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1. Why the proposed Brussels buyers club to procure critical minerals is a bad idea

Author:
Cullen Hendrix
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Concerned about critical mineral supply chains and its own strategic vulnerabilities, the European Union is advancing a buyers club to procure minerals critical to the clean energy transition, such as bauxite, cobalt, lithium, and nickel. The European Union is deeply dependent on imports of both raw and processed critical minerals and materials and thus highly exposed to global price volatility. The door appears to be open for the United States or other EU trading partners and like-minded countries to join this club. Decarbonization is not the only impetus behind the proposed Brussels buyers club. Both the European Union and United States view China’s dominance of critical mineral supply chains as a national security issue, because these minerals are key inputs to modern military technology. Hendrix agrees that supply chains for critical minerals desperately need widening to meet projected global demand and tackle climate change mitigation, but he warns that a purchasers club would not be a step in the right direction. A buyers club would be prone to free riding, set up distributive conflicts within the European Union, and reduce the share of climate mitigation benefits accruing to critical mineral–producing countries, many of which are developing and middle-income economies.
Topic:
Economics, National Security, European Union, Supply Chains, and Minerals
Political Geography:
China and Europe

2. The international tax agreement of 2021: Why it’s needed, what it does, and what comes next?

Author:
Kimberly Clausing
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In 2021, more than 135 jurisdictions agreed on transformative new international tax rules that would establish a minimum tax rate of 15 percent on multinational corporate income regardless of where it was reported. In December 2022, the European Union unanimously moved forward to implement this minimum tax, and other countries, including South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, are also either implementing the tax or taking substantial steps toward implementation. In tandem, the United States should also reform its international tax system and adopt a stronger minimum tax. While the future of the international agreement is uncertain, it has important implications for the ability of governments worldwide to create tax systems that are administrable, fair, and efficient. The agreement also demonstrates important guiding principles for the future of multilateral cooperation on global collective action problems, including efforts to protect public health from future pandemics, address nuclear proliferation, and resolve territorial conflicts. US progress on international tax reform would enhance much needed international cooperation on these issues.
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Reform, European Union, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

3. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The Economic Dividend of Competitiveness

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
In a world of technological and economic rivalry, the EU must devote increased attention to its competitiveness. Higher levels of competitiveness will help the EU build a more prosperous economy which will in turn produce innovation and resources to address the great challenges of our time. ECIPE published a study presenting a competitiveness compass with concrete policy recommendations that will improve EU’s competitiveness. These policy recommendations, once implemented, will bring tangible benefits to the EU economy in the form of higher levels of trade and productivity. This report presents five scenarios in which the EU pursues competitiveness policies that lead to higher economic growth.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Growth, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Building a Mature UK Trade Policy

Author:
David Henig
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Global Britain has not delivered according to the hopes expressed by supporters of leaving the EU. Trade with the rest of the world has not grown to make up for leaving a bloc with seamless trade, early Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand are of minor economic significance, and it is hard to discern much of a strategy beyond completing a few more similar deals. Meanwhile the world of trade policy is transformed since 2016, negatively. The US has essentially declared its national interests to be more important than global rules, while the EU wants to act unilaterally as the global regulator. In both, the climate crisis is being used as an excuse to reintroduce protectionist measures threatening economic damage and global stability. Expectations of what a UK outside of the EU could achieve were exaggerated, but nonetheless the country could be doing a lot better in its trade policy. There is no good reason for such tensions as exist with a broad range of frustrated stakeholders, the absence of clear purpose on UK strengths such as services, or the defensiveness that seemingly takes pride in secrecy and resistance to proper scrutiny. Adjustment time was inevitable, but six years should have been enough.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

6. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:
Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Estonia

7. Quo Vadis, Belarus?

Author:
Zoran Meter
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
Year 2021 was one of the most turbulent for Belarus since its independence after the collapse of the USSR. In the West Belarus is sometimes called the “European North the global economic crisis in 2008 without too many problems and internal turmoil. Belarus has also successfully overcome problems with its neighbor the Russian Federation caused by Korea” and its longtime president Alexander Lukashenko, whom the West no longer recognizes, is dubbed “Europe’s Last Dictator.” Although this country is still to a large extent dug in its communist past, it has overcome disputes related to the content and dynamics of the implementation of the establishment of a Federal State between Belarus and Russia to which they previously committed.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Leadership, Dictatorship, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

8. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:
Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

9. Don’t Get Caught in the Middle: A Geo-Economic Strategy for Germany to Survive US-Chinese Rivalry

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The economic fallout from the war in Ukraine has been very significant. The consequences of a war in East Asia involving the United States and China would be much worse. And even if a Sino-US military confrontation can be avoided, geo-economic conflict between the two powers is going to intensify. Washington will put increasing pressure on Germany and Europe to align their policies with Washington’s geo-economic strategy.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America

10. EU carbon border adjustment mechanism faces many challenges

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Megan Hogan, and Jisun Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the evolving EU Emissions Trading System and EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and explains objections within Europe and from major trading countries likely to be affected by the proposed CBAM import levies. While EU officials have sought to ensure that the CBAM is consistent with obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), key aspects of the CBAM could violate WTO rules and are likely to be contested, taking years to play out. Meanwhile, several other countries will adopt new carbon-inspired border restrictions, adding to global trade frictions. Major carbon-emitting countries, therefore, need to act cooperatively instead of unilaterally to both advance the fight against climate change and update the rules-based global trading system. Two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions result from nontraded activities, such as road transport, electricity generation, and home and office heating. Countries can curb emissions in these activities, while developing guidelines for carbon abatement in traded sectors.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe

11. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

12. Russia’s connectivity strategies in Eurasia: Politics over economy

Author:
Kristiina Silvan and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia has been attempting to strengthen connectivity within Eurasia since the early 2000s as a part of its policy to “pivot to the East”. Yet due to limited resources and political will, the tangible effects of its connectivity strategy have remained limited. The Russian Far East would greatly benefit from an improved connectivity infrastructure, given its proximity to Asian markets and the abundance of natural resources in the region. However, the attempts to accelerate regional socio-economic development by strengthening the region’s connectivity have failed to make a difference. In post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia adopted a passive approach to connectivity in the 1990s and 2000s, which meant focusing on maintaining and protecting the links inherited from the Soviet Union. It was only the pressure of external actors – both China and the West – that prompted Moscow to take a more active stance in the region in the 2010s. The launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative pushed Russia to promote its own grand vision of trans-continental connectivity, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, designed to reaffirm Moscow’s great-power status and its equal standing with China. While it lacks economic and administrative foundations and its implementation is highly implausible, it has fulfilled a symbolic role as Russia’s grand connectivity project for Eurasia.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Rivalry, and Resource Allocation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

13. Early warning: How Iraq can adapt to climate change

Author:
Nussaibah Younis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Iraq is at high risk of suffering the worst effects of the climate crisis, including soaring temperatures and acute water scarcity. As land suitable for farming shrinks and rural jobs disappear, ordinary Iraqis are moving to cities in search of work. This increases pressure on services, pushes up food prices, and exacerbates social tensions, leading to protests and even violence. Iraq’s weak internal governance prevents it from improving water management, managing inter-provincial and inter-tribal conflict, and attracting investment and expertise to create new green-economy jobs and adapt to the changing climate. Public awareness of climate risks is growing, but too few political leaders prioritise the issue. Iraq has long struggled to reach agreement on water issues with upstream states Turkey and Iran, which are building dams that affect supply to Iraq; they also believe that Iraq manages water badly. Similar issues complicate relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan region. Iraqis and Europeans should work together to improve Iraq’s poor governance and consider measures such as establishing an ‘early warning’ system about potential conflict arising from climate effects.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, and Middle East

14. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:
Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. Tough trade: The hidden costs of economic coercion

Author:
Jonathan Hackenbroich, Filip Medunic, and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Chinese economic coercion against Europe is on a deeply worrying trajectory. Having moved from threats in 2020 to punishment of European companies in 2021, China is now interfering with the EU market as part of a diplomatic dispute with Lithuania. If Beijing pressures European companies to stop trading with Lithuania, businesses could face pressure to stop dealing with Taiwan, Slovenia, or other places when tensions rise. The threat of Russian energy coercion is real, too. The EU needs to develop an Anti-Coercion Instrument that acts as a powerful economic deterrent, but this alone will not sufficiently protect Europe against economic coercion. The EU also requires a comprehensive resilience architecture, including a strong agenda for improving economic strength and trade links, a Resilience Office, and a reformed Blocking Statute that can counter secondary sanctions with Chinese characteristics. A Resilience Office could provide strategic coordination of the EU’s response and evaluate the costs of economic coercion, while the Blocking Statute could allow for targeted countermeasures against companies based in third countries.
Topic:
Security, Economics, European Union, Trade, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Europe

16. The nonsense of Next Generation EU net balance calculations

Author:
Zsolt Darvas
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The estimation of payments from the European Union’s COVID-19 economic recovery fund, Next Generation EU (NGEU), to each EU country in 2021-2026 involves uncertainties, yet the overall magnitudes can be estimated with a reasonable degree of precision. In contrast, estimating member states’ contributions to the repayment of EU debt (which will be issued to finance NGEU spending) is burdened with enormous difficulties, primarily related to the uncertainty of gross national income projections up to 2058. Some numerical scenarios can be put forward to illustrate the difficulties in estimating the amounts of such future contributions.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

17. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

18. Energy price hikes: which European solutions?

Author:
Ramona Bloj
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
As energy prices rise around the world, against the backdrop of the post-Covid economic recovery, the 27 EU leaders discussed what Europe could do to ease the pressure on consumers at the European Council on 21-22 October. The increase in prices is due to a particular international context and is affecting all countries: China is facing electricity shortages in many provinces due to insufficient coal supply, and in the United States the price of natural gas has risen by more than 150% since the beginning of the year. However, this increase raises questions about Europe's energy strategy and its impact on climate objectives, just a few days before the opening of COP26 in Glasgow.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

19. Biden and Belarus: A strategy for the new administration

Author:
Anders Åslund, Melinda Haring, John Herbst, and Alexander Vershbow
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
United States President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has an historic opportunity to bring Europe together and reverse the tide of dictatorship by building an international coalition to support democracy in Belarus. In 2020, Belarusians unexpectedly called Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s legitimacy into question in the country’s August presidential election. Lukashenka brazenly rigged the results, claiming that he took 80 percent of the vote, but neither the United States nor the European Union (EU) recognizes his victory. A months-long protest movement has coalesced that demands new elections under the supervision of the international community. Recent years have seen no better chance for US leadership to facilitate lasting positive change in Europe than the crisis in Belarus. But how to secure democratic change in Belarus is not simple given internal resistance and Moscow’s determination to prevent another “color revolution.” Lukashenka is likely finished, unable to restore any authority or legitimacy. But he is seeking to hang on despite Moscow’s efforts to arrange a pliable replacement who would preserve Minsk’s pro-Russian orientation. Managing Moscow’s efforts to prevent an aroused citizenry from choosing their own leader is no easy task. Russia remains the key geopolitical player in Belarus, often plays the long game, and may be willing to countenance military options that the United States cannot. Perhaps the key fact is that Belarusians have made it amply clear that they want accountable leaders that they can choose and dismiss for themselves. More than thirty thousand peaceful protesters have been detained since August, more than three hundred and fifty police officers have defected, and ordinary Belarusians are no longer afraid to voice their opposition to the regime. Kremlin support for the ongoing repression risks turning the Belarusian people—historically friendly toward Russia—in a pro-European direction. These changes in Belarus are something that Moscow cannot ignore, and the United States and its allies must nourish and strengthen them in consistent ways that avoid and deter a Kremlin overreaction. Biden, with his long experience promoting US values and interests and his determination to strengthen transatlantic relations, is ideally situated to promote clear support for the people of Belarus that does not directly challenge Moscow’s security interests.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

20. Transatlantic Paralysis: The US-EU Trade Policy Stalemate and the European Union’s Democratic Deficit

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
What is often labeled the democratic deficit in governance of the European Union (EU) is not a a flaw or bug in its architecture, it is a design feature. From its earliest days in the Second World War’s chaotic aftermath, European integration “was essentially an elite project, pursued at a distance from the daily concerns of the national populations in Western Europe.” Also formed as a response to the economic disintegration following the Depression and World War Two, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was similarly removed from national or populist politics. It too was an elite, top-down initiative designed to embed nations in a system of international rules largely articulated by technical experts, enforced by a form of international courts, and far removed from national and populist politics. Many of the intellectual proponents of both supranational institutions, from the Austrian School of economics, the ordoliberals emerging in early-20th century Germany, to the London School of Economics indeed shared a distrust of American-style democracy, let alone the various parliamentary democracies whose failure led to the disasters of the 1930s and 1940s. Over the last fifty years, the institutions put in place after World War II have been perfected and have, to a certain extent, ossified. Many of the difficulties in achieving greater US-EU economic coordination in the 21st century have their origins in the institutional design and the subsequent early implementation of early European Community rules during the post-war period. A brief overview of the history of European integration, and the political thinking behind it, helps explain the current paralysis in contemporary transatlantic cooperation, including in a joint approach to the challenge of Chinese mercantilism and its growing international reach.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Democracy, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America