such high-risk attacks are destined to result in more American deaths at some point, they will also produce many more injuries if permitted to continue, as seen in the January 8 strike. More broadly, they will limit U.S. freedom of movement in Iraq and Syria, undermining the point of being there in the first place. This situation is unacceptable—the United States needs a way to deter such behavior even when attacks fall short of killing Americans. When faced with similar challenges in past decades, the U.S. military established reckoning systems that matched the punishment to the crime, with useful levels of predictability, proportionality, and accountability.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Assassination, and No-Fly Zones
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

79. New Khamenei Speech Underlines the Importance of Popular Support for the Regime

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Instead of focusing on Iran's missile retaliation or future threats, the Supreme Leader used his latest speech to extoll the virtues of public unity behind the regime’s revolutionary goals. On January 8, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his first public speech since the U.S. assassination of Qasem Soleimani and the subsequent Iranian missile strike on Iraqi bases housing American forces. As part of an address that touched on regional solidarity against the United States and other notable subjects, he spent considerable time claiming that Soleimani symbolized the Iranian people’s continued commitment to the revolution. In doing so, he indicated that popular support for the regime remains a crucial objective for Iran’s leaders, perhaps more so than issuing or acting on further military threats.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Domestic Politics, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

80. Escalating Houthi Offensives in Yemen: U.S. Options

Author:: Alex Almeida and Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: To keep recent rebel victories from cascading into a wider military collapse, Washington must urge the Gulf coalition to firm up the government’s forces and move more quickly on peace talks. On March 2, Yemen’s Houthi rebels seized the capital of al-Jawf province in the latest phase of a forty-five-day campaign along multiple fronts. Stemming from shifts in the country’s increasingly fragile military balance since last fall, the offensives show that Saudi Arabia is providing insufficient frontline support to the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi and its allies, while also failing to complete backchannel peace talks with the Houthis. Unless talks reach fruition or the Houthis are checked militarily, rebel forces will continue to use their ever-widening array of advanced Iranian weapons to exploit the government’s weakness with more offensives.
Topic:: Conflict, Negotiation, Peace, and Houthis
Political Geography:: Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

81. The Coronavirus in Iran (Part 2): Regime Culpability and Resiliency

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Even as their lack of transparency worsens the public health crisis, the Supreme Leader and other officials have systematically gutted any civil society elements capable of organizing substantial opposition to such policies. Iran’s ongoing coronavirus epidemic has left the people with less reason than ever to trust the information and directives issued by their leaders. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discussed the clergy’s role in aggravating this problem, but the state’s mistakes and deceptions have been legion as well. They include scandalous discrepancies between official reports after a period of denial that the virus had entered the country; a health system that was unprepared to deal with such a disease promptly and properly; and official resistance to implementing internationally recommended precautionary measures, such as canceling flights from China and quarantining the center of the outbreak. These decisions have sown widespread confusion about facts and fictions related to the virus, the most effective medically proven ways to control it, and the degree to which it is spreading throughout the country. As a result, an already restive population has become increasingly panicked about the future and angry at the state. Yet can the coronavirus actually bring down the regime? The harsh reality is that the state has left little space for opposition to organize around health issues, or any issues for that matter. Instead, it has sought to confuse the people and redirect their anger toward external enemies, even as its own policies contribute to the crisis.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Health, Public Health, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

82. The Coronavirus in Iran (Part 1): Clerical Factors

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The clergy’s ambitions for global Shia revolution made the city of Qom uniquely vulnerable to the disease, and their resistance to modern medical science weakened the state’s ability to combat its spread. On February 19, two days before the Iranian government officially announced the arrival of coronavirus, an infected businessman who had recently returned from China to Qom passed away. The location and timing of his death illustrate how the Shia holy city and the religious leaders and institutions who call it home have played an outsize role in the disease’s disproportionately rapid spread inside Iran compared to other countries. How did this situation come to pass, and what does it say about the current state of the clerical establishment, its relationship with the regime, and its alienation from large swaths of Iranian society? (Part 2 of this PolicyWatch discusses the regime's role in the outbreak and its resiliency to such crises.)
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Health, Religion, Shia, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America

83. Who Is Esmail Qaani, the New Chief Commander of Iran’s Qods Force?

Author:: Ali Alfoneh
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Given the IRGC’s recent restructuring, the Qods Force will likely see more continuity than change under Qaani, though his bureaucratic background is a far cry from Soleimani’s brand of charismatic, risky leadership. On January 3, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani as chief commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, just hours after his predecessor, Qasem Soleimani, was killed by a U.S. drone strike. The new commander’s background and military activities are not nearly as well known as Soleimani’s, so taking a closer look at them can help determine whether and how the IRGC’s main extraterritorial branch might change under his leadership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

84. Reading Trump in Tehran

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A week after Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei played coy, remarking, “I have no judgment on the American election...[Both parties have been] naughty toward us.” Of course, his true reaction was far more complex. On one hand, he saw in the president-elect—who had spoken much of disentangling U.S. forces from the Middle East—a prospect of decreased military pressure on his country. On the other, he heard Trump’s raw vitriol directed at Iran’s leadership and the nuclear deal crafted by President Obama. The eventual U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA demonstrated that the new president could back up his talk with punishing action. In this close analysis of statements by Khamenei and other Iranian leaders, former seminarian Mehdi Khalaji lays out the regime’s current views on President Trump and the United States. He shows that even after the American assassination of Qods Force chief Qasem Soleimani, Iranian leaders could be open to negotiating with Washington if they believe the regime’s existence depends on it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

85. Beirut Port Blast Punctures Trust in Hezbollah

Author:: Andrew Devereux
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The explosion in the Port of Beirut on August 4 caused domestic reverberations throughout Lebanon. With close to 200 people killed, over 6,000 wounded and damages estimated at over $15 billion, the public outrage toward the ruling elite was immediate and damning (Daily Sabah, August 12). The political classes were already subjected to heavy criticism for an ongoing economic crisis that has left 55 percent of the population living below the poverty line, while remnants of the October 2019 protests against political corruption remain active (Middle East Monitor, August 20). In the aftermath of the explosion, public ire accelerated swiftly. No group has come under more scrutiny, or been blamed more directly, than Hezbollah.
Topic:: Corruption, Non State Actors, Hezbollah, Militias, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Beirut

86. The Iraqi and Kurdish Regional Government’s Sinjar Agreement: Consequences for U.S., Turkish, and Iranian Influence and Rebel Rivalries

Author:: Rami Jameel
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On October 9, the Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed the “Sinjar Agreement” to normalize the situation in the war-torn district of Sinjar in northern Iraq. The agreement stated that only Iraqi federal forces should operate in Sinjar and all other armed groups must leave the town. It also gave the KRG a say on establishing a new local government, including appointing a new mayor, and planning and running reconstruction efforts in Sinjar, including related budgetary matters (Rudaw, October 10).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Kurds, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and United States of America

87. Pugwash Note on the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle Eastern Security

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: This is a very short note addressing the issue of the Iran nuclear agreement and pointing out some key issues that are relevant to enhancing Middle Eastern security.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

88. Troubled vision: Understanding recent Israeli–Iranian offensive cyber exchanges

Author:: JD Work and Richard Harknett
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Reported Iranian intrusions against Israeli critical infrastructure networks and alleged Israeli actions against Iranian proliferation-associated targets pose substantial new challenges to understanding ongoing competition and conflict in the Middle East. These cyber exchanges may be interpreted through two distinct lenses: as the struggle to achieve deterrence using the instrument of cyber operations, or as the contest for initiative in order to establish conditions for relative security advantage in a cyber-persistent environment. Either way, these ongoing incidents are best understood not as “bolt out of the blue” attacks, but rather fleeting glimpses of continuing cyber campaigns leveraging previously disclosed and newly developed capabilities as each side grapples to anticipate cyber vulnerability and shape the conditions of exploitation. The opaque nature of these interactions is further complicated by potential bureaucratic politics and interservice rivalries, as well as unknown dynamics of a counter-proliferation campaign to slow, disrupt and potentially destroy Iranian nuclear capacity. In the end, observed cyber actions may not represent reflections of accurate strategic calculation, and even if aligned to the operational environment they may not lead to intended outcomes. Continuous failure to deter, or inability to manage persistent interactions, may lead to greater dangers.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

89. Trump’s JCPOA withdrawal two years on: Maximum pressure, minimum outcomes

Author:: David Mortlock
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Two years ago, US President Donald J. Trump walked into the White House Diplomatic Reception Room and announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Trump administration reimposed sanctions on Iran and has adopted a policy of “maximum pressure” to compel Iran to change its behavior and to deny the Iranian regime the resources to engage in its destabilizing activities. However, he also promised he was ready, willing, and able to make a new and lasting deal with Iran. In “Trump’s JCPOA Withdrawal Two Years On – Maximum Pressure, Minimum Outcomes” author David Mortlock, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, evaluates the policy outcomes of President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. The author walks readers through the timeline of President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, the subsequent implementation of the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, and the policy outcomes relative to stated objectives. In sum, Mortlock concludes that although the maximum pressure campaign has been effective in inflicting economic harm on Iran, it has had minimum effect in other areas. Therefore, Mortlock believes the Trump administration should seize the opportunity to pivot from maximum pressure to an approach focused more on policy outcomes.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Economy, Donald Trump, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

90. Iran's successful transnational network: Iranian foreign policy utilizes partners

Author:: Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In Western and Middle Eastern capitals there is growing concern over the growth of Iran’s transnational network. In the last decade, Iran has exploited the weaknesses of other states to expand its influence through relationships with state and non-state actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, but what characterizes this network? Key take-aways: The group of state and non-state actors referred to as proxies of Iran is diverse, and important nuances are lost by approaching them all solely as proxies. Whereas sectarian affinity plays a role, Iran’s ability to portray itself as anti-imperialist and as fighting oppression transcends sectarian boundaries. Iran’s transnational network is multifaceted, pragmatic and diverse, as each relationship reflects each member’s capabilities, history and importance to Iran.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Sectarianism, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

91. Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans can promote peace in Yemen

Author:: Raiman Al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Early Houthi promises to Yemenis of fairer and more transparent government have come to nothing, and the group exerts a rule of brutal suppression. The Houthis now govern over most of Yemen’s population and should be included in efforts to end the conflict and restore peace to the country. The Houthis seek international recognition, face growing internal challenges, and may no longer want to extend their control over southern Yemen. This provides some negotiating space. While the Houthis benefit from Iranian support, they are driven by their own interests and will wage war regardless of Tehran’s position. European states should now increase conditional engagement with the Houthis, looking to widen political and humanitarian space on the ground, while pushing all sides to the negotiating table.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Peace, and Houthis
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

92. Reviving the revolutionaries: How Trump’s maximum pressure is shifting Iran’s domestic politics

Author:: Ellie Geranmayeh
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Europeans wish to persuade Iran to compromise on strategic issues – but, unless they understand the dynamics of domestic Iranian politics, they will not get far. Three main power blocs compete to influence Iran’s supreme leader, including the ‘modernisers’, who were instrumental in building the case internally for the nuclear deal. The US ‘maximum pressure’ campaign has placed them on the back foot. Improving the economy remains the most pressing issue in Iran. Without a Western economic offer, the other two power blocs – the conservative ‘Principlists’ and IRGC-linked ‘securocrats’ – will continue their recent ascendancy and press for a confrontational ‘maximum resistance’ response. Immediately after the US presidential election, Europeans should embark on shuttle diplomacy with Washington and Tehran to agree an interim deal on the nuclear issue. This could also strengthen modernisers ahead of Iran’s own presidential race in 2021.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

93. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: A new balance of power in the southern Caucasus

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Despite the ambiguity around the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the war produced clear winners – Azerbaijan and Turkey – and losers – Armenia, France, the United States and Iran.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, War, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, France, Armenia, Azerbaijan, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

94. Protests and Regime Suppression in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Author:: Saeid Golkar
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Since its formation in 1979, the Islamic Republic has seen multiple cycles of unrest, from ethnic movements in the early 1980s to urban riots in the early 1990s, student protests spanning 1999-2003, the Green Movement response to the 2009 election, and the December 2017-January 2018 upheaval in smaller cities and urban fringes. The most recent instance, sparked in November 2019 by a gas tax hike, spread to as many as one hundred municipalities and still reverberates today. The hardline Iranian regime has successfully put down all challenges to its authority thus far, causing numerous injuries and deaths in the process. State agents are also known to have perpetrated torture in prisons. But as Saeid Golkar contends in this prescient Policy Note, a climate of coercion has undermined Tehran’s legitimacy and its ability to coopt various social classes. Future protests, if they continue to grow in volume and violence, could exhaust even the regime’s multilayered security forces.
Topic:: Security, History, Social Movement, Protests, and Revolution
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

95. The IRGC Lifts Off: Implications of Iran's Satellite Launch

Author:: Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In April 2020, the IRGC launched its first domestically made satellite, the Nour-1, into orbit. The launch showed the risks of lifting arms restrictions on Iran, a move supported by potential weapons trade partners Russia and China but vehemently opposed by the United States. Ending the embargo could facilitate Tehran’s unhindered access to dual-use materials employed to produce satellites with military or even terrorist applications. The launch also showcased an expanding IRGC solid-fuel capability that, together with other technologies, could transform Iran’s future ballistic missile designs. In this Policy Note, military expert Farzin Nadimi explores the consequences of the regime’s latest space achievement. The study’s rich technical detail—on missile types, motors, and “tumbling webcams” known as CubeSats—is complemented by images and framed in a strategic context. The United States and its partners, the author concludes, must respond to these advances by curtailing Tehran’s access to relevant technologies and preventing it from using space initiatives as a cover for illicit military activity.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Weapons, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), and Satellite
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

96. Taking Back the Neighborhood: The IRGC Provincial Guard's Mission to Re-Islamize Iran

Author:: Saeid Golkar
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In 2008, the IRGC established a new branch that remains little known or studied today: the Provincial Guard. Operating in all of Iran's thirty-one provinces plus Tehran city, the IRGC-PG carries out the regime's revolutionary aims at the local level, inculcating conservative religious values, shaping educational curricula, and even sponsoring sports activities. It also delivers military might and security through its Imam Hussein infantry battalions and anti-riot Imam Ali battalions. This pathbreaking Policy Note, written by expert Saeid Golkar, casts the Provincial Guard as a rising actor in Iran's national narrative. If Tehran has its way, the organization will succeed in finally enshrining Iran as an "Islamic society." But domestic precedent suggests this bid will meet more than a little resistance, especially given a regime dealing with economic weakness, a coronavirus pandemic, and a restive, increasingly secularist public emboldened by last year's mass protests.
Topic:: Islam, Military Affairs, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

97. Iran's Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Strategy and Capabilities in the Persian Gulf

Author:: Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In an April 22 tweet, President Trump spoke of instructing the U.S. Navy to destroy any Iranian gunboats that "harass our ships at sea." Aside from whether it departed from existing U.S. rules of engagement, the statement highlighted a persistent reality: the military threat posed by Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. Months before the coronavirus pandemic seized the world's attention, these forces were already reasserting themselves through bold actions against U.S., Saudi, and wider Gulf interests. In this impressively detailed Policy Focus -- an updated version of his 2008 volume -- military expert Farzin Nadimi offers historical context and specifics on Iran's naval activities in the Gulf. The study, which includes maps, tables, and other graphics, covers everything from submarines to sea mines, while also distinguishing between the roles of the revolutionary navy (IRGCN) and the conventional one (IRIN). Most important, it offers a sober take on Iran's capabilities and intentions during a perilously unstable time.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Navy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

98. Israel and the UAE on Iran: Shared Foe, Different Perspectives

Author:: Danny Citrinowicz
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Given past developments, the UAE’s and Israel’s recent announcement of normalization in exchange for shelving annexation plans should come as no great surprise, even if the timing was unexpected. There remains, however, frequently understated differences between one aspect of this relationship often assumed to be a common denominator: Jerusalem’s and Abu Dhabi’s perspectives on Iran. Understanding and accommodating these differences will be critical issue for a lasting relationship between the two countries, with the Israeli government in particular needing to acknowledge the differences as well as similarities between the two sides. It is no secret that Israel and the UAE see Iran as a common enemy; both countries have worked together covertly for years to prevent Iranian hegemony in the Gulf and Middle East at large. Since the beginning of their unofficial relationship several decades ago, the two countries have improved their intelligence-sharing and military relations, strengthened their diplomatic ties behind the scenes, and worked to improve their readiness for Iranian threats across the board. President Trump’s recent decisions to withdraw troops from parts of the Middle East region and the world at large have further catalyzed development of Israel-UAE relations in anticipation of weakened direct support from the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Gulf Nations
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United Arab Emirates

99. Iran-South Korea Humanitarian Trade Requires U.S. Assurances

Author:: Katherine Bauer and Kevin Mathieson
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Tehran is pressing Seoul regarding the billions in Iranian oil revenues held by South Korean banks, creating an opportunity to expand the U.S. humanitarian trade mechanism. On July 21, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to lodge a complaint over Tehran’s heightened rhetoric regarding access to funds frozen in South Korea. The week before, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson had accused Seoul of having a “master-servant relationship” with Washington, while the governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) had previously threatened legal action to access the funds, which Tehran says it plans to use for humanitarian purchases. Although the U.S. government authorized use of the funds for such purposes in February, South Korean banks appear hesitant to move forward without additional U.S. assurances—a reluctance compounded by the $86 million fine that U.S. regulators levied on the Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) in April for failing to identify large-scale Iranian money laundering. With COVID-19 cases on the rise again in the Islamic Republic, Washington should work with Seoul to ensure that trade for medicine, equipment, and other humanitarian items moves forward—albeit with strict oversight.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, and Trade
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

100. With COVID-19, Iran’s Dependence on China Grows

Author:: Kevjin Lim
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Beijing has steadily become Tehran’s economic ventilator, diplomatic prop, and military enabler, and the Iranians need this backstop now more than ever. When the coronavirus spun out of control in Wuhan this January, Iran ignored the example of many other countries and continued to maintain direct flights and open borders with China. Even after President Hassan Rouhani’s government suspended all such flights on January 31, Mahan Air—a company affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—kept flying between Tehran and four first-tier Chinese cities, leading many to allege that the airline was instrumental in introducing or at least exacerbating Iran’s raging epidemic. Whatever the truth behind these allegations, Mahan’s policy is symptomatic of a larger geopolitical reality: Tehran has become profoundly, disproportionately, and perhaps irretrievably dependent on Beijing, despite its own revolutionary opposition to reliance on foreign powers. Where diplomatic and economic sanctions have fallen short, the pandemic has succeeded in isolating the Islamic Republic like never before, compelling it to keep its borders to China open. COVID-19 has also dispelled the notion that Iran’s heavily-sanctioned “resistance economy” still suffices to keep the country solvent. The government has conceded that staying afloat would be impossible if it curtailed cross-border trade, shut down industries, and quarantined entire cities. The crisis is so severe that Iran’s Central Bank has for the first time in decades requested billions of U.S. dollars in assistance from the IMF. Indeed, according to Deputy Health Minister Reza Malekzadeh, whenever his colleagues questioned why China flights continue, bilateral economic relations were among the reasons given. Two days after the government’s ban on such flights, Chinese ambassador Chang Hua tweeted that Mahan CEO Hamid Arabnejad wanted to continue cooperating with Beijing. Neither man specified exactly what this meant, but the implied message to Tehran was clear given China’s resentment of travel bans. Meanwhile, the Iranian Students News Agency, Tabnak, and other domestic media criticized Mahan for prioritizing profit margins over public health.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS