Search

Begin New Search Topic Bilateral Relations Political Geography China Content Type Journal Article Publication Year within 10 Years

1. The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

2. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

3. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. China Strengthens Regional Leadership Countering US Challenges

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia featured prominently in Beijing’s increasingly strong international efforts to portray China as a source of strategic stability and economic growth with comprehensive global governance plans supportive of interests of developing countries and opposing the United States. These efforts intensified after the landmark 20th Party Congress in October and the 14th National People’s Congress in March. They were reinforced as Xi Jinping emerged from COVID restrictions and preoccupation with domestic matters to engage actively in summitry with leaders of Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. China’s economic importance for regional countries grew as did its dominance over the contested South China Sea. Its show of force against Taiwan in April had little discernible impact on China-Southeast Asia relations, while notable US advances in military cooperation with the Philippines warranted Chinese warnings that escalated during the reporting period.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Leadership, Economic Growth, Strategic Stability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

5. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

7. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

8. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

9. Tensions Intensify as Taiwan-US IT Cooperation Blossoms

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the wake of then US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, China’s extensive military exercises continued to impose a more threatening “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan continued to be the focus of heated public exchanges between the US and China. US President Biden said, for a fourth time, that the US would defend Taiwan and added an inflammatory codicil that independence was for Taiwan to decide. At the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi Jinping promised China would strive for peaceful reunification with Taiwan but would not renounce use of force. On Dec. 23, Biden signed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and a State Department appropriation providing $2 billion in loans for Taiwan to purchase US equipment. Two days later, China sent 71 military aircraft and seven ships to intimidate Taiwan, its largest-ever one-day exercise near the island. Two days later, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen announced that Taiwan would extend its military conscription to 12 months. TSMC formally broke ground for the first of two factories in the US, a $40 billion investment. The new year will see Taiwan’s DPP and KMT parties launch their presidential election campaigns, debating visions for cross-Strait defense, dignity, and dialogue as the Chinese military appears determined to intensify its intimidation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Information Technology, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

10. US-India Relations: Friends with Benefits

Author:
Akhil Ramesh
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2022 was a challenging year, not just for US-India relations, but for every India analyst trying to explain the Indian government’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Explaining to a non-IR audience India’s history of nonalignment during the Cold-War era and its current policy of multi-alignment was not a gratifying endeavor. While the last four months of 2022 did not have the friction and stress-tests as the first four of 2022 or the slow and steady expansion of relations that followed between May and September, they certainly had multiple surprising events that could make them the halcyon months of 2022. In mid-November, the US and Indian armies engaged in a military exercise at Auli, not far from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian-held and Chinese-held territory. While the US and Indian armies have engaged in exercises prior to 2022, this proximity to the Indo-China border is a first. A month later, in another first, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to India to meet Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman to expand the US-India “Indo-Pacific partnership.” Yellen characterized India as a “friendly shore” for supply chain diversification and as the indispensable partner for the US. A country that earned notoriety for its bureaucracy and trade protectionism over the years was suddenly characterized as “friendly”; one that was highly skeptical of foreign militaries on its shores was actively engaging the US military at one of its most sensitive and tempestuous borders. The primary catalyst for this sea change has been shared concerns over a rising, authoritarian, and hegemonic China. The events of the last four months, while making India’s multi-alignment labored, also made it abundantly clear that the US-India relations will continue to expand to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

11. Factores endógenos y exógenos en el relacionamiento bilateral entre Paraguay y la República de China (Taiwán). Primacías en un contexto internacional tensionado por el enfrentamiento chino-estadounidense

Author:
Julieta H. Heduvan and Maria Antonella Cabral López
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
En el marco de la creciente escalada en el estrecho de Taiwán y en medio de la tensión provocada por dinámicas que buscan desafiar el orden existente, Paraguay, como el único país sudamericano y uno de los pocos Estados a nivel global que reconoce en la actualidad a la República de China (Taiwán) y no a la República Popular China (RPC), percibe desde el otro lado del mundo un conflicto que no es ajeno a él. Este contexto hace oportuno el análisis del relacionamiento de Paraguay con Taiwán y los elementos que determinan su reconocimiento actual, identificando los factores exógenos y endógenos que rigen esta vinculación. Esto permite a su vez, dilucidar cuál es la situación que podría presentarse en un futuro.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Endogenous Factors, and Exogenous Factors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, South America, and Paraguay

12. Exploring the Interplay between Trade and Industrial Policies and the Impact of Geopolitics on the Transformation of Taiwan’s Economy

Author:
Ying-Jun Lin
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Over the past five decades, Taiwan's economy has shifted from inward-oriented to outward-oriented, from an import-substitution policy to an export-expansion policy. This evolution in economic structure has also brought about changes in the industrial landscape. While there is an ongoing debate about the respective roles of the market and the government in promoting Taiwan's economic growth, this article argues that the history of Taiwan's economy demonstrates a mutually beneficial relationship between trade and industrial policies. The integration of market forces and government intervention has played a crucial role in Taiwan's economic success story. However, the dynamics between the United States and China, as well as the emergence of new Asian regionalism, pose challenges to Taiwanese industries and enterprises. In conclusion, this article emphasises the importance of refining trade and industrial policies in line with the geopolitical context in order to maintain the momentum of Taiwan's economy.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

13. The Sino-French Relationship At 60: China’s Losing Bet On A Reset

Author:
Juliana Bouchard
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Against a background of increasingly fraught relations with the European Commission, China has been doubling down on its outreach to member states, with France chief among them. The two countries have been gearing up to the 60th anniversary of their bilateral relationship in January 2024 with a flurry of diplomatic exchanges. These have included high-level visits by President Emmanuel Macron in April, Economic Minister Bruno Le Maire in July, diplomatic adviser Emmanuel Bonne in late October, and most recently Foreign Affairs Minister Catherine Colonna (FMPRC, November 22). On the Chinese side, Premier Li Qiang traveled to Paris in June to take part in the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact. However, this year also saw Paris deal some blows to China’s economic ambitions, with Macron being one of the driving forces behind Brussels’ ongoing anti-subsidy investigation into China-made electric vehicles and revamping its own EV purchase credits to exclude Chinese-made models (Service Public, October 10). During Bonne’s visit, Wang Yi framed his expectations for the anniversary in no uncertain terms, calling on China and France to “revisit the original intention (重温建交初衷)” of their bilateral ties and “consolidate and reset (巩固和再出发) the relationship” (FMPRC, October 30). Paris’ appetite for meeting Beijing halfway in “resetting” the relationship is far less certain. Most likely, China’s lofty ambitions for a reset will be met with more ambiguity from France, continuing its diplomatic outreach to safeguard economic opportunities in China, all the while pushing for more assertive policies within Brussels to achieve its vision of “strategic autonomy.” While some scholars are not entirely immune to the “dual-faced (两面性)” nature of French diplomacy (Fudan Development Institute, March 2), a prevalent view—or hope—among officials in Beijing is that Macron’s vision of strategic autonomy is primarily about asserting an independent foreign policy from the United States. However, in reality, strategic autonomy also informs France’s own de-risking agenda toward China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and France

14. China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace

Author:
Scott B. MacDonald
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In October 2023, Nicaragua signed an agreement with China’s CAMC Engineering Company (中工国际工程) for the reconstruction, expansion, and upgrading of the Punta Huete International Airport (Yicai, October 18). The company is a subsidiary of the conglomerate China National Machinery Industry Corporation (国际集团), also known as Sinomach (Sinomach, accessed November 15). Local and Chinese officials are touting the $492 million project as part of China’s Bridge and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting a deepening of Daniel Ortega’s regime’s ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Global Times, October 18). Closer links between Beijing and Managua demonstrate that China’s economic statecraft remains central to its strategy to further penetrate Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of significant geopolitical importance to the United States. The sustainability of China’s economic statecraft, and BRI in particular, have come into question in recent months due to the country’s domestic economic problems. However, the Nicaraguan airport announcement signals that the PRC remains economically active in the region, and its ambitions have not wavered. This is something of which the remaining handful of countries that officially recognize Taiwan are well aware: Beijing’s attention to regional infrastructure continues, if more selectively than before, but only to those countries who have decided to forgo relations with Taiwan. Beijing is further extending its reach into the strategic underbelly of the United States. For Nicaragua, the restoration of diplomatic ties with China serves the geopolitical needs of President Daniel Ortega in distancing his regime from the United States and softening the blow of sanctions (imposed due to fraudulent elections and gross human rights violations), while providing a source of non-Western funds to finance infrastructure projects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Central America, and Nicaragua

15. Money Alone Is Not Enough: The Future Of The China-Argentina Relationship

Author:
Román D. Ortiz
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Observers assessed the outcome of the first round of Argentina’s presidential elections held on October 22 as good news for the Chinese government (VOA, October 26). Against the odds, Sergio Massa, the Peronist candidate and current minister of economy, emerged on top, despite his overseeing an annual inflation rate of almost 140 percent. Meanwhile, Javier Milei, the libertarian opposition candidate, took the second place (Yahoo Noticias, October 23). These two politicians will compete for the presidency in the second round of the election scheduled for November 19. At first glance, the victory of Massa should be an encouraging sign for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since it keeps open the possibility that the China-friendly Peronist party remains in government. However, a more granular analysis suggests two alternative outcomes: First, Milei is likely to be the eventual winner after the second round of voting, which would make the new occupant of the Casa Rosada (the Argentinian presidential palace) a politician who has called the PRC an “assassin” and who plans to freeze relations with Beijing. Second, if Massa wins the presidency, his more moderate Peronism is far from the Third-World foreign policy promoted by the outgoing president, Alberto Fernandez, and his vice-president and former president, Cristina Fernandez. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, Beijing’s desires to increase political influence over Buenos Aires, which have focused particularly on its defense policy, are likely to be curtailed. A decrease in political influence with Buenos Aires would deal a serious blow to the Chinese strategy in Latin America, in which Argentina plays a critical role. Argentina is the only large country in the region to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It also exports food, minerals, and oil needed by the Chinese industrial sector. Argentina’s expansive territory represents a natural platform to project power within South America and to the South Atlantic. Buenos Aires’s geopolitics makes it particularly attractive for Beijing, which is exploring opportunities to secure rights for a naval base on the west coast of Africa in order to gain access to the Atlantic. Argentina also forms a key part of PRC efforts to consolidate its hegemony over the Global South. Specifically, the PRC views Argentina as a counterbalance to Brazilian regional hegemony, which motivated China’s interest in Argentina joining the BRICS grouping of countries, against Brazilian opposition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

16. The PRC Eyes Vietnam: Chinese Assessments of Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy

Author:
Nathan Waechter
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In July, the Barbie movie––an ostensibly apolitical and innocuous film––­­was banned by the Vietnamese Department of Cinema over real-world tensions between Vietnam and China. According to the state film council, the new Barbie movie was barred from the Vietnamese market over its inclusion of a map purportedly showing China’s preferred territorial “Nine-Dash” line in the South China Sea (Vietnam News, July 7). As the head of the national film evaluation council stated, “Vietnam’s stance has been clear. It does not accept movies that are ambiguous in matters related to territorial sovereignty” (Vietnam News, July 7). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the incident by asserting that “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are solidly grounded in history and law” (Global Times, July 7). Accusing the Vietnamese government of overstating the issue, the Chinese state media outlet Global Times urged all “relevant parties to control domestic hype and nationalist sentiment” (Global Times, July 7). Viewed within a broader context, the Barbie movie incident is only the most recent expression of the historical baggage between Vietnam and China. Many PRC military officials and academics largely perceive Southeast Asia as China’s proverbial “backyard” that should rightfully remain in its sphere of influence. Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies an important position directly on China’s periphery. Publicly, China considers Vietnam’s governing regime to be close “comrades and brothers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28). However, Vietnam has a long, acrimonious history with China. Vietnam has been invaded by China numerous times and subjugated to Chinese rule and the exaction of tribute for thousands of years. The “Vietnam Military Museum in Hanoi … lists 13 “Vietnamese Resistance Wars Against Invaders,” with the majority fought against the Chinese. To some extent, Vietnam has also benefited from its contact with China. The Chinese written script, ideas of ethics and governance, and even chopsticks were absorbed from China. [1] During America’s war in Vietnam, China provided Vietnam with vast amounts of material support. From 1965-1969, a total of 320,000 Chinese troops covertly served in North Vietnam. [2] Despite this, China invaded Vietnam in 1979 in a war that the PRC refers to as the “Self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam” (对越自卫还击保卫边疆作战) (Baidu Encyclopedia). In more recent years, Vietnam and China have clashed rhetorically over islands in the South China Sea and had a tense standoff over a Chinese oil exploration rig in Vietnamese-claimed waters in 2014 (CSIS, December 23, 2014). With its historical domination by China and its position as a small, weak, and still developing country, Vietnam has pursued a strategy of hedging. Research by Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato, Le Hong Hiep, and Tuan Uy Tran provide robust definitions of Vietnam’s hedging strategy from Vietnamese and Western perspectives (Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2013; Asian Politics and Policy, January 2018; Naval Post-Graduate School Monterey, March 1, 2018). However, it is important to understand how China views Vietnam’s strategy as well. Further analysis is needed to examine primary Chinese sources and understand Chinese elite perceptions, their conclusions, and what “countermeasures” they believe China should take against Vietnam’s approach. On balance, while Chinese security analysts have a clear understanding of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, they exhibit a modern version of historical Chinese paternalism towards Vietnam. Many contemporary Chinese analysts believe that Vietnam, as a developing country, will inevitably fall into China’s sphere of influence as it remains dependent on Chinese economic ties for growth. While Vietnam does benefit from its economic relations with China, however, the Chinese analyses fail to fully recognize Hanoi’s fundamental apprehensions and insecurity caused by the historical enmity between the two countries, as well as China’s modern-day rise and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. To a certain degree, China is guilty of exhibiting a degree of the same imperial hubris towards Vietnam as it has often accused the US of in the latter’s relations with other countries. While PRC strategists appear to have concluded that time is on their side, Beijing’s paternalistic complex may ultimately handicap China’s ability to pull Vietnam closer into its orbit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hedging, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Vietnam

17. U.S.-China Data War Intensifies as Bilateral Relations Nosedive

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S.-China relations appear headed for further deterioration despite the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to lure back American multinationals and Beijing’s relatively limited support for Russia in its war with Ukraine. Washington has characterized the “existential competition” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an entrenched struggle on all fronts, but the data and information sectors have recently become areas of particularly intense contention. The Xi Jinping leadership has sternly retaliated against purported efforts by the U.S. and its allies to choke off the PRC’s high-tech development pathways. Recent moves targeting American and other foreign firms are also closely linked to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s obsession with cybersecurity and control of data. Last weekend, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the administrative arm of the policy-setting Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) that Xi chairs, announced an investigation into the operations of leading American memory-chip maker Micron Technology. The CAC cited the need to safeguard the supply chains of Chinese IT and data companies. Regardless, Micron, whose China operations account for 11 percent of worldwide sales, has insisted that it “stands by the security of our products” (Straits Times, April 1; South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 31).
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Assessing the Role of the PLA Southern Theater Command in a China-India Contingency

Author:
Suyash Desai
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Soon after Xi Jinping assumed charge as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman in November 2012, he set the stage for a sweeping military restructuring. On February 1, 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved away from the old Soviet-inspired Military Regions (MR) system to the U.S.-inspired Theater Command (TC) model. Under this new model, the seven Military Regions—Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou—were reorganized into five geographic TCs, each with a specific “strategic direction” (战略方向). [1] Following the force restructuring, the three TCs that concern India are the Western Theater Command (WTC) along with Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts (TMD and XMD), the Southern Theater Command (STC) and the Central Theater Command (CTC). WTC’s 76th and 77th Group Armies (GA) under the PLA Army’s (PLAA) jurisdiction are mandated to ensure the security of China’s land boundaries with Central Asian states, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. The TMD and XMD were retained to oversee security on the Chinese border with the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Union Territory of Ladakh, respectively. In addition to the PLAA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the PLA Logistic Support Force (JLSF) are also significant services under the WTC command, while the PLA Navy (PLAN) plays a minor role at Pangong Tso in the Aksai Chin region. Elsewhere, PLAN forces under the STC’s jurisdiction are responsible for securing Chinese interests not only in the South China Sea but also possibly in the Indian Ocean Region and the Western Pacific Ocean. The CTC is mandated to protect the capital but also acts as an anchor to provide additional troops to other theaters in case of a contingency, including WTC. This is an important division of responsibilities for the Chinese armed forces after Xi’s recent military reforms. [2] However, recent developments have highlighted that the STC’s 75th Group Army could also play an important role in securing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial integrity in Tibet, especially in the eastern sector bordering the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, the troops from the STC’s 75th Group Army could be used for rotation in the Tibetan theater, and the 75th GA’s artillery could be mobilized during a contingency with India. The four major reasons that the STC’s 75th GA could play such a role are improving connectivity between Tibet and the Southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan, minor changes to the 75th GA’s force composition, recent military exercises by STC’s 75th GA in Tibet and historical precedent.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

19. The Lion, the Wolf Warrior and the Crossroads: UK-China Relations at a Turning Point

Author:
Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May visited China with a British business delegation, seeking a free trade deal and expressing optimism over Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula for governing Hong Kong (Global Times, January 31, 2018; Zaobao, January 31, 2018). In her first foreign trip since moving into 10 Downing Street, she promised that the “golden era of relations” between the UK and China would be even better after Brexit (Xinhua, February 1, 2018). Since May’s visit, however, a great deal has happened to move UK-China relations in the opposite direction, with the PRC’s suppression of mass demonstrations in Hong Kong (Global Times, July 29, 2020); the implementation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law that London sees as a breach of “one country, two systems” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], June 12, 2020); the British riposte in offering a path to citizenship for Hong Kongers (Gov.cn, April 14, 2021); and the escalation of tensions between China and its trading partners, particularly the UK’s closest ally, America (FMPRC, September 24, 2021; Xinhua, October 5, 2021). The British establishment, like their American cousins, have changed tack on China of late. In June 2022, MI5 Director Ken McCallum and FBI Director Chris Wray gave a joint address warning business and academic leaders in Britain of the “massive shared challenge” posed by China (MI5, July 6, 2022). Two years earlier, McCallum said that if Russian behavior is like “bursts of bad weather,” then “China is changing the climate” (CIGI, June 2, 2022). Last November, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, referring to UK-China relations, said that “the so-called ‘golden era’ is over, along with the naive idea that trade would lead to social and political reform” in the People’s Republic (ThePrint, November 29. 2022). Even the pro-engagement business weekly Beijing to Britain admits that no one in the UK Parliament “believes that an enriched Chinese middle class will steer the country towards democracy” (Beijing to Britain, January 24, 2021). Britain’s conundrum in stabilizing commercial relations with Beijing while heeding American sensibilities is as difficult as at any time since Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972. Meanwhile in Beijing, the decades-old ordeal of striving to play the British off against the Americans has become an increasingly uphill battle. In fact, much of today’s menu of bilateral issues between London and Beijing, with the Washington factor always hovering in the background, might be familiar to Clement Atlee, Winston Churchill, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. That brings some predictability to the rollercoaster ride of UK-China relations, but unsettling variables have changed the course of relations and pushed London, not to mention the rest of NATO, ever closer to Washington. Specific aspects of the PRC’s increasingly destabilizing and aggressive policies that have rankled London include the removal of Hong Kong as a centerpiece of the UK-China bilateral relationship; and Beijing’s announcement immediately prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that “the Sino-Russian cooperation has no limits, no exclusion zone, no ceiling” (中俄合作没有止境 ,没有禁区,没有上限) (Global Times, December 24, 2021; Gov.cn, February 4, 2022).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia

20. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Socio-Cultural and Political Implications for Pakistan Amid Covid19 and the Way Forward

Author:
Mubeen Adnan and Reema Murad
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Through the ‘game changer’ project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor, China is aiming to stabilize its western part by promoting investment and economic development in its neighbour to the West, Pakistan, which will lead to a boost in the Pakistani economy through investments in infrastructure and construction of gas and oil pipeline. There is also the aim of reducing extremism in the Xinjiang region. However, there are several social, cultural and political changes that the project has the potential to bring about in Pakistan. This research work has made an attempt to understand the variousimplications of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor on Pakistan as well as how the COVID-19 pandemic impacted CPEC and the path ahead as the world slowly transitions out of COVID-19. This research paper has used secondary sources in order to answer these pertinent topics. Major opportunities which Pakistan and China have gained through this ChinaPakistan economic Corridor as well as some challenges are also discussed.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Investment, Economic Development, COVID-19, and Opportunity
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

21. Deciphering Pakistan Navy’s Role in CPEC Security: A Comprehensive Security Approach

Author:
Shabana Fayyaz and Nabeel Hussain
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Contemporary geo-political and geo-economics potentialities creates new horizons for the bilateral relations between states. These potential arrangements require security as a pre-requisite, both traditional and nontraditional domain. Pakistan Navy is dealing with these security threats from a comprehensive security approach. Through Task Force-88 and Task Force-150 as well as the Force Protection Battalion (FPB) for the security of CPEC from foreign actors, it has made enormous efforts to protect the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from new challenges and threats. This demonstrates that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Pakistan Navy might accomplish compressive security through joint efforts. The protection and defence of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and the maritime-based economy are also enshrined in Pakistan's maritime doctrine. The Pakistan Navy's active engagement in Pakistan's security sector has also opened doors for the improvement of bilateral ties between various countries through the AMAN Exercises, a global collaboration of 45 nations to combat rising security threats.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Non-Traditional Threats, and CPEC
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and South Asia

22. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

23. U.S. Relations With China: DACOR Conference Summary

Author:
Keith McCormick and Emma W. Sandifer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
As relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) loom ever larger for the U.S., DACOR’s annual conference in 2022 focused on “Balancing Competing Interests in U.S. Relations With China.” The Washington-based organization of foreign affairs professionals brought together diplomats and academics to explore the idea that U.S. policy toward China needs to pursue cooperation in some areas and competition in others while simultaneously confronting Beijing and preparing to deter or win a conflict, if it comes to war. The hybrid conference, with some attendees present at the historic DACOR-Bacon house and others joining online, was conducted under Chatham House Rules. The keynote address, by Ambassador (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, was live-streamed to a classroom of political science faculty and students at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Meloni at the Helm: What Does Italy’s New Government Mean for Sino-Italian Relations?

Author:
Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Questions about the unity of Italy’s new government on several key foreign policy issues persist, ranging from the extent of its support for Ukraine to its commitment to various European Union institutions. However, on the issue of China, the new government of Prime Minister (PM) Giorgia Meloni appears united. This bodes well for transatlantic cooperation and could spell trouble for Beijing, which not too long ago entertained ideas of using Italy as a friendly counterweight in Europe. Under Meloni, Italian foreign policy, particularly toward China, is unlikely to chart a dramatically new course. This is largely because the current government has prioritized its commitment to NATO and needs to focus on domestic issues rather than risk upsetting the international arena. While openings remain for Sino-Italian cooperation in economic terms, such cooperation will be geared toward supporting Italy’s domestic challenges and is unlikely to provide Beijing with the significant foothold that it has long hoped to gain in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

25. China Increases Support for Pakistan’s Naval Modernization with an Eye on the Indian Ocean

Author:
Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In mid-July, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the Pakistan Navy (PN) held the “Sea Guardians-2” exercise in the waters off Shanghai (China Brief, October 4; Pakistan Television, July 12). The joint naval drills focused on neutralizing maritime security threats, particularly those that might jeopardize strategic sea lanes. The bilateral exercise also included joint target practice, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and anti-missile drills (China Military Online [CMO], July 10). The drills built on the first iteration of the exercise, Sea Guardians-1, which was held in January 2020 in the North Arabian Sea off Karachi, Pakistan. The participation in these exercises of the guided missile frigate Taimur, which is the most advanced warship built by China for the PN, demonstrates the increasing level of Chinese support for the training and modernization of Pakistan’s naval forces (Global Times, July 10). Bilateral military ties, which are a mainstay of the China-Pakistan all-weather friendship and strategic partnership, have strengthened in recent years. China is the main supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, which from 2017-2021 absorbed nearly 47 percent of all Chinese arms exports (China Brief, March 25). In a move to further deepen defense ties, China provided Pakistan with J-10C multi-role fighters in late 2021 (South Asian Voices , April 12). In June, a high-powered Pakistani delegation comprising top brass from the army, navy and air force paid a visit to China at a time when tensions between China and the West were on the rise (CMO, June 12). The visit was part of the Pakistan-China Joint Military Cooperation Committee (PCJMCC), which is the highest body involved in facilitating bilateral defense cooperation. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa also attended the top-level committee’s meeting, along with senior-most counterparts in the PLA. Both countries vowed to further deepen their strategic partnership in challenging times and enhance their joint military cooperation in training, technology and counterterrorism (Express Tribune , June 12).
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Navy, Modernization, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, Asia, and Indian Ocean

26. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

27. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

28. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

29. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

30. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia

31. China and Pakistan: Strains in the All-Weather Partnership?

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
China and Pakistan have formally launched Phase II of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship venture in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing on February 3-6 for the Winter Olympics, the two sides signed a Framework Agreement on Industrial Cooperation to kick off the second phase of CPEC, which will focus on the development and industrialization of special economic zones (SEZs) (Pakistan Today, February 4). The joint statement issued at the end of Khan’s visit noted that “the two sides signed or concluded a number of agreements / MoUs, covering bilateral cooperation in areas of economic and technical, industry, investment, infrastructure, space, vaccine, digitalization, standardization, disaster management, culture, sports, and vocational education” (for the full text of the China-Pakistan joint statement see People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6). According to Pakistan’s Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM) on CPEC Affairs Khalid Mansoor, CPEC’s second phase will attract multi-billion dollar investments to Pakistan. Representatives of around 500 Chinese companies met with Khan in Beijing, and per the Prime Minister’s remarks to Pakistani media following the visit, expressed interest in investing in industry, agriculture, information technology, infrastructure, housing and construction, mining and oil refining (Business Recorder, February 8). The big question, however, is whether this ostensible interest from Chinese businesses will translate into hard cash commitments. China is concerned over the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan. In the run-up to Khan’s visit, Pakistani militants carried out several major attacks in the country. On January 17, the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, opened fire on a security checkpoint in Islamabad (Dawn, January 19). A few days later, the newly formed Baluch Nationalist Army (BNA) carried out a bomb attack in a busy market in Lahore (Express Tribune, January 20). Hours before Khan left for China, Baluch militants struck again, this time attacking security forces’ camps in Panjgur and Naushki in Baluchistan province in southwestern Pakistan (Dawn, February 2). Then on February 5, the TTP killed five Frontier Corps personnel at a security checkpoint in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Dawn, February 7). Last year, Pakistan suffered 207 terrorist attacks, a 42% increase over 2020, according to a study by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an independent think-tank based in Islamabad. Fatalities from terror attacks increased by 51% over the previous year. [1] Worryingly for Beijing, Pakistani militant groups have increasingly threatened Chinese nationals. Four of the attacks in 2021 targeted Chinese nationals and at least 17 Chinese workers were killed in these attacks. As China and Pakistan move into Phase II of CPEC, the safety of Chinese projects and personnel in Pakistan will be a key concern.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

32. What is at Stake in China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations?

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Satellite imagery reveals that China has recently accelerated construction along its border with Bhutan. Underway since 2020, the project includes over 200 structures, with several two-story buildings in six locations (Times of India, January 13). Bhutan has not commented on the situation in keeping with its policy to refrain from public discussion of border issues, whereas Beijing has framed the development as “normal construction activities on its own territory” (The Hindu, January 13). India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has acknowledged that it is monitoring China’s bridge-building activities over the Pangong Tso lake (India MEA, January 6). In late December, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the “standardization” of the names of 15 places (eight residential areas, four mountains, two rivers, and one mountain pass) in the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims and calls “Southern Tibet” (藏南, Zangnan). This is the second instance of China renaming localities in Arunachal Pradesh; the first occurred in 2017 (Global Times, December 30, 2021). India called it a “ridiculous exercise to support untenable territorial claims” (Indian MEA, January 6). Though 2022 has only begun, China’s various intimidation tactics against India are already in full swing: from renaming places and circulating videos of People’s Liberation Army soldiers raising the five-starred red flags of China, supposedly, in the Galwan Valley as part of their New Year celebrations, to expanding its dual use infrastructure along the Himalayan border (Global Times, January 1; The Print, January 13). According to state media, China has been strengthening infrastructure-related projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Beijing claims its infrastructure push in Tibet is intended to support economic development, but the Indian side interprets the projects as serving dual use, or, military purposes (China Brief, November 19, 2021). While Chinese sources claim that India was making a “fuss,” they did not, however, entirely deny these reports (Global Times, January 19).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Bhutan

33. The U.S.-China Perception Gap: A Recipe for Disaster?

Author:
Harry He
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In December, a war of words raged across the Pacific over the very meaning of the word “democracy” (China Brief, December 14, 2021). The United States held its Summit for Democracy, inviting other democracies of various stripes, while China convened its own competing “Dialogue on Democracy,” calling out the U.S. for fomenting a cold war-style global geopolitical split (CGTN, December 2, 2021; U.S. Department of State). This discourse battle exemplifies a trend in Chinese views of the U.S. that has been gradually forming over the past 15 years. The 2008 global financial crisis, ill-fated American military campaigns, and mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic have led Chinese leaders to doubt U.S. power and capabilities. Yet, Washington has held on to the belief that it is capable of shaping China’s behaviors, either through inducement or deterrence. Even as the U.S. recognizes the limits of its influence and the recent relative decline in prestige, it still sees tremendous strengths in its military and economic prowess, alliance networks, democratic values, and soft power. The perception gap between China and the U.S. concerning American power is a potential recipe for disaster. While this does not imply that conflict is imminent or unavoidable, it does make miscalculations and miscommunications in the U.S.-China relationship both more likely and more dangerous.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Discourse, and Perception
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

34. Pak-China Geostrategic Interdependence: Impact on Rising Economies of Asia

Author:
Ameena Nasim
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
China and Pakistan have enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship during the last seven decades. Both the nations‘ leadership pronounced the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan as the ―All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership‖ and ―Iron Brother.‖ The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has a significant impact on the Asian strategic environment in particular and global politics. The Indian strategic enclave regards China-Pakistan‘s multifaceted relationship as a substantial obstacle for India‘s rise as a Great Power within the regional context. The study‘s primary objective is to critically examine impact on Asia‘s main actors such as India and Russia. So that one can profess about the dynamics of this relationship and implications of China and Pakistan‘s geo-strategic relations on the rising economies. A qualitative study with qualitative interviews and thematic analysis was applied to conduct this study. The analysis reveals that South Asian RSC has no change in the patterns of amity and enmity. The region continues to be conflictive, where their enduring rivalry and continued distrust shape enmity patterns between Pakistan and India. On the contrary, Pakistan and China‘s amity patterns can be seen growing in the longstanding strategic relationship and deep-rooted cooperation. The investigation discovers that on a bilateral level, several new factors in the post-9/11 era have molded Pakistan-China Strategic relations, which have intricate linkages with the regional and global security complexion.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, Interdependence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, and Asia

35. When only China wants to play: Institutional turmoil and Chinese investment in Brazil

Author:
Niels Sondergaard, Ana Flavia Barros-Platiau, and Hyeyoon Park
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The political and institutional crisis in Brazil from 2015, fueled largely by corruption probes and lawfare, had severe repercussions within the Brazilian construction and energy sectors. While many international investors withdrew from Brazil in this period, Chinese investment surged. This article accounts for the particular characteristics of Chinese investments, such as sectorial complementarities, risk assessment, market size attraction, and state-drivenness, which may explain this development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Investment, and Institutions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

36. The Coronavirus: Fueling Concerns and Contrasts between India and China

Author:
Tanvi Madan
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
On February 26, 2020, an Indian plane landed in Wuhan carrying medical supplies for China, which was then the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak. On its return, it evacuated a number of Indian and Bangladeshi nationals, as well as citizens of other countries. On the face of it, this is the kind of cooperative effort that is expected during a global public health crisis, with countries—even competitors—coming together at a time of need. However, the saga of that flight reflected another (prescient) dynamic—that COVID-19 would reinforce and increase rather than alleviate competition between China and India and complicate cooperation, with pandemic response and recovery efforts being seen through a competitive prism. That flight to Wuhan was not smooth; indeed, it was much delayed. Delhi had announced it a week earlier. It was a way to help China, demonstrate India’s capacity, and assist India’s neighbors by evacuating their citizens. But then Indian officials publicly, albeit anonymously, revealed that Beijing was not clearing the flight. The reason was unclear—China, after all, had been requesting international support. There also did not seem to be a bureaucratic snafu. So, was it the visual of Beijing accepting support from India, which Chinese officials and analysts sometimes dismiss as a less capable, even chaotic, neighbor? Was it the desire not to give India a soft power win, including with its neighbors? Was it because the flight involved a military transport aircraft procured from the U.S.? Was it retaliation for the temporary Indian detention of a Chinese ship bound for Pakistan due to a tip-off of dual-use items on board? Or was the reason Chinese unhappiness about Indian travel restrictions to and from China, or Indian export limits on certain medical products? Whatever the reason, China eventually gave the flight clearance, but only a week later and after much Indian negotiation. It was an early sign that the public health arena would not be immune from the competitive atmosphere prevailing between the two countries, and in the region as a whole. Subsequent events only bore that out. There has been considerable discussion about how countries’ perceptions of China would change due to the pandemic—at the beginning because of its mishandling, and then because of its recovery. This chapter argues that, rather than change perceptions, Beijing’s handling of COVID-19 increased the largely skeptical views of China that prevail in India, which had at least 29 million cases and over 385,000 deaths in India by mid-June 2021 (the 2nd and 3rd highest in the world respectively). This trend was further bolstered by the worst boundary crisis between the two countries since they fought a war in 1962. Together, the pandemic and the boundary crisis have ensured that the competitive and conflictual elements of the India-China relationship have been front and center over the last year. They have reinforced and accelerated concerns in India about China’s lack of transparency, its uncertain commitment to the rules-based order, as well as its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and in international institutions. And they have demonstrated that despite Delhi and Beijing’s efforts to cooperate and to stabilize their relationship over the last two decades, it remains a fundamentally competitive one that can spill over into conflict. This chapter examines the impact of first the pandemic and then the boundary crisis on perceptions of China among the Indian government, establishment, and public. It proceeds to outline the consequences of these perceptions on Indian domestic policy, its partnerships with like-minded major and middle powers, and its counter-COVID activism. Finally, it considers China’s response, particularly to Indian policy changes.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

37. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Author:
Ali Haider Saleem and Arhama Siddiqa
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The term Silk Road is used by scholars to describe a network of trading posts and markets linking East Asia to the Mediterranean. In terms of geographical context, the editors of Baku Dialogues define the region as the “geographic space looking west past Anatolia to the warm seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down around in the direc­tion of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent.” States falling under this parasol include China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan, and Russia. China’s Belt and Road Initia­tive (BRI), which traverses several continents, is a long‑term, strategic investment plan with the objective of facilitating economic integration of countries in line with the historic Silk Road. In April 2015, China’s President, Xi Jinping announced the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which amounts to BRI’s flagship project. This en­terprise, which encompasses road, rail, and oil pipeline links, will help Beijing advance its influence across South and Central Asia.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and Asia

39. China-India New Intricacies: Rivalry and Cooperation in a New Changing Global Context

Author:
Buddhi Prasad Sharma
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Borders, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

40. China's Belt and Road Initiative and Georgia: A Short Overview

Author:
Ekaterine Lomia
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the 2000s, China has embarked on an unprecedented path of economic development, as evidence of which is the largest economic project of the XXI century initiated by the People's Republic of China. The global Belt and Road Initiative announced by the first person of the country, Xi Jinping, is a shortened name of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘XXI Century Maritime Silk Road’. It covers the Asia-Pacific, Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia, and Africa and involves more than a hundred countries, international organizations, and leading economic actors. The main participants in the project are China, Mongolia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, and India. The article reviews the role of the Chinese project in a global context. The paper focuses on the role and purpose of Georgia in the Belt and Road Initiative. This study will try to reveal the results for the benefit of Georgia, which is one of the participating countries, and the role of China through research to be made from documents and academic studies on the subject. Georgia tries to conduct its relations with China, as a partner in the project, with a policy of balance without disturbing its relations with the West.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Georgia

41. Early Days of Sino-Pakistan Relations

Author:
Muhammad Tariq and Adnan Saleem
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Pakistan and China got independence one after another. China of Chiang-Kai-Shek had very little interest in Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent. However, they were hostile to the division of Subcontinent on religious ground. When Pakistan got independence, it did not receive any felicitations from China; on the other hand Pakistan took no interest in Chinese revolution. Pakistan only got activated when India became the floor-runner in recognition of China. After Indian recognition, Pakistan also recognized China. The real test of relationship was, when India stopped supply of coal for Pakistani trains and Chinese helped Pakistan, Pakistan on the other hand refused to condemn China in 1950s Korean War. The start of the relationship was neither warm nor cold. Pakistan had assumed that China was a neighbor and neighbor can not be changed. Moreover in case of Chinese assumption of Security Council seat, Pakistanis realized that Kashmir question would be discussed at UN, therefore, close and friendly relationship with China was necessary but Pakistan also needed economic and military assistance which could only come from Western block. However, maintaining normal relations with China was considered necessary. Therefore, Pakistan strongly supported Chinese‟ entry into UN Security Council and at Bandung Conference.
Topic:
NATO, Bilateral Relations, History, and Buddhism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Himalayas

42. Chinese Investments in Brazil: Economic Diplomacy in Bilateral Relations

Author:
Virginia Soledad Busilli and Maria Belen Jaime
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China has consolidated its status as a great power and strengthened its presence in different regions of the planet. In accordance with its economic development strategy, Beijing’s growing bond with Latin America is part of China’s need to guarantee access to raw materials and energy resources. In this framework and through economic diplomacy, China has strengthened its trade relations, as well as loans and investments in most of the region’s countries.Brazil is an example of this relationship pattern, as one of China’s most important partners and top investment destination in Latin America. It became Beijing’s top commercial partner in 2012. This paper will analyse the composition and evolution of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil between the years of 2004 and 2020. In order to do so, we will study the main projects carried out by the country, as well as the characteristics of the Chinese companies (state or non-state) that participated in the process, in order to understand their most important features. Likewise, we will analyse the articulation of the Chinese FDI with its trade flows. We will start from the premise that Chinese investments in Brazil are directly linked to Beijing’s strategic interests, while at the same time guided by market logics that try to maximise profits. In this vein, within the framework of the ‘going out strategy’,state companies play a fundamental role.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

43. Defence diplomatic relations between Poland and China and how they can be improved

Author:
Lech Drab
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The main purpose of the article is to examine diplomatic relations between China (official name: the People’s Republic of China) and Poland with a special focus on defence. It also gives an overall assessment of the relations between the armed forces of the two countries and evaluates what has been achieved so far and possible involvements that the countries (especially Poland) should take. A comparative analysis and a historical approach were used whilst investigating the facts. Qualitative research, including participant observation, archival resources, analysis and selection of studies, reports and expertise were the methods employed for collecting research material. Comparative studies were used to analyse other countries’ relations with China to help come to a conclusion. Based on the research, the author recommends an intensification of defence diplomacy between Poland and China which would bring a number of defence and economic benefit to both Warsaw and Beijing. The latest changes in the global balance of power, especially economic, political and military, should be taken into account in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive and long-term strategic programme in the field of defence diplomacy between Poland and China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

44. U.S. Trade Policy toward China: Learning the Right Lessons

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Labor market and cultural disruptions in the United States are real and important, as is China’s current and unfortunate turn toward illiberalism and empire. But pretending today that there was a better trade policy choice in 2000—when Congress granted China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status and paved the way for broader engagement—is misguided. It assumes too much, ignores too much, and demands too much. Worse, it could lead to truly bad governance: increasing U.S. protectionism; forgiving the real and important failures of our policymakers, CEOs, and unions over the last two decades; and preventing a political consensus for real policy solutions. Indeed, that is happening now.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. Myanmar’s Foreign Strategy Toward China Since Rohingya Crisis: Changes, Outlook and Implications

Author:
Jaesoo Park
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Myanmar has crafted a neutral foreign policy since its colonial years to avoid leaning too much on any foreign power, but a spiraling political crisis at home is pushing it toward China as a buffer against international outrage. Myanmar faces charges of genocide against the Rohingya. China has backed Myanmar in the UN. In fact, China is in a similar situation. China is grappling with international criticism over the perceived repression of ethnic Uighur people. Myanmar is exposed to various words and loud in the international community. So Myanmar wants to improve relations with China and is turning into an active cooperative attitude as a strategy to secure a friendly army. This paper shows how the diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China are changing, and how Myanmar’s foreign strategy toward China is approaching. Also, this article analyzes the outlook of diplomatic relations and the implications of the current situation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Rohingya
Political Geography:
China, Myanmar, and Indo-Pacific

46. “Mainlandization” of Hong Kong, A Model of Influence, Resistance and Adjustment

Author:
Lukasz Zamecki
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The aim of this article, based on the author’s field research in Hong Kong and critical analysis of publications, is to conceptualize the process of “mainlandization” of the Hong Kong SAR. “Mainlandization” is understood here as the process of transfer and institutionalization of political visions, policy paradigms, procedures, and norms which originate from the PRC. The model is inspired by various theoretical perspectives (e.g. diffusion of regimes, dependence, political convergence, and processes of “Europeanization”). The article differentiates the “top-down” transfer of values and/or policy standards and the “bottom-up” adjustment. All institutions engaged in intermediation (such as the “one country, two systems” principle) are mentioned, as well as the processes connected to the reaction to PRC activity in Hong Kong and their variations (e.g. accommodation, resistance, resignation). Moreover, the concept of “sinoscepticism” is introduced.
Topic:
Politics, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Institutions, Autonomy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

47. Fair-Weather Friends: The Impact of the Coronavirus on the Strategic Partnership Between Russia and China

Author:
Johan Van de Ven
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In June 2019, during a visit to the Kremlin by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation announced that they had “agreed…to upgrade their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” (Xinhua, June 6, 2019). This continued the warming of bilateral relations nurtured by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have met at least 30 times during their respective tenures. The strengthening of ties has seen unusually relaxed encounters between the pair, such as when they made blini (traditional Russian pancakes) together in Vladivostok in September 2018 (People’s Daily, September 12, 2018). In more substantive terms, support from Chinese state-linked financial institutions has played a critical role in the construction of a new wave of Russian energy infrastructure, ranging from the Yamal Liquified Natural Gas Project to the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline. However, the ongoing COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak has opened a stress fracture in the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship. After weeks of gradually escalating restrictions, reports emerged in late February that Moscow public transit drivers had been instructed to call police if they witnessed Chinese passengers using the transit system (Wangyi Keji, February 25). The PRC Embassy in Russia warned that such actions “will harm the good atmosphere for developing Chinese-Russian relations” (Novaya Gazeta, February 25). While China was initially restrained it its public criticism of Russian measures taken in the course of the COVID-19 epidemic, the decision of the PRC Embassy in Moscow to highlight the discrimination being faced by Chinese citizens in Moscow is a reminder of just how quickly tensions can arise between the two countries, even in the age of “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

48. China-Iran Relations: The Not-So-Special “Special Relationship”

Author:
John Calabrese
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Over the years, unremitting hostility between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has created opportunities as well as dilemmas for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and the subsequent adoption of a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, presented mixed challenges and opportunities for the PRC. Beijing has sought to exploit the rift between Washington and Tehran without further fueling Sino-American tensions. For the past year, Washington and Tehran have been locked in an action-reaction cycle of escalation. This dangerous spiral reached new heights with the January 2 U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani, which was followed by retaliatory Iranian missile attacks on two coalition bases in Iraq that injured dozens of American troops. Although both sides managed to pull back from the brink of war in early January, underlying tensions remain—as does the possibility of a more direct military confrontation. In what manner and to what extent has the current unstable situation affected China’s interests in, and relationship with, Iran? What is the likelihood that, as this latest round of high-stakes poker between Washington and Tehran continues to unfold, Beijing will seize it as yet another opportunity to profit from America’s entanglements in the wider Middle East?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

49. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term.” [1]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

50. Analytical Review of Pak-China Strategic Cooperation 1950-2017

Author:
Muhammad Azhar Naeem and Abdul Majid
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The present study is aimed to provide analytical review of Pak-China strategic cooperation starting from 1950 to 2017. Pakistan started to establish her strategic relations with the outer world soon after her independence in 1947 in order to maintain balance of power in the region. Bilateral ties remained very encouraging from the beginning of Pak-China relations. However, bilateral ties touch its heights in the decade of 1960s. After 1960s, bilateral relation turned to diplomatic relations because of changing world scenario i.e. cold war, terrorism, One China Policy and change of world order. Still China helped Pakistan financially, technologically and assisted in developing nuclear program. In 21st century, relations became stronger of and both the nations started helping each other to materialize their goals in diverse fields. One such example is the implementation of (China – Pakistan Economic Corridor) CPEC which is expected to change the fate of both the countries in future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and Asia

51. China Pakistan Ties: Challenges and Implications for the region (2013-2018)

Author:
Rabia Bashir
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
China’s active role in South Asia is based on a “win-win” approach which is also beneficial for the economic progress of the regional states. China’s rapid economic integration represents its intention to maintain peace and stability in its vicinity. To hold its presence in the Indian Ocean region it is developing strong economic and trade ties with South Asian states. This region has become a center of attention where the interests of major powers China, India and the United States intersects. The joint venture of “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” strategically holds huge significance for China, Pakistan and major powers like India and the US being rival to China. This corridor will enhance the economic conditions of not only China and Pakistan but also the other developing and the landlocked states of CARs and Afghanistan.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and Asia

52. CPEC and Re-Orientation of China-Pakistan Relations

Author:
Muhammad Ikram
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The ̳One Belt One Road‘ term refers to ̳The Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt. This mega initiative was announced by Chinese president, Xi Jiping, in September 2013 during his official state visit to Kazakhstan. Pakistan is most important pillar of this Chinese initiative. Under the One Belt One Road framework, several corridors will be built in future. Whereas, with the development of OBOR, regional economies will boost up to $2.5 trillion and more than 4.4 billion population will get benefits across 65 countries. The Silk Road Economic Belt will link China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe through the Persian Gulf and South East Asia and Indian Ocean. However, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will be built to connect the Pakistan's Port Gawadar with Chinese city of Kashagar in autonomous province Xinjiang. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is a game changer for the region and particularly for China and Pakistan, through the development of roads, railways, oil and gas pipe lines. Thus, the project brings wealth and prosperity across the region, particularly in Pakistan. But on the other hand, Pakistan is facing serious internal and external threats from terrorism and extremism since 2001. This work is an attempt to enlighten the prospects of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and constraints in the way of this mega projects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Peace, Economic Development, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and Asia

53. Sino-US Kashmir Policy: Analyzing The Bilateral Approach

Author:
Sumeera Imran and Lubna Abid Ali
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Sino-Indian stand-off in Galwan has revived world attention to the dispute in Kashmir. Indian revocation of Article 370 and Article 35-A propped up diverse responses from the international community. China condemned Indian abrogation and the US offered to mediate on Kashmir. Trump’s offer of mediation opened up a pandora box of strong opposition in Indian Lok Sabha. Resolute criticism unleashed on Modi for compromising on Indian national security objectives and territorial integrity. Reflecting the urgency and complications involved in conflict resolution, the propensity of nuclear confrontation in South Asia remains high in Kashmir. US Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has declared Human Rights in Kashmir as integral part of his electoral agenda. The US State Department has declared no change in its historic Kashmir policy, while China has resented Indian unilateral change in the region’s status. Great powers’ involvement in regional conflicts has been fluid, fluctuating with the change in their national security interests. Broad contours of national security objectives have shaped Sino-US Kashmir policy in the past. Employing qualitative research methodology and theoretical perspective of complex interdependence, the article reviews Sino-US traditional policy roles in conflict resolution on Kashmir. How has the US and Chinese Kashmir policy evolved over the years? What impact does the US and Chinese Kashmir policy has on regional stability? The article argues that great powers’ involvement has inflicted more injury than cure, exacerbating regional tensions. Great powers’ alignment along opposite poles has increased India-Pakistan bilateral hostilities on Kashmir. Sino-US insistence on Indo-Pakistan bilateral approach for conflict resolution rather than the UN framework has created the impasse on Kashmir.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
China, Kashmir, and United States of America

54. The First Contacts between China and Poland in History

Author:
Bi Wei
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Poland is one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of China. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties 70 years ago, both countries have conducted close cooperation in all areas and the bilateral relations have witnessed steady development. In particular, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, launched in 2013, got the positive responses and support from many countries, including Poland, which became an important partner for China to promote the construction of the initiative. This paper, from a historical perspective, reviews the first interaction between China and Poland in the period of Yuan Dynasty which is arranged in chronological order. The narrations mainly concentrate on accounts of the western expeditions by Genghis Khan and his descendants as well as the Battle of Legnica, during the period of which the Mongolia Empire was successively set up. Each entry will include a concrete description, highlighting where possible issues such as where the Mongolia went, why the expedition and its record are important. The paper also expounds the first record about Poland and the change of the name of Poland in Chinese literature so as to deepen the mutual understanding between two countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Poland

55. New Silk Road – An Opportunity for the Development of Rail Container Transport in Poland?

Author:
Aleksandra Bartosiewicz and Paulina Szterlik
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Poland, due to its location in the center of Europe, is a key element of the New Silk Road (NSR), an initiative that attempts to create the shortest land connection between China and Western Europe. This article analyzes various industry reports, national development strategies up to 2030, and EU and local projects to see is the further development of NSR an opportunity for container rail transport in Poland. As it turns out, the issue discussed in the article has hitherto been outside the circle of researchers’ interest, thus the analysis is an important supplement to the existing research gap. It indicates that the further participation of Poland in the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative is a great opportunity for the economic growth of the Republic of Poland (RP).
Topic:
Development, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, Transportation, and Railways
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Poland

56. A Look at Taiwan's Cooperation with Paraguay (2009-2019)

Author:
Maria Antonella Cabral Lopez
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
Taiwan's situation in the international system is particular and the recognition of other states is key to its survival. Paraguay has maintained diplomatic relations with this Asian country continuously since 1957. This research aims to describe the south - south cooperation of Taiwan with Paraguay during the period 2009 - 2019, a very important facet of the bilateral relationship between both parties. For this, a bibliographic-documentary research was used. In addition is important to mention the level of this was descriptive and primary and secondary sources were employed. Among the main results obtained, it can be seen that non-reimbursable cooperation projects are being adjusted according to five-year negotiations, that there is some continuity regarding the issues addressed by technical cooperation and the existence of other less known initiatives such as conferences and participation in fairs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, South America, and Paraguay

57. Is China’s Innovation a Threat to the South Korea-China Economic Relationship?

Author:
Wonho Yeon
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper reviews China’s technological rise and assesses whether it poses a threat to the South Korean economy. In terms of comparative advantage between the two countries, many experts have long believed that China’s strength is low-cost labor and Korea’s is technology and capital. However, this has changed as China’s economy grows. Now China has enough capital to invest in its economy. Some scholars even argue that China has the potential to meet its “innovation imperative” and emerge as a driving force in innovation on a global level.1 This paper examines the Korea-China economic relationship from the innovation productivity perspective, organized into sections: briefly introducing the Korea- China economic relationship; describing the technological rise of China, based on recent data; developing the model to analyze the innovation productivity of China and report the estimation results; evaluating the concern of the South Korean semiconductor industry; and presenting conclusions.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Science and Technology, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

58. U.S. Policy Options Toward China: An Appraisal

Author:
Simon Lester
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Most Americans will agree that the Chinese government has behaved badly in a number of ways, although they may not agree on exactly which Chinese government behavior is a problem. Perhaps it’s the treatment of ethnic or religious minorities, such as the Uighurs or Tibetans or Christians; maybe it’s the crackdown on protests in Hong Kong and failure to uphold the “one country, two systems” principle; or assertiveness in territorial disputes; or censorship; or protectionist trade practices; or intellectual property theft; or cyber‐​hacking; or spying; or most recently, being slow to disclose the emergence of the coronavirus and engaging in a propaganda war regarding who is at fault. It’s a long list, and everyone has their own priorities. But while there is loose agreement on the existence of a problem, there is great difficulty in coming up with an appropriate response. What can or should the United States government do about any of this? Is it possible to change the behavior of other governments? Is the U.S. government in a position to do it? Is it appropriate to do so?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. India-China relations reconsidered: A realist perspective on India´s border dispute with its neighbour

Author:
Jayanta Kumar Ray
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
India’s relations with Communist China have evolved through various twists and turns. India’s lack of realist approach and naiveté about emerging global politics helped China in gaining an upper hand over India in achieving regional dominance particularly displayed through the bilateral disputes over the border determination. While the defeat of 1962 is a distant past, it has continued to wield great influence over India’s overall approach towards China. This article, thus, goes for a reappraisal of the border issues which have and still continue to influence Indo-China relations.
Topic:
Communism, History, Bilateral Relations, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

60. The United States Foreign Policy Towards ChinA: Invalidity of Convergence and Integration in Facing an XXI Century China

Author:
Bama Andika Putra
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The US faces many dilemmas in facing an XXI century China. The recent crisis that has occurred in the South China Sea and issues related to the trade war between the two global powers have significantly divided the positions of both states in world affairs. The US policy of engagement and coercion, forcing China into the US liberal order has shown slow progress. Therefore, it is critical to re-evaluate the US foreign policy strategy in facing an XXI century China, which shows discontent towards the values that are promoted by the US. This paper critically analyzes the US foreign policy approach to China, provides key elements of its success, and concludes the major issues faced throughout the process of interacting with the modern global superpower known as China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Liberalism, and Integration
Political Geography:
United States and China

61. A State Visit by Kazakhstan’s President Demonstrates China’s Increasing Influence in Central Asia

Author:
Leo Lin
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on September 10-12 was not merely a state visit, but also signaled a new era in bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China. During his visit, Tokayev met top officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and Li Zhanshu, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Tokayev also stopped in Hangzhou, where he visited the headquarters of the Alibaba Group and spoke with founder Jack Ma, as well as the new chairman and CEO Daniel Zhang (Sina Tech, September 12). The September visit has symbolic meaning for both Xi and Tokayev as they prepare for a new stage of their partnership—in the same year as the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, and the 30th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan

62. The Prospects for Sino-Indian Relations During Modi’s Second Term

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On May 30, Narendra Modi was sworn in for a second term as India’s Prime Minister. Conspicuous by their absence at the inauguration ceremony were Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan; Lobsang Sangay, President of the Central Tibetan Authority (CTA), more commonly known as the Tibetan government-in-exile; and Tien Chung-Kwang, Taiwan’s trade representative to India. While Khan was not invited on account of the serious deterioration in India-Pakistan relations since early this year, the absence of Sangay and Tien can be attributed to the Modi government adopting a more cautious approach to China in its second term. Modi’s administration seems keen to avoid needling the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially at a time when Sino-Indian relations are improving (Deccan Herald, May 29). This caution on the part of India notwithstanding, Sino-Indian relations during Modi’s second term (scheduled to run through May 2024) are unlikely to be tension-free.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Tibet

63. Italy Joins the Belt and Road Initiative: Context, Interests, and Drivers

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In March 2019, Italy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a broad and comprehensive, albeit not legally binding, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Italy to join the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has triggered a significant debate—in Brussels as well as in Washington—about whether this decision signalled an Italian shift away from its historical pro-European and pro-Atlantic position, to a more nuanced position open to deepening strategic ties with China. The MoU is not definite proof of such a shift, and the Italian government has denied any strategic change. However, Italy is the first major European country, and the first Group of Seven (G7) member, to formalize its participation with the BRI project. As such, this development is particularly remarkable.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

64. Reevaluation of U.S. Security Policy towards South Asia

Author:
Ahmad Ejaz
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
South Asia has always been regarded as a significant area for the security interests of the United States. In view of the U.S. threat perceptions in Asia, the American policy makers were constantly motivated to construct a stable security system in the region. The U.S. security programme in South Asia actually is predominantly exerted on United States-Pakistan –India triangular relationship. Given its strategic perspective in the area, the U.S. policy is found transferred. During the Cold War days, the U.S. interests were attached with Pakistan. Thus Pakistan was regarded as the „America‟s most allied ally in Asia.‟ With the end of Cold War, the U.S. policy underwent a tremendous change that subsequently picked India as a potential counterweight to China and called it a „natural partner.‟ Eventually, the U.S.-Pakistan relations had been in a depressing setting. However, in the post 9/11 period, the two countries came closer and collaborated in war against terrorism. But this single-issue alliance could not engulf the differences between the partners. This paper attempts to trace the US security policy and its maneuvering in South Asia during and after the Cold War periods.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, International Cooperation, International Security, History, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, South Asia, North America, Punjab, and United States of America

65. U.S.-China Economic Relations Under the Trump Administration at the 2-Year Mark

Author:
Peter Harrell
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since entering office in 2017, President Trump has upended longstanding tenets of U.S. trade policy and launched the most aggressive set of new U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions since at least the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Actions include renegotiating the U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS) and NAFTA, using “Section 232” of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on most steel and aluminum imports into the U.S. in a bid to support U.S. smelters, using “Section 301” of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose tariffs on approximately half of U.S. imports from China, and threatening to use Section 232 to impose tariffs reportedly up to 25% on U.S. imports of automobiles. The administration’s aggressive stance on trade has upended diplomatic relationships and prompted multinational companies to re-consider aspects of their global supply chains. It has also brought retaliation, including Chinese tariffs on most Chinese imports of U.S. goods. European countries and other U.S. allies affected by Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs have also retaliated with tariffs of their own against imports of U.S. goods, with many of the retaliatory tariffs targeting perceived politically important constituencies in the U.S., such as U.S. whisky distillers, who are heavily concentrated in the home state of Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. But Trump’s aggressive trade policies also began to deliver some successes in 2018, including a successful renegotiation of NAFTA, now renamed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), a renegotiated Korea-U.S. FTA, and at least some willingness by European and Japanese officials to discuss greater market access for U.S. products. While many major U.S. importers and trade associations have complained about the tariffs, the tariffs continue to draw support from several of the key constituency groups that they are intended to assist, such as the U.S. steel industry. While U.S. tariffs against imports from allies are seemingly driven largely by the Trump administration’s general protectionist bent, Trump’s trade actions against China reflect a broader set of concerns that is more widely supported by members of the United States congress and American experts outside of government. These include both longstanding U.S. concerns over Chinese trade practices and market access barriers, and growing U.S. geopolitical competition with China—what the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, refers to as the return of “great power competition.” These geopolitical concerns have been central to the administration’s recent aggressive efforts to block the deployment of Huawei telecommunications technologies in new “5G” mobile communications networks around the world, and in the administration’s increasingly vociferous opposition to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). And because of increased U.S.-China geopolitical competition, U.S. use of targeted trade controls, investment restrictions, potential targeted sanctions, and other measures against China, will likely continue even if, as is widely expected, Trump and President Xi reach a broad agreement on many trade issues in the coming months and reduce some of the tariffs that are currently in place.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

66. Just a Dash? China’s Sharp Power and Australia’s Value Diplomacy

Author:
John Fitzgerald
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
When supporters of China’s President Xi Jinping point to his many accomplishments they highlight his impressive anti-corruption drive, the end of the one-child family policy, the intensive monitoring of social organizations and citizens, his reorganization of the party and its armed forces, the unilateral occupation and militarization of contested territories in the South China Sea, and the massive Belt and Road Initiative advanced under his administration. Among these larger accomplishments, one that is easily overlooked is his role in compelling the people and government of Australia to recalibrate their relationship with China. In particular, the actions of his government have triggered a major rethink on the place of values in Australian foreign policy and diplomacy.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

67. The North Korean Factor in the Sino-Russian Alliance

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Kim-Putin summit in April 2019 and the abortive Trump-Kim summit in February 2019 compel us to review Korean issues from the regional security standpoint, rather than primarily as a proliferation question. Despite apparent failure of the Trump-Kim summit, the search for denuclearization and peace in Korea will continue. North Korea is obviously resuming discussions with Russia and China to decide their future course of action, inasmuch as Kim went to Vladivostok. The summit with Putin in April only reinforced those considerations, as it is clear from the subsequent press conference that Kim asked Putin to transmit his views to Washington and that Putin agreed to do so. Likewise, Washington must rethink its approach. Instead of emphasizing denuclearization, Washington would likely benefit from viewing Korean issues primarily as regional security questions. Certainly, Russia and China do so. Therefore, rethinking Russo-Chinese ties to North Korea offers valuable insights in the quest for a lasting Korean peace, especially as Russia and China have become allies.5 The argument of a Sino-Russian alliance is admittedly a minority view among scholars, but the mounting evidence of their alliance is apparent not only in regard to Korea—as the other chapters in this collection show—but in larger military-political affairs as well.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

68. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea

Author:
Robert Sutter
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

69. Sino-Indian Nuclear Dynamics: Taking the Global Lead

Author:
Prakash Menon
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Technology often seduces potential adversaries through a promise of relief from security threats only to deceive through the inevitable action-reaction cycle. In the universe of security, technology is contestable both by technology itself and by doctrinal prescriptions and operational countermeasures. The advantage provided by new technology is mostly ephemeral in that provides the momentum for an endless cycle that is best described as chasing one’s own tail. Only political intervention through mutual understanding, doctrinal prudence, and regulating the search for operational supremacy holds potential to escape the stranglehold of the action-reaction cycle. The elusive search for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a prime example. This paper seeks to interrogate the role of the technology-security dynamics in the context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship. ​ The context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship is clouded by the enhancing reach of India’s missiles[1], the evolving Chinese reaction to U.S. nuclear modernization accompanied by a shift in nuclear posture, and a shared belief in the role of nuclear weapons that is signified by No First Use (NFU) doctrine. The latter point represents political intervention while the two former signify the action-reaction cycle which is primarily a product of technology. However, both China and India must contend with nuclear powers that espouse First Use. China in dealing with the United States and Russia who are quantitatively superior nuclear powers, while India deals with Pakistan whose claims of quantitative superiority are contested. ​ In technological terms, the rise of China and the U.S. reaction resulting in contemporary geopolitical flux at the global level has impacted the evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal. The most prominent illustration of this is China’s reaction to the United States’ withdrawal from the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. Earlier China had eschewed development of BMD, but the United States’ quest to create BMD has caused China to attempt to develop its own BMD system as well as systems that can overcome BMD like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and Hyper Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Similarly, India has reacted to developments in China and Pakistan by launching an indigenous BMD development program...
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, and Asia

70. U.S.-China Relations: The Way Forward

Author:
P. H. Yu
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
As confrontation looms over Washington and Beijing, it is critical to identify the true nature of this challenge from an international relations perspective before any attempt to devise a counter measure. Wrong presumptions or prejudicial interpretations may lead to dire consequences of unforeseeable magnitude. One past example would be the U.S. government’s belief that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) before the American invasion in 2003. A more current example would be the American nuclear anxiety on North Korea and how President Trump bypassed conventional American strategic thinking and circumvented hawkish threats of preemptive nuclear annihilation to resolve a “draconian crisis” via “smart diplomacy.” These examples may shed light on a pathway to resolution for the current U.S.-China trade conflict. The United States and China have ample experience of weathering a crisis on the brink of war, whether it was on the Korean Peninsula or in Indochina. China today remains on the U.S. sanctions list for certain high-tech products and military equipment. Both the Trump administration and Congress continue to criticize China regularly, ranging from human rights to religious rights, from the rule of law to the autocratic political system, from the state-owned banks to restrictive market access to foreign corporations, and from currency manipulation to unfair trade practices.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

71. Working hand in hand to create a brighter future for China and Poland

Author:
Liu Guangyuan
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Ambassador Liu Guangyuan’s keynote speech at the conference on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

72. The 10th Special Measures Agreement between the U.S. and South Korea: Analysis and Implications for Northeast Asia

Author:
Elton J. Chun
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The United States and the Republic of Korea concluded the 10th Special Measures Agreement on February 10, 2019. The two countries agreed to a one-year agreement after difficult negotiations in which Washington demanded that Seoul increase the amount paid to offset the costs of stationing American forces in Korea. Since 1991, Washington and Seoul have concluded 10 Special Measures Agreements. Unlike the previous five-year agreement, the 10th SMA was a “stopgap deal” that covered a one year of bilateral defense budgets with an option of extending the agreement for an additional year; it was the first SMA negotiated by the Trump administration. This article examines the 10th Special Measures Agreement, exploring the history of defense cost sharing between the two countries, effects on South Korea, implications for coordinating policy on North Korea, and influences on Japan, Russia, and China. The article concludes with an assessment on how the 10th Special Measures Agreement and other factors will affect future agreements.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

73. China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations

Author:
Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
China has great power over both Koreas, but its influence looks to be at its peak. There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the two Koreas are moving closer together and in the process shutting out outsiders. Moreover, the U.S., as it seeks to disarm North Korea, is pursuing policies undercutting Beijing’s role on the peninsula. And to make matters worse, China is beginning to limit its own effectiveness.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

74. Chinese Investment and Its Implications for Nigeria’s Economic Security

Author:
Shiitu Adewole Raji and Adenike Ogunrinu
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
The international system consists of different nations which pursue their national interests within the global arena having put into consideration the benefits they stand to gain from such relationships (Ampiah and Sanusha 2015, 8). The explosive growth of China’s economic interests in Africa, which is part of the sustained global interactions discussed above, is an important trend in the continent’s foreign relations arena. China’s rapidly expanding ties with Africa has superseded the United States’ since 2010 as Africa’s top trading partner because of its massive investments in the continent , which is largely aided by China Investible Export loan assistance of $150 billion to its multinational corporations (Brautigam 2009, 22). Between 2001 and 2011, Chinese exports to Africa were raised from $4.4 billion to $56.3 billion. Though China is still regarded as a third world country, the country is the second biggest economy in the world. [..] Although there is a vast body of literature on the bilateral relations between Nigeria and China, little is known about the implications of China’s increasing FDI for the economic security of Nigeria, a gap this paper intends to fill. The study is anchored on descriptive research methodology, consisting of qualitative data, which relied primarily on the existing literature.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Nigeria

75. Why India Won’t Play Its ‘Tibet Card’

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Upon coming to power in May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) adopted a more muscular approach to China than its predecessors. As part of this, it was not averse to using the Dalai Lama and the CTA to gain leverage in its dealings with China. Its recent move to put distance between itself and Dharamsala reflects an understanding that playing the ‘Tibet card’ brought India no benefits. In fact, the failure of the BJP’s four-year gambit reaffirms what many Indian diplomats and scholars have been saying for decades: there is no ‘Tibet card’ for India to play.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Tibet

76. India-China Relations: Conflict and Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Region

Author:
Balwinder Singh
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
From the last three decades, the Indo-Pacific has been a central theme in the global geopolitical scenario. India, China, and several other rising powers have shifted the balance of power. Thus, Indo-Pacific region marks instability and uncertainty especially caused by consistent crises of the world economy. In the present globalized era, both India and China are paramount drivers of the global economy. They are simultaneously reacting to this shifted balance of power in Indo-Pacific region. The actions of China and India towards each other and especially in Indo-Pacific region have significantly changed in last decades. At present, the Indian government has started to focus on Indo-Pacific region. The Trump Administration has focused India to contain China in Indo-Pacific region. At that moment, the Indo-Pacific region has thus become more important region than ever before. The geo-strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region has attracted the main global-powers to preserve their strategic interests in this region. So, the Indo-Pacific has got enormous significance in the present context. From the last few years, the region has got international acknowledgment. The US`s Asia-pivot policy and China’s ‘String of Pearl’ policy have been focusing on India. The geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific region has dragged the western powers to counterweight growing Chinese power. That’s why; Indo-Pacific has shaped the new subject of divergence between China and India. Yet, there is no need to undermine the enlarging economic relations between the two big nations of Asia. This study also examines that how US and Pakistan are affecting the bilateral India-China relations. The study observes that how India and China satisfying their strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the study tries to find out the new issues of cooperation and conflict between the two nations. Thus, the study tries to find out the new issues of cooperation and conflict between the two nations.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

77. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Author:
Kirk W. Larsen
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In July 2014, Ambassador Qiu Guohong in preparation for Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul stated that the “relationship between South Korea and China couldn’t be any better.”1 Among the many reasons for this—economic, geostrategic, cultural—was a shared sense of history. China and Korea, officials and commentators in both nations claimed, were close because of their agreement regarding the significance of their experiences as victims of foreign, particularly Japanese, imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. History, that constellation of memories, stories, and notions about the past, has often been deployed to reinforce conceptions of identity, to support certain courses of action, and to demarcate between the in-group and the other. But history is ever malleable and protean. Not only do individuals, institutions, and ideas change but so does the understanding of them. When one draws on the past, one inevitably focuses on a limited set of events or narratives that best serve one’s interests—to the exclusion of potentially equally valid candidates. Their utility can vary over time; one need only think of how figures such as Zheng He or Confucius have been imagined and re-imagined over the last century. This has been the case with the history of relations between China and Korea from the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For many Chinese, Korea has served first as a subject of contestation as China’s position in Korea was challenged by both Western and Japanese powers. Then, when it became increasingly clear that China (or the Qing Empire) was losing this contest, Korea became an omen of China’s own fate absent significant course changes. As Japan’s growing empire engulfed Korea and subsequently threatened parts of China, resistance served to bring China and Korea closer; many in China celebrated what they saw as courageous resistance to Japan—such as when An Chunggun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Shared status as victims of Japanese imperialism in an age of “humiliation” brought the two closer, and the mutually shared memory of “humiliation” has been deployed by contemporary Chinese and South Korean leaders—Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye—to foster greater levels of cooperation. However, past conceptions of China, Korea, and the Sino-Korean relationship have sometimes ranged far afield from the cherished tropes of humiliation and the struggle for independence. Even seemingly universally agreed upon symbols, such as An’s heroic 1909 assassination, find themselves subject to changing interpretations such as recent emphasis by some on his pan-Asian vision of Sino-Korean-Japanese cooperation rather than his bold anti-Japanese act. As interests and priorities change, so does the utility of any particular historical narrative.
Topic:
International Relations, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

78. Go Global, Meet the Locals: Pragmatism, Plunder, and AntiChinese Populism in Africa

Author:
Richard Aidoo
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
From Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward to Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Up, through Jiang Zemin’s Going Out (also known as the Going Global strategy) to Xi Jinping’s recent Chinese Dream, China has pursued diverse diplomatic engagements with African countries within these broad development visions. These engagements have evolved along with Africa’s changing political and economic circumstances, as well as China’s resurgence as a global economic power. Most significantly, in large parts of the developing world (including Africa), China has shifted away from its support for the struggle for ideological identity to assume geopolitical and geo-economic weight, as anti-imperialism rhetoric and support have given way to its business-is-business mantra, and noninterference diplomacy. In other words, from the late 1970s, Africa encountered Beijing’s gradual shift away from an ideological proselytizer to a global economic adventurer. After the Cold War, Chinese influence in Africa has grown significantly as it has traded, invested, and constructed its way to the most relevant economic partner to African economies. Chinese capital, aid, expertise, and diplomacy have brought increasing numbers of Chinese to the continent to serve as expatriate workers as they heed the call to “go out” and enhance the national ambitions and seek personal fortunes. In the past two decades, it has been remarkably evident that the relationship between China and Africa has entered into a different phase. Contrary to the rather simplistic and unilinear account of China’s scramble of the African continent, current engagements are rather complex with China as a pragmatic economic actor with both complementary and competitive impacts that draw different reactions from African populations – from the often reported embrace to intense local anger in certain parts. Along with a political independent and largely democratically governed Africa, China is also currently engaging mostly empowered African populations who will readily assert and preserve their sovereignties, political rights and civil liberties through public protests, pronouncements and political competitions like elections, and referendums. So, in spite of Beijing’s touted African embrace as the partner-in-development option for African states, some growing popular resentment for “most things Chinese” in some parts of Africa is confronting China as it deals with a continent in transition. Alternatively, though the effectiveness of popular African reactions towards the Chinese in African countries may be shaped by factors such as regime type, and economic status of the state in question,3 sustainability and longterm impacts of these people centered movements depend on more than any visceral efforts. Consequently, how will Beijing’s motives and strategies in Africa be impacted by popular reactions as African populations look to the past and present?
Topic:
Development, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Natural Resources, and Populism
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

79. Beijing’s Policy Towards President Tsai Ying-wen and the Future of Cross-Strait Relations

Author:
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
ions through the lens of both asymmetry and (re-)balancing. Beijing-Taipei relations have become more and more asymmetrical. While this structural asymmetry has allowed the former to exert all sorts of pressures on the latter (economic, ideological and military), this very asymmetry has not prevented the latter from keeping some room of maneuver vis-à-vis the former.1 Balancing against China and bandwagoning with the United States has, since 1950, been Taiwan’s security and survival strategy even if after the U.S. de-recognition of the ROC in 1978, Taipei and Washington have not been linked by a formal alliance but a much more narrow and vague security arrangement, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). However, in this paper, I will argue that under the Tsai Administration, Taiwan’s balancing strategy has remained rather “soft,” because of the island’s hard economic dependence upon China. At the same time, Taiwan cannot ignore the U.S. Administration’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia and the consequences it has on U.S.-China relations and the region. Using this double approach, I will first present Beijing’s new Taiwan policy. Then, I will explore its root-causes and main drivers. Finally, I will venture to speculate on the chances of success of China’s strategy towards the Tsai Administration, particularly after the new U.S. President Donald Trump comes into office and in view of the telephone call that he accepted to have with Ms. Tsai in early December 2016. My tentative conclusion is that for many domestic and international reasons—the KMT’s inability to reform, Taiwan’s consolidated identity and the U.S.’s likely continuing, and perhaps stronger strategic support and overall “rebalancing” under Trump—Beijing will probably not reach its major objectives, at least in 2020. As a result, Taiwan will be able to continue to go its own way; the political gap between both sides will keep widening; and the relations across the Taiwan Strait will probably remain a mixture of political and perhaps military tensions as well as dense exchanges and inevitable interactions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

80. China’s Relationship with Chile: The Struggle for the Future Regime of the Pacific

Author:
Evan Ellis
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Though superpower diplomacy dominated coverage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) leaders summit in November, China’s upgrading of a free-trade agreement with Chile served to highlight the strength of an economic and political relationship that it has built with the country, and the influential position Chile currently occupies in shaping Chinese engagement with Latin America.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Chile

81. Hamstringing a Hegemon: Examining the Effectiveness of Lawfare in the South China Sea Disputes

Author:
Rodelio Cruz Manacsa
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The South China Sea is the locus of a tense political struggle for territorial control between an increasingly aggressive regional power and a host of small states and their own respective sets of allies. In such a scenario, we can expect that China, the hegemonic state, will attempt to steer the discussions towards bilateral negotiations since its power projection and military capabilities tend to carry greater leverage against weaker states when talks are conducted on a one-on-one basis. In an international system characterized by the absence of a global government, power bends the arc of contention towards the hegemon. On the other hand, small states in the region like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei have a plethora of strategies and tactics for dealing with regional powers.[1] Their menu of options ranges from direct military balancing on one end and appeasing and bandwagoning on the other.[2], [3] This analysis will focus on the strategy that was chosen by the Philippines against China, which will be characterized as “lawfare.” The paper will proceed as follows: First, it will seek to define the concept of “lawfare” as a strategy and then map out the conditions under which it can succeed and fail. Second, it will apply the framework that was developed in the initial section to the conflict between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Finally, the consequences of lawfare use will be assessed, with the end goal of understanding how the Philippines’ victory in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) inexplicably led to reticence and bandwagoning, a case of historic success morphing into strategic retreat...
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Law, Negotiation, and Oceans and Seas
Political Geography:
China, Vietnam, Philippines, South China, and Brunei

82. China’s Role and the Potential of Pak-China Cooperation in Regional Organizations

Author:
Manzoor Khan Afridi and Mansoor Akbar Kundi
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The paper attempts to analyze China’s role in various regional organizations and potential cooperation between China and Pakistan within these forums. SAARC, SCO, OIC, Heart of Asia-Istanbul Peace Process, APEC, CICA and Boao Forum have been selected here for analysis. Pakistan is one of the founding members of SAARC and China has an observer status. Pakistan supports Chinese membership in SAARC to reduce Indian role and hegemony. China wants to have easy access to Indian Ocean, Middle East and influence in South Asia, for which India is the biggest hurdle. In SCO, China is the founding member while Pakistan joined it as observer in 2005 and as a member in 2015. Combating terrorism, extremism and separatism and to enhance the trade opportunities, stability in neighborhood and energy security are the common objectives of the two states in SCO. Pakistan, being a founding member in OIC, has always played an active and dynamic role for the cause of Muslims. Pakistan wants China to have greater role in OIC where the later showed interest for observer status in 2012. Chinese interest in Muslim states, particularly in Middle East and Central Asia, is triggered by the energy hunt and growing posture of these regions in contemporary world politics. Pakistan can play a bridge role, not only geographically, but also ideologically and culturally, to bring these states closer to China. China and Pakistan are increasing their cooperation in the Heart of AsiaIstanbul Process on Afghanistan, APEC, CICA and Boao Forum for Asia, as well. The paper concludes that both states share similar views on all bilateral and multilateral issues, support each other’s position, and enhancing their cooperation in regional organizations and multilateral forums.
Topic:
International Relations, Regional Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

83. The Run-up to Xi Jinping’s State Visit

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacqueline Vitello
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Preparations for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the US in September were the primary focus of the US-China relationship from May to August. The seventh Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was held in June in an effort to tee up agreements for the summit. Friction increased on a range of issues, including China’s artificial island building in the South China Sea, Chinese cyber hacking against US companies and the US government, and repressive laws and actions undertaken by the Chinese government, some of which are likely to have negative repercussions for future US-China people-to-people exchanges. National Security Adviser Susan Rice traveled to China at the end of August to finalize deliverables for the summit amid reports of a possible Obama administration decision to impose sanctions on China for cyber-enabled theft of US intellectual property before Xi’s arrival.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

84. Abe-Xi Met; Diplomats Talked; Wait ‘Til Next Year…

Author:
James J. Przystup
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Prime Minister Abe and President Xi met twice in the last four months of 2016. Both committed to advancing the relationship during 2017, taking advantage of the opportunities presented by historic anniversaries – the 45th anniversary of normalization and the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Friendship Treaty. Both leaders also committed to the early implementation of an air and maritime communications mechanism. Notwithstanding the increasing air and maritime interactions between the PLA and the Japanese SDF and Coast Guard, working-level officials were unable to reach agreement. At the end of the year, the Abe government announced a record high defense budget for 2017; days later the China’s aircraft carrier transited in international waters between Okinawa and Miyakojima into the western Pacific. Meanwhile public opinion polling revealed growing pessimism in Japan with respect to China and Japan-China relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Leadership, and Peace
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

85. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-U.S. Relations

Author:
Guo Yingjie
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Party-state’s warnings about the danger of Western ideas appear with increasing frequency. Whether the target is “constitutional democracy,” the “rule of law,” “universal values,” “judicial independence,” or “color revolutions,” the refrain is becoming familiar. These are “erroneous” notions in the public discourse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which not only threaten CCP rule, their advocacy by Chinese is evidence of traitorous conduct, and their support by U.S. officials or on the Western-led internet must be resisted for bilateral relations to proceed successfully. Such admonishments are consistent with the CCP’s official ideology and reflect the national identity currently espoused by CCP leaders and propagated in the increasingly tightly controlled media and academia. They have had a negative impact on the Sino-U.S. relationship, and are likely to continue to do so even as President Donald Trump remains largely silent on China’s human rights record and concentrates on “America First” economically and on tough talk about pressuring China regarding issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and North Korea.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Ideology, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

86. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-Russian Relations

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
When we think of national identity as a factor in China’s external relations, we normally focus on Japan or, for those bolder in their thinking, the United States. Few recently have put China’s policies toward Russia in that context. After all, the Chinese and Russians are adamant that their relationship eschews ideology or any other sign of national identity in favor of pure realpolitik. This paper takes exception to that interpretation, arguing that it would be difficult to understand the Sino-Russian relationship without paying close heed to the identity factor, not just from the Russian side, but seen in China’s views of Russia. Moreover, in the mid-2010s this factor has intensified, now favoring a closer relationship.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Ideology, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

87. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-South Korean Relations

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How do Chinese national identity narratives affect Sino-South Korean relations? The Koguryo history war more than a decade ago was a turning point in bilateral relations since diplomatic normalization in 1992, generating enduring competition over representations of history.1 In 2010, China’s commemoration of its entry into the Korean War raised early warnings in South Korea over Beijing’s hostile foreign policy orientation under Xi Jinping. Contrary to such expectations, however, the earliest summit agreements between presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye after both took office in 2013 were on history cooperation as common victims of Japanese colonialism. Most notably in 2015, Park’s participation in Beijing’s 70th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II consolidated joint claims of what was called the best period in bilateral relations.2 This chapter assesses the impact of Chinese national identity on China-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations under the Xi and Park administrations since 2013. It examines Chinese constructions of national identity and their implications for the security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Sino-South Korean relationship. Rather than promoting partnership, competing identities across these dimensions reinforce enduring differences over the region’s political, economic, and cultural order. These differences surfaced most saliently in 2016, following an initial period of engagement that corresponds with the downward trend in China-Japan relations since 2012. Managing them requires the very trust-building that both Beijing and Seoul have prioritized since 2013.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

88. Intro | The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Bilateral Relations

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The construct “Chinese national identity” refers to narratives from China’s leadership, media, and academic spokespersons about what makes their country distinctive and how those ideas matter in relations with other nations. This is a relational concept that serves to distinguish the “self” and “other,” whose interpretation is shaped by interactions with other states. Seen from the vertical dimension of identity, these interactions are filtered through rhetoric aimed at promoting unity at home. Demonizing other nations while conveying an image of enemies or states seeking to contain China is a means to boost solidarity behind Communist Party control over a society with little means to dissent. The horizontal dimension of identity depicts bilateral relations as the result not of different national interests, but of clashing and often irreconcilable identities. Examining the way national identity on the Chinese side impacts five external relationships is the objective of this set of articles, which concentrate on Chinese rhetoric during the period of Xi Jinping.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Identity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

89. A View from the United States on Sino-U.S. Relations

Author:
Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, the candidates reached a bipartisan consensus on one issue: how to deal with North Korea. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both called for China to do more to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program once and for all. Candidate Trump said that China has “absolute control” over North Korea and promised to do whatever it takes to convince Beijing to use that leverage, including imposing penalties on Chinese firms. As president, however, Trump will have to navigate the reality of China’s extreme hesitance to use the only type of pressure likely to divert North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—the threat of regime-endangering punishment. If and how China should continue to fit into U.S. strategy for dealing with North Korea will thus be a key issue facing Trump and his advisors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

90. Will China Allow North Korea to Collapse?

Author:
Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Relations between China and North Korea have deteriorated during the last year, but Beijing has not fundamentally changed its approach toward its neighbor because that approach serves vital Chinese interests. If the regime of Kim Jong Un should look like it might fail—and there are several reasons why it could—Beijing’s leaders will undoubtedly do all they can to effect a rescue. The Chinese state, however, is not as stable or as capable as it appears, and it may not be in a position to lend needed assistance.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, and Political stability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

91. Manila’s Pivot Toward Beijing

Author:
Peter Wood
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In mid-October, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte visited China. His visit was marked by a recalibration in Philippine policy toward China and the announcement of economic and military “separation” from the United States.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China, Malaysia, Asia, Philippines, and United States of America

92. Chinese Military Promises Aid to Syria

Author:
Peter Wood
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Although it is highly unlikely that China will deploy a large force or even, as one widely disseminated and erroneous report suggested, its aircraft carrier to fight in Syria, it is clear that China is increasing the visibility of its support for Bashar al-Assad’s government to improve its level of influence in whatever resulting post–civil war government emerges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and Syria

93. China and Iran Expand Relations After Sanctions’ End

Author:
Chris Zambelis
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
While the full implications of the JCPOA on Iran’s regional and international standing have yet to be realized, the outcome of Xi’s 2016 visit to Tehran is likely to presage years of continued Sino-Iranian engagement and cooperation. At the same time, China is steadily being confronted with outside competition for Iran’s most promising markets and similar challenges. In terms of its history of dealings with Iran in recent years, this represents unfamiliar territory for China.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

94. China’s Interests and Challenges in South Asia

Author:
Umbreen Javaid
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
In the arena of international politics, South Asian region has been magnetizing greater interests and China is its close neighbor. There is no significant change in China‘s strategic interests since the end of Cold War but her economic capacities and requirements, from natural resources to transit routes have changed the level of influence and interest of her ties with South Asian region. China is continuously expanding economic activities and investing in trade and development in the region. The drive to reinforce economic development through building up transport and infrastructure connections with her neighboring states as Gwadar-Xinjiang route and KunmingChittagong route will have an increasing impact on regional stability and the states across the region. The ongoing and forthcoming projects of China, to use them in future, will surely have an impact on the economies in the region. China‘s South Asia policy is refracted through China‘s ‗all-weather friend‘ in the region; Pakistan. The presence of Uighur extremists in China‘s Xinjiang province and absence of a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy provide other areas of attention to the Chinese government with ramifications for stability in the region. China‘s interests in South Asia include attainment of a matching role against India, containing the terrorist threats and expansion of her economic base in South Asia. China‘s strategic interests can be maintained through her complete approach to move towards the path of progress and managing better ties with South Asian neighbors.
Topic:
Development, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, Geopolitics, Economy, Grand Strategy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Punjab

95. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Road to Development and its Challenges

Author:
Mubeen Adnan and Bushra Fatima
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
On the world map, Pakistan and China being the neighboring states are inclined to develop and strengthen their relations with each other. These two states can be called as the good neighbors who can assist each other during the time of crisis. Both countries have had always a welcoming attitude towards each other in different situations due to which right from their independence till today in the 21st century, they are cooperative, supportive, encouraging, and friendly states among the other states of the world. This article is based on the fact that apart from the diplomatic, cultural relations, Pakistan and China are making great attempts and efforts for building viable economic relations with each other. It is also to see that how much these two would be beneficial in their economic interests by making the Gawadar project in their journey of making progress in economic capabilities. What challenges are being faced by these states in terms of the economic corridor. It is assumed that However, through this macro-level economic project both Pakistan and China would lead up to reach their destinations along with the attainment of their national interests.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, Asia, and Punjab

96. Staying on a Test Course

Author:
James J. Przystup
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Citing his November meeting with Premier Li as evidence, Prime Minister Abe found relations with China improving in his Diplomatic Report to the Diet. Chinese officials took a more cautious view. While acknowledging progress, China’s ambassador to Japan called attention to unstable elements in the relationship and Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused Japan of “double dealing” in its relations with China. Issues related to the East China Sea and the South China Sea continued to trouble the relationship. Chinese Coast Guard ships made incursions into Japan’s territorial waters in the Senkakus while Japan continued to strengthen its military presence in Okinawa and the southwest islands. The foreign ministers met at the end of April.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

97. Friction and Cooperation Advance Simultaneously

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser and Alexandra Viers
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Senior US and Chinese officials publicly emphasized positive developments in the bilateral relationship at the eighth US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, while privately raising concerns. The second US-China Cybercrime and Related Issues High-Level Joint Dialogue convened a week later. The South China Sea persisted as a major area of tension as an UNCLOS Tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines in its case against China. National Security Adviser Susan Rice traveled to Beijing in late July to prepare for the US participation in the G20 Summit in Hangzhou and what is likely to be the last meeting between Xi Jinping and President Obama. Bilateral military ties maintained an active pace with a visit by the US chief of naval operations to China in July, a port visit by a US guided-missile destroyer to Qingdao in August, and Chinese participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercises in Hawaii.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. No Lack of Dialogue, Results – TBD

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
There was no lack of high-level bilateral dialogue over the summer months with the foreign ministers meeting three times between late April and the end of August. There were several other exchanges in between including a meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Premier Li in July at the Asia-Europe Meeting in Ulaanbaatar. Despite the dialogue, strong differences continued to mark the relationship, in particular on issues related to the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Tensions heightened in June when a PLA Navy ship entered Japan’s territorial waters off Kagoshima and again in August when Chinese fishing boats and Coast Guard ships swarmed into the Senkakus, entering Japan’s contiguous zone and territorial waters despite repeated high-level protests.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Territory
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

99. Politics of “Reluctant Allies”

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The China-Russia relationship was both extraordinary and ordinary. On one hand, both sides were visibly, albeit reluctantly, moving toward more security-strategic coordination to offset growing pressure from the US and its allies. On the other hand, they continued to interact with a mix of cooperation, competition, and compromise for interests and influence in a range of areas including trade, investment, and regional development. Neither trend was definitive, given the complex dynamics between the two, as well as their respective relations with others, which are beyond the control of Moscow or Beijing. The asymmetry between “high” and “low” politics in their bilateral ties may be normal, if not necessarily desirable. Nevertheless, the scope, speed, and sustainability of the emerging Sino-Russian strategic alignment deserve careful scrutiny.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

100. Sino-Poland cooperation on publishing fosters the flower of friendship

Author:
Liu Yehua, Gao Ya, and Tian Yuan
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
There has been a long-termed history of Sino-Poland friendship. Poland is one of the first countries establishing diplomatic relation with China, in terms of which the year of 2016 is the 67th anniversary. Since establishment of diplomatic relation, with mutual exchanges being deeper and deeper, cooperation between China and Poland on publishing has been more and more prosperously developed. According to this great trend, China Renmin University Press has cooperated with Polish publishing houses on a great number of outstanding academic works since 2008.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Publishing
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Poland