Author: / Content Type: Journal Article / Political Geography: Asia / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Geopolitics

1. Will Turkiye Find Herself A Place in the New World Order?

Author:: Oğul Tuna
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Türkiye has been a challenging actor in the regional and global politics since the early 2010s, which relies on its imperial past and soft power. This paper argues that Türkiye has embraced a conventional foreign policy principle, pursuing the balance of power, to adapt to the new multipolar world in the contemporary period, which can be defined as “the new nineteenth century.” The country can only exploit its power and resilience to the utmost extent after realizing its limitations to accomplish its regional and international foreign policy goals. Then, it might emerge as a dependable crisis mediator and a significant player in world politics.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Liberal Order, Strategic Interests, and World System
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

2. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

3. Coalitions of the Week: BRICS, ASEAN, the G20

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Supreme leader Xi Jinping’s failure to attend the G20 summit in New Delhi this weekend (September 9-10) — thus nullifying the possibility of a meeting with top Western leaders including American counterpart President Joe Biden — is symptomatic of the isolation that China is facing on the international stage. Instead, Xi is sending Premier Li Qiang, not only to New Delhi but also to a series of meetings between Western and Asian powerhouses, including between the United States, Japan, and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta, Indonesia. ASEAN members seem eager to seize the opportunity to promote free trade and high-tech cooperation with the United States and its Western allies, agreeing this week to inject more funds into projects under the U.S.—ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (InvestASEAN.org, September 7; The White House, September 5). By contrast, China’s recent business ties with ASEAN nations has been dominated by a continuous exodus of multinational corporations moving production bases from China and into countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Xi’s absence has raised eyebrows, particularly due to the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary has pulled out all the stops when it comes to expanding the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) clout on the global stage, even while ignoring worsening socio-economic conditions at home, such as rising youth unemployment, declining exports and consumer spending, and disappointing new home sales. Deemed a crypto-Maoist by China’s critics, the CCP chief remains convinced that, in the words of both Mao and himself, “the East is rising and the West is declining,” conditions which would allow the PRC to seize the geopolitical high ground given “opportunities that only come once in a century” (Gov.cn, June 23 ; Xinhua, March 23).
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, G20, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and BRICS
Political Geography:: Asia

4. Distrust in the heartland: explaining the Eurasian “Organization Gap” through the Russo-Chinese relations

Author:: Valdir da Silva Bezerra and Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, Institutions, and International Institutions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

5. The Indo-pacific and Southeast Asia: The Impact of External Strategies on Southeast Asia and Asean’s Response

Author:: Gracia Abad Quintanal
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The Indo-Pacific concept is imprecise and designates more a geopolitical reality than a geographical space, but it is not, as is often suggested, a recent creation of the US, nor of the Trump administration. On the contrary, several actors have used it before the United States itself. And the US will not be the last actor to adopt it, either. On the contrary, it has gradually been adopted by other actors, including ASEAN, which tries to turn the concept in its favor in a way that reaffirms the importance of the group in the region as a whole and does not put in question neither “its centrality or its unity”, something that is far from being achieved.
Topic:: Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

6. Azerbaijan in the Struggle for Eurasia Restoring America’s Geostrategic Approach

Author:: Michael Doran
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Azerbaijan is “geopolitically critical” to the United States, argues the 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard, by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor to former President Jimmy Carter. Counterbalancing Russia is a primary duty of the United States, and the mere placement of Azerbaijan on the map makes it a crucial partner in that effort. The benefits of partnership extend well beyond Azerbaijan’s immediate neighborhood, the South Caucasus. The country is the sole gateway to the West of the former Soviet states of Central Asia. The independence of those states, Brzezinski explains, “can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow’s control.” Brzezinski was not alone in championing this view. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, American foreign policy professionals on both sides of the political aisle espoused the same perspective, which we shall dub the “the geostrategic approach.” Its influence generated significant American support for the creation of an East‑West land bridge, across which rail tracks and energy pipelines now stretch—the Silk Road region’s only terrestrial supply lines from Asia to Europe that Russia cannot control. This land bridge opened the way for an air corridor which, during the war in Afghanistan, allowed planes from America’s military bases in the Middle East to reach the battlefield by a route much shorter than any alternative, and one that required no haggling with difficult partners, such as Russia. As it emerged defeated three decades ago from the First Karabakh War (1988‑1994), Azerbaijan was virtually a failed state, inundated with hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. Today it is the wealthiest, most prosperous, and most influential country in its neighborhood. Its victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War also revealed the startling power of its military. The rise of Azerbaijan has vindicated Brzezinski and his cohort, but even as the country grows stronger and fulfills the role envisioned for it, the geostrategic approach grows weaker. Supporters of this perspective in Washington today are few and far between. Are we witnessing the temporary eclipse of an influential foreign policy doctrine, or its total demise?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, Azerbaijan, North America, and United States of America

7. The Digital Asset Battlefield Between the United States and China

Author:: Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: United States dollar dominance has underpinned American economic and geopolitical leadership since the Second World War. The tremendous structural and geopolitical advantages the United States derives from the hegemony of the dollar have contributed substantially to Washington’s military power, alliances, and strong hand in trade relations with other states. However, the convergence of a shifting international balance of power and the accelerated digitalization of the world economy will have major implications for this pillar of American strength.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Currency, Strategic Competition, and Digitization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. China Makes a Move in the Middle East: How Far Will Sino-Arab Strategic Rapprochement Go?

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: With a well-planned strategy and a careful exploitation of the gaps opened by U.S. foreign policy shifts, China has successfully increased its role as a strategic actor in the Middle East, including by gaining a foothold in the regional arms market. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s early December visit to Saudi Arabia, upon King Salman’s invitation, exemplifies the recent improvement in Sino-Arab ties (Xinhua, December 8). While in Saudi Arabia, Xi initiated two new multilateral forums intended to strengthen engagement between China and the Arab world: the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council summit (Xinhua, December 11). In addition to deepening political rapprochement between Beijing and several regional countries, China is simultaneously establishing crucial military-strategic ties with key Middle Eastern states. Chinese-made drones are already present in the arsenals of multiple Arab countries and technological cooperation between Beijing and its regional counterparts is rapidly increasing. The most striking example in this regard was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) revocation of the F-35 deal that constrained its cooperation with the Chinese tech and telecommunications giant Huawei over 5G technology (Al Arabiya News, December 14, 2021). As many Arab countries’ doubts about Washington’s commitment to regional security grow, more and more countries are increasingly open to entreaties from China.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

9. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

10. The Enemy of My Friend Remains My Friend: China’s Ukraine Dilemma

Author:: Horia Ciurtin
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: State media in China remains equivocal about the level of destruction and mayhem caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the Chinese government has stated it will meet the challenge of overcoming strained global supplies resulting from the conflict, and has emphasized that the nation’s food security will be ensured (People’s Daily, June 2; China News Service, May 27). Nevertheless, given Ukraine’s position as a global agricultural supplier, China has not fully appreciated the scope of the problem. At a broader level, the war is a litmus test for China’s ability to navigate geopolitical troubles along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Thus far, the conflict has underscored the difficulties facing China in moving beyond convenient cordialities to play the role of a benign ‘balancer’ in global politics. In its relationships with Moscow and Kyiv, Beijing is entangled financially with both sides. Furthermore, China is now exposed to secondary sanctions due to its economic entanglement with Russia. At the same time, its investments, construction projects and supply chains that traverse Ukraine risk destruction as the war drags on.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia

11. Impact of CPEC on Pakistan’s Economic Outlook

Author:: Sajid Mehmood Shahzad
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Pakistan‟s vital geopolitical position is an advantage for this South Asian nation. It is located at the apex of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the People‟s Republic of China has setup the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with a futuristic strategy to gain long-term benefits. This planning is not random at all. It is a cohesive plan to revitalize the financial system of its long-standing collaborator and ally through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is currently the talk of the town. The present study analyzes how Pakistan‟s conventional economic outlook can be transformed through the CPEC. While harnessing the power of Pakistan as a „trade route‟, the CPEC has the potential to reshape transport & security options, increase the cost-effectiveness of goods, and widen the scope for new and existing businesses. it will develop a networking coherence among agricultural & industrial hubs and connect special economic zones (SEZs) with the rest of the country and beyond. This paper evaluates the CPEC‟s fiscal footprint on Pakistan‟s economy and examines the correlation between overcoming economic shortcomings and increasing future gains through a cause-and-effect relationship.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

12. The Geopolitical Dimensions of Chinese Infrastructure

Author:: David M. Lampton
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: David M. Lampton is Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and Professor Emeritus at Johns Hopkins--SAIS. Immediately prior to his current post he was Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center from 2019-2020. For more than two de- cades prior to that he was Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Lampton is former Chairman of The Asia Foundation, former President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and for- mer Dean of Faculty at SAIS. Among many written works, academic and popular is his most recent book (with Selina Ho and Cheng-Chwee Kuik), Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (University of California Press, 2020). He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Stanford University in political science where, as an undergraduate student, he was a firefighter. Lampton has an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Far Eastern Studies. He is a Life Trustee on the Board of Trustees of Colorado College and was in the US Army Reserve in the enlisted and commissioned ranks.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Interview, and Railways
Political Geography:: China and Asia

13. The Geopolitical Consequences of COVID-19: Assessing Hawkish Mass Opinion in China

Author:: Joshua Byun, D. G. Kim, and Sichen Li
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: JOSHUA BYUN, D.G. KIM, and SICHEN LI examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Chinese public’s foreign policy attitudes. Drawing on original surveys fielded in China during the first six months of the global pandemic, they find that ordinary Chinese citizens are optimistic about China’s future global position, and that this optimism corresponds with the widespread perception that the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating China’s rise relative to the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, Survey, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

14. The Centrality of Karabakh in Caucasus Geopolitics

Author:: Svante Cornell
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Azerbaijan’s ability to reassert its territorial integrity in the 2020 war with Armenia was a major event in the modern history of the Caucasus. This war, commonly called the Second Karabakh War, showed the continued centrality of Karabakh in the geopolitics of the Caucasus. Even more specifically, the citadel of Shusha is the center of the Caucasus: the capital of the former Karabakh Khanate, Shusha lies at the center of this conflict and thus of the region’s geopolitics. Surprisingly, very few scholars have underlined this critical point; in fact, only two studies spring immediately to mind. The first is by Elchin Amirbayov, who in 2001 wrote a report for the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center on Shusha’s “pivotal role” in any future Karabakh settlement; the second is by Faris Shafiyev, who in 2021 contributed a chapter on the “paramount significance” of Shusha in a book co‑edited for ADA University Press by the Co‑Editors of Baku Dialogues. (Amirbayov is presently an adviser to the First Vice President of Azerbaijan; Shafiyev is presently the chairman of the Center of Analysis of International Relations. Both are former Azerbaijani ambassadors.) To reiterate: Shusha has been—in military and symbolic terms—the center of the Armenia‑Azerbaijan conflict, with wide implications that have gone beyond that. For example, it was the loss of Shusha in May 1992 that spelled the end of the first post‑Soviet government of Azerbaijan. Conversely, it was the occupation of Shusha that same year that sealed the Armenia‑Russia alliance, which formed one of the major geopolitical axes of the post‑Soviet Caucasus. But it was also Azerbaijan’s retaking of Shusha that ended the Second Karabakh War. On a deeper level, the Armenia‑Azerbaijan conflict (which centered on but was not limited to Karabakh) formed the main dividing line in the Caucasus. This conflict ensured that the Caucasus was composed of states that were suspicious of each other or in conflict with each other, instead of developing statehood and sovereignty and cooperation together.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Geopolitics, Regionalism, and Statehood
Political Geography:: Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan

15. The Lynchpin of the Middle Corridor

Author:: Anthony Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Particularly in today’s evolving geopolitical and economic reality triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Caspian region has gained greater relevance whilst acquiring renewed significance. More specifically, one of the geostrategic consequences of Putin’s ongoing assault against Ukraine and its broader implications for the global economy has been the enhanced impetus for ensuring the pragmatic and strategic utility of the “Middle Corridor” (also more formally known as the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR) for the Caspian region and beyond as a viable commercial transport route alternative to the long‑established northern pathway through Russia. China, which has been eager to expand its economic networks, had hoped to dominate economically the utilization of the Middle Corridor as part of an expanding BRI. But at least some of the countries in the region (and beyond) have grown increasingly uneasy about participating in it. They have viewed China as leaving many of its BRI promises unfulfilled. And they have also become more concerned that Beijing’s BRI engagement comes with too many geopolitical strings attached and can lead to debt traps. By and large, China has invested in a number of infrastructure projects in Central Asia within the framework of BRI. Most of China’s activity has taken place on the eastern shore of the Caspian. Major port, pipeline, and infrastructure projects on the Caspian’s western shore have been done without much, if any, direct Chinese involvement. Making the Middle Corridor work properly is not an easy task: it will take considerable degrees of time, financial means, and political commitment. With many economic and political challenges lingering around, by no means, the cross‑country transportation route could become the cheapest option any time soon. Nonetheless, in an increasingly raucous world where diversifying supply chains reduce risk and has become more desirable, the route could become not only fully viable but, more importantly, truly cost‑effective.
Topic:: Security, Development, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

16. INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Author:: Chuong Nguyen, Binh Nguyen, Hiep Tran, and Mi Le
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The XXI is considered by major countries in the Asia-Pacific region as ‘the century of sea and ocean’ and is accompanied by fierce competition among the nations to gain interest in the sea regions. On the basis that previously only considered the competition for military objectives, geostrategic bases and traffic channels through the straits, nowadays, countries worldwide have stepped up the competition for economic interests and marine resources. The development of military power and the competitive activities for resources at sea show clear the tendency to use the sea to contain the continent. In that context, the Indian Ocean, as the world’s third largest ocean, has an important geographic location and rich and diverse natural resources; the arterial sea route is gradually becoming the center of new world geopolitics and an important area in the strategic competition between two ‘Asian giants’ - India and China. The competition between these countries in the Indian Ocean is growing and profoundly impacts the region’s stability and security. This article focuses on the position and important role of the Indian Ocean in the policies of India and China, the fierce competition between the two countries in nearly two decades of the XXI century.
Topic:: International Relations, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Indian Ocean

17. The Sino-Russian Geopolitics in Eurasia and China-USA Disputes: Asia Pacific Great Eurasia vs Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lucas Gualberto do Nascimento and Marcos Cordeiro Pires
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article aims to analyze the main elements and processes underway in Eurasia, involving three essential actors: the United States, Russia, and China. At first, it is emphasized the importance of Eurasia as a space that has historically influenced the hegemonic disputes between Great Powers. Then, Eurasia is analyzed as a space for development cooperation, presenting the intersections of the Chinese BRI and the Russian EAEU. Last, the US approach to China is addressed, specifically the Indo-Pacific strategy. We conclude that despite the intense pressure to contain the rise of China and Russia in Eurasia, rivaling both powers is not feasible. In the current path, it will boost the cooperation between two giants, China and Russia.
Topic:: Hegemony, Geopolitics, Conflict, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Game Changer in the Indo-Pacific: The View from Japan

Author:: Glen S. Fukushima
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The coronavirus pandemic that struck in late 2019 has affected the world profoundly, and Japan is no exception. But the direct impact on Japan has been relatively small considering the number of cases of infections and deaths relative to the size of Japan’s population, particularly considering its elderly population and high density. For instance, among the G7 countries, Japan has had the fewest cases of infections (4,690 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 32,276 in Canada, 40,620 in Germany, 64,804 in the United Kingdom, 66,828 in Italy, 86,283 in France, and 99,652 in the United States. Similarly, among the G7 countries, Japan has had by far the fewest number of deaths (81 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 638 in Canada, 996 in Germany, 1,601 in France, 1,776 in the United States, 1,870 in the United Kingdom, and 2,004 in Italy. This chapter argues that although the direct disruptions to Japan resulting from the pandemic have been less than to the other G7 countries, the effect of the pandemic on other nations with strong geopolitical importance to Japan—in particular, the United States and China—coupled with changes in Japan’s domestic political and economic environment have accelerated changes in geopolitical posture and direction that were already in progress in Japan. The fundamental geopolitical challenge facing Japan is how to ensure its military security, political independence, and economic prosperity in the face of a less reliable and less predictable United States and a more powerful and more assertive China. For Japan, the ideal resolution of this challenge is to maintain positive and constructive relations with both countries, while recognizing the reality that even as economic ties with China—whether in trade, investment, finance, tourism, or the exchange of people—are growing relative to ties with the United States, political and security ties (and the sharing of common values) with the United States remain the centerpiece of Japan’s foreign policy. Given this context, it is only natural that Japan would seek to diversify and strengthen its relationships with other countries, regions, economic arrangements, and international organizations and institutions. This diversification, which could be seen since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, has gained momentum in recent years, and the pandemic has served only to accelerate it. The analysis proceeds through the examination of the following: 1) pandemic chronology; 2) Japan’s domestic politics; 3) relations with the United States; 4) relations with China; 5) Japan’s diversification strategy; and 6) conclusions.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

19. How COVID-19 Has Affected the Geopolitics of Korea

Author:: Jung-Yeop Woo
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: COVID-19 has not gone away, and observers are now discussing possible long-term effects of the pandemic, including on geopolitics. A report by the European Parliament discussed five COVID-generated factors that could impact the geopolitical environment, i.e., supply chains, health multilateralism, digital diplomacy, climate change, and democratic activism. It predicted a reshuffling of value chains, where cooperation within the same “bloc” would be strengthened, while states continue their reshoring efforts, consequently shifting the current geopolitical environment. The report pointed out that the pandemic necessitated thorough scientific cooperation and information sharing beyond the level that the WHO had initially offered, suggesting changes in patterns of behavior, as in adapting to digital platforms while opening opportunities for nations to counter climate change and strengthen their geopolitical positions. Moreover, it also looked at the number of protests resulting from the pandemic and its economic effects and suggested that such pressure would encourage governments to mollify inequality. Missing is optimism that countries will be stirred to pursue common interests. Missing too is the geopolitical fallout from acutely worsening Sino-U.S. relations, as in South Korea, which stands at the forefront of states facing pressure from both sides. With the unforeseen disruption in both global and domestic economies, much attention has been paid to the effect of COVID-19 on the economic side rather than the political side, perhaps because many did not expect that the pandemic would last this long. However, recent disruptions are clearly rife with serious political implications, both domestically and globally. Above all, as seen from Seoul, their impact on the relationship between Beijing and Washington demonstrated how much the economic forces could spill into geopolitics. Koreans follow this impact attentively, realizing that worsening Sino-U.S. ties may reverberate on one or both powers, increasing pressure on Seoul’s efforts to sustain a precarious balance for the sake of its North Korean policy and its hope for regional stability. Many nations in the Indo-Pacific have recently struggled between the United States and China, trying to find the most advantageous equilibrium between security and economy. South Korea has uniquely stood on the frontlines, as in 2016-17 when it bowed to the U.S. and deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense targeting North Korea, which was met with strong Chinese pressure—strict economic sanctions through unofficial channels and demands to promise the “three noes” that restricted further missile defense deployment to deescalate the tension. President Biden’s new measures to bridge security and economy through multilateralism call for Seoul to choose between acceding to U.S. requests or risking China’s threats to respond aggressively—even as some anti-THAAD sanctions remain in place. President Xi Jinping’s warnings point to China’s harsh response. South Korean concerns have grown because of the relationship between the current global supply chains and geopolitics, which is a preoccupation of the Biden administration. Situated at the juncture of supply networks centering around China, South Korea’s economy is almost certain to be heavily hit. Furthermore, the pandemic brought ongoing pressures for de-globalization and de-dollarization to the forefront with major ramifications for Seoul. Much of the anxiety has focused on the geopolitics of deteriorating relations between Beijing and Washington. The former is warning Seoul against joining the Quad, agreeing to trilateralism with Japan and the U.S., and tilting the balance away from China in the Sino-U.S.-ROK triangle. Meanwhile, the Biden administration, even before it clarifies its regional strategy, is nudging Seoul in precisely the opposite direction. The year 2020 raised challenging issues for Seoul, which loom in 2021 as more severe geopolitical tests for the Moon administration. To properly gauge the effect of COVID-19 on South Korea’s geopolitics, it is crucial to understand the world before the pandemic. Has COVID-19 functioned as an independent variable in South Korean geopolitics? If there is a discernable difference, we have to see whether that difference was caused by COVID-19. This paper proceeds in four parts: 1) outlining the pre-pandemic status quo up until 2020; 2) assessing how COVID-19 affected international geopolitics; 3) examining how it influenced South Korea’s supply chain and geopolitics; and 4) analyzing ongoing discourse on South Korea’s strategic choice amid the U.S.-China rivalry. These sections are followed by brief conclusions on implications for policy choices.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

20. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Gamechanger in the Indo-Pacific: The View from China

Author:: Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: How has the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped or influenced China’s geopolitical outlook and its grand strategy for the years to come? This is a question that will determine China’s relationship with the United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and the rest of the world. In the Chinese strategic community, the pandemic has been regarded as a “watershed” event that has reshaped the structure of the international system and the power equilibrium. Its importance is elevated to the same status as the end of World War II, which determined the bipolar international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War which began thirty years of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Although China began as a sheer loser in the pandemic given its culpability in the origin of COVID and its early poor management of the domestic spread of the disease, Beijing believes that it has eventually emerged as a pure winner in the pandemic: the relative gain China has made vis-à-vis the U.S.’s bigger losses in disease control, national power, economic growth, global leadership, and credibility has strengthened Chinese confidence that the tide is turning in China’s favor. The “effectiveness” of the Chinese political system, as manifested in its domestic disease control, has reinforced China’s ideological conviction of its superiority. As China uses COVID diplomacy to demonstrate the superiority and desirability of its political system, the pandemic is perceived as an opportunity for it to shape the new international order and promote China’s desired “Community of Common Destiny.” Challenges remain, as the U.S. revamps its alliance system under the Biden administration and as regional powers and Western countries grow increasingly concerned and anxious about China’s growing confidence and capabilities. However, for China, the pandemic has been a great opportunity, and China has emerged from it as a pure winner. It is an interesting question as to how the pandemic has changed the nature and the dynamics of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. Most would agree that the pandemic exacerbated, accelerated, and aggravated the deterioration of relations that the U.S. and China had already been experiencing before 2020. However, the differences lie in the degree, intensity, velocity, and extensiveness of the damage. Without the pandemic, the downward slope U.S. and China had already been on would not have come to a state of “freefall” in 2020. And that “freefall” period has long-lasting and significant implications for their bilateral relations in the post-COVID world. The damaged trust, confidence, and credibility, and the deeply entrenched sense of hostility, or even antagonism, have made any effort to repair the relations extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. And this reality will affect the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region for the many years and decades to come.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

21. Domestic Politics and Regional Dynamics in Turkey’s Geopolitical Approach to the Middle East Between 2002-2019

Author:: Billy Agwanda
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: During the last two decades, key reforms in social, economic, and political structures have elevated Turkey into a rising regional power. In the Middle East, the increasing influence of Turkey for a better part of the last two decades has been reinforced by its humanitarian oriented foreign policy. Whereas this transformation is extensively attributed to the reform agenda by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the last decade has proved to be challenging for Turkey’s foreign policy stance. Regional dynamics, such as the Syrian civil war, Qatar crisis, and the Kurdish question, have influenced Turkey to gradually shift from its previous subtle to a more assertive foreign policy. Additionally, the frequent domestic political challenges and economic pressure on the AKP government have only pushed Turkey further towards a more assertive Middle East foreign policy. This article examines how regional and domestic political developments are influencing Turkish foreign policy approach. The analysis will attempt to provide a comprehensive perspective on why Turkish geopolitical engagement and an increasingly assertive foreign policy that is characterised by unilateralism particularly in the pursuit of national and regional security is leading to its isolation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

22. Information disorder and What Ukraine is Doing About It: Analysis of Ukraine’s Policies and Actions to Combat Russia-Generated information disorder

Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Abstract:: It is a conventional wisdom that information is power, but even more power lies in the manner in which it is (mis)used. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, all parts of so called ‘information disorder’, are phenomena that seem to be wreaking havoc worldwide nowadays. The emergence of the Internet and social media has brought fundamental changes to the way information is produced, communicated and distributed and thus has given new momentum to the phenomenon of ‘information disorder’. Its effects, in combination with online technologies, are proving to be devastating: it destabilizes public discourse, undermines general belief in democratic institutions and threatens national, international and civilian security. Based on a theoretical analysis approach, the paper will look into the nature of the ‘information disorder’, and how the Internet and social media contribute to its growing influence. It will also examine what are the effects of the phenomenon, and how it threatens national and international security. With Russia arguably being the most aggressive in spreading disinformation nowadays, and Ukraine being the country affected by Russia’s information offensive the most, the paper will try to analyze Ukraine’s policies and actions to combat Russia-generated ‘information disorder’. In the conclusion, the paper will make an effort to suggest recommendations on tackling negative informing.
Topic:: International Security, Geopolitics, Information Age, Basic Data, and Propaganda
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia

23. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Author:: Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:: Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:: Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

24. Is Japan the “Britain” of East Asia? A Geopolitical Analysis of Japan’s Long-term Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Young-Hwan Shin
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Japan’s geographical location is often compared to that of the United Kingdom in Europe, and its strategic role is expected to correspond to Britain’s as a balancer that has endeavored to keep the European world from being dominated by a hegemony or hegemonic coalition of powers. his geographical resemblance infers that Japan will play the role of a British balancer in East Asia. However, Japan differs from the UK geopolitically. If it were a balancer, Japan would welcome a more stable Korean Peninsula able to manage unexpected provocation from the North. Instead, Japan is skeptical about today’s changing inter-Korean situation, following the Panmunjom Declaration on 27 April 2018. It needs to be understood that Japan has lain within a different geopolitical environment from Britain in Europe, which influenced different strategic choices in the history of East Asia.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Seapower, and Insularity
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Korean Peninsula

25. The two Koreas´ Relations with China: Vision and Challenge

Author:: EunSook Yang
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The relationship between China and the two Koreas can be considered as a friendship that is not completely reliable. North Korea and China have been considered strong allies by the outside world, but questions arise nowadays about whether that relationship is based on a true friendship. The relationship between South Korea and China is a somewhat ambiguous one. There exists a complex situation and dilemmas in that trilateral relation. This article examines the current trilateral relations between China and the two Koreas in order to draw the position of each other. For this purpose, we explore three different approaches: China´s position toward North Korea and South Korea; the position of the two Koreas toward China and their defence; and the regime survival of North Korea and the political and economic interests of South Korea. The analysis of the relationship between China and the two Koreas is based on the context of a shared history, culture and the rapidly changing international economic and political situation together with the regional security hazards caused by the nuclear weapons essays and missile tests of North Korea.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, History, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

26. China in the Geopolitical Imaginations of the Polish Pop Music after 1989

Author:: Jaroslaw Macala
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This paper focuses on the issue of geopolitics in the pop culture interpretation as illustrated by the Polish pop music after the year 1989. Songs selected from various trends of the Polish popular music made the source material of the text. The primary study method involved the analysis of the lyrics discourse. The Polish geopolitical imaginations used to revolve around the basis axis of better West and worse East, symbolized mainly by Russia, but its image was transferred over entire Asia. Asia, including China, was scarcely present in the geopolitical imaginations contained in the pop music, which, at the same time, reflected the irrelevant interest of Polish elites in global problems. The discourses in the musical texts about China frequently adopted the West’s perspective, where Poland made part of as seen by our elites. The rhetoric strategy concerning China in popular music featured two essential views, which references Orientalism as specified by E. Said. It explains the frequent use of the postcolonial discourse by the Polish elites, also the music ones, which promoted the supremacy of the West over the rest of the world and the universal nature of the Western world values which were meant to be implemented into other civilizations and nations for their own sake. China was presented as a growing threat for the dominance of the West, the USA in the first place, as an alternative model of globalization and international deal putting offthe world by its cultural and geopolitical alienation, as well as indicating negative effects for Poland
Topic:: Culture, Geopolitics, Music, and popular culture
Political Geography:: China and Asia

27. Big Business in a Multipolar World

Author:: A. Borisov
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The 20th Century went down in history as a century of ideologies and sharp confrontation of states belonging to different systems, the Soviet Union and the United States in the first place. The 21st century has already demonstrated a mounting geopolitical confrontation of great powers that drew international business interests into their whirlpool. It turned out that the main actors of world politics cannot agree on new prin- ciples of economic cooperation, free competition and respect for the spheres of interests – they have chosen the road of mounting worldwide tension.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

29. Participation of Kazakhstan in the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Advantages, Problems and Prospects

Author:: Saltanat Kuzembayeva
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article is devoted to the geoeconomic goals and prospects of implementing the Chinese initiative „One Belt, One Road”. The author explores the benefits, problems and future opportunities that open up to the Republic of Kazakhstan as a participant in this initiative. The analysis carried out in the article showed that there are still many problems in the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) project taking into account the state program of Kazakhstan “Nurly Zhol”, and difficulties arise in the practical implementation of various cooperation areas. At the same time, Kazakhstan should be guided exclusively by its national interests in cooperation with China in the framework of the “One Belt, One Way” initiative.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

30. Moon Jae-in: Putting North Korea at the Center

Author:: Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: While President Moon Jae-in has a calmer demeanor than his mentor and friend, former President Roh Moo-hyun, there can be no doubt that his vision for transforming Northeast Asia is as far-reaching. While Moon has been more careful to assuage the U.S. president, less abrasive in his language toward Japan, and more strategic in reaching out to leaders in China and Russia, his strategy of putting North Korea at the forefront of regional realignment has similar geopolitical ambition. The objective is the rejuvenation of a reintegrated peninsula with the capacity to steer actions by all of the great powers rather than falling prey again to their machinations that are not in Korea’s interest.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

31. Putin’s Strategic Framework for Northeast Asia

Author:: Dmitri V. Trenin
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper discusses the strategic framework for Russia’s policies toward Northeast Asia, placing it in the context of Moscow’s geopolitical repositioning after the Ukraine crisis and the ensuing confrontation with the United States, and the alienation from Europe. After 2014, the Ukraine crisis put an end to Russia’s quarter-century-long attempt to integrate with the West and become part of a Greater Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time and in the same place (Ukraine), Russia’s attempt to build a power center in the former Soviet space came to an end. Ukraine was not the cause of either failure, but it was the trigger of both. The conclusion was clear. Russia was not fit for integration into something that was bigger than Russia, and Russia was no longer capable of integrating former borderlands. Two-plus decades after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Russia stood alone—but also free. Such was the end of a grand illusion linked to the West, and also the end of three centuries of empire-building.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

32. Xi Jinping’s Geopolitical Framework for Northeast Asia

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: When Xi Jinping’s strategizing in East Asia is discussed, attention centers on the southern tier, stressing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Policies toward Northeast Asia have been treated mostly as ad hoc responses to specific countries in shifting circumstances. The prospect that Xi has in recent years adjusted his overall approach toward this region has scarcely been explored. Unlike Southeast Asia, however, Northeast Asia is a geopolitical hotbed, with Russia and North Korea as military threats to the international community beyond any threats present to the south. At the same time, Japan and South Korea are U.S. military allies incomparably more significant than U.S. partners in Asia’s south. Given the legacy of the Six-Party Talks, focus on the strategic battleground here would seem desirable in its own right and as a key indicator of Xi’s evolving strategic thinking.
Topic:: International Relations, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

33. The (Re)emergence of the BRICS and the Reorganization of Power in Contemporary Geopolitics

Author:: Charles Pennaforte and Ricardo Luigi
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The two first decades of the 21 st Century were marked by the recrudescence of two powerhouses, Russia and China. Given their important role on global geopolitics, these two countries took advantage of the gaps resulted from yet another crisis on the structure of global capitalism, which influenced the relative decline of the United States capacity to impose its will on the international system as they had been able to do so since the end of World War II. This article’s objective is to analyze the global geopolitical rearrangement due to a weakened United States which opened the possibility for the BRICS nations to emerge as possible sources of power. To reinforce this analysis, the world-systems perspective, (here on referred to as WSP) elaborated mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi is used, as well as a geopolitical approach to provide a link to international relations theories. Therefore, this paper is divided on to four sections. The first one interrelates the geopolitical theories and those of the WSP. The second section is guided towards understanding the origins and fundamentals of the WSP. On the third section, an approach is made towards the motivations and the effects of the rearrangement of power on the world’s geopolitics. Finally, on the last section, the roles and opportunities that have arisen from the emergence of the BRICS nations on the international system are presented.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Capitalism
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

34. Silk Road Pathways: The China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor

Author:: Yu Hongjun
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Since the outbreak of 2008 world financial crisis, issues such as lackluster economic growth around the world and lack of progress in regional cooperation have not been resolved. Conservatism, isolationism, racism, populism, and unilateralism are on the march; political and social movements based on opposition to economic globalization are in vogue; and policymakers as much as ordinary people are expressing concern about the future of the world. Based on his observations and thoughts with regards to modern international relations, as well as his commitment towards a common destiny for mankind, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt and Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road, which together form the globally influential Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Topic:: International Political Economy and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Global Focus

35. The OSCE and Minorities in the Silk Road Region: Fostering Social Cohesion and Integration

Author:: Lamberto Zannier and Eleonora Lotti
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: At the beginning of the 1990s new conflicts erupted in Europe as new borders appeared on the map following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. As emerging states were striving to assert new identities (or revive old ones), various minorities found themselves living within new national borders, which in a number of cases provoked instability and conflict, with geopolitics complicating these dynamics even further. As quickly became apparent, some of these divisions were so deep that a number of those conflicts remain unresolved.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Minorities, Geopolitics, Silk Road, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

36. A Most Significant Geopolitical Development: Strategic Benefits and Strategic Focus

Author:: Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The November 10th, 2020, trilateral agreement signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin could become the most significant geopolitical development in the South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union—perhaps even more than the establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-TbilisiErzurum natural gas pipelines. But it is not yet clear that key actors in the Transatlantic community appreciate this opportunity, especially Washington and Paris, who along with Moscow, comprise the Co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the supposedly impartial mediating body of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The trilateral agreement defines a peace settlement in line with the framework unofficially agreed by the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan over a decade ago, and thus stands a good chance to hold. The so-called “Basic Principles” or “Madrid Principles” were originally tabled by the American Russian, and French Co-chairs of the Minsk Group in November 2007 at a meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Madrid.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Asia, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

37. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Geo-political Implications, Regional Constraints and Benefits of CPEC

Author:: Umar Farooq and Asma Shakir Khawaja
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The article is intended to find out the geopolitical implications, regional constraints and benefits of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Researcher reviewed both published research articles and books to find out geopolitical implication, regional constraints and benefits of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. For this purpose, researcher also reviewed newspapers articles and published reports by government and non-governmental stakeholders working on CPEC. Review of the articles and reports indicated that CPEC had enormous benefits not only for China and Pakistan but also for the whole region. But different internal and external stakeholders are not in favor of successful completion of this project. Extremism, sense of deprivation, lack of political consensus, political instability are some of the internal constraints. On the other hand, Afghanistan, India, Iran, UAE and USA are posing constraints to halt the successful completion of CPEC.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Violent Extremism, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, India, Asia, Punjab, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

38. Global Image of Pakistan: Significance of Public Diplomacy

Author:: Hafeez Ullah Khan
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This paper is an attempt to examine how is soft power and public diplomacy imperative conditions for Pakistan‟s international stature by examining the effective utilization of public diplomacy of the states like USA, Russia, China and India, public diplomacy of which have got a very significant position at the international stage. Based on an understanding of their Public diplomacy, the author seeks to explore what lessons and strategies should Pakistan take into consideration for the promotion of Pakistan‟s good image at the international front, and how Pakistan can be successful in achieving the positive results. The author has highlighted some serious recommendations as well.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and State
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Asia, North America, Punjab, and United States of America

39. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:: Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

40. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? The View from Russia

Author:: Artyom Lukin
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This chapter provides an overview of Russian expert commentary found in Russia’s media during the run-up to the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi and in its aftermath, covering the period of January to April 2019. The chapter also covers Kim’s first meeting with Vladimir Putin that took place in Vladivostok in late April. With regard to the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem, Russia’s commentariat traditionally splits into three groups. The first includes specialists who are more or less neutral toward North Korea. The second one is formed by experts who sympathize more with Pyongyang and tend to blame Washington and American allies for anything that goes wrong on the Korean Peninsula. The third group, now almost extinct in Russia, represents liberal and pro-Western pundits who loath the North Korean regime and view it as a major threat to international, and Russia’s, security. Similar to Western media, the Russian press has extensively covered the preparations for the Hanoi summit, the event itself, and its outcomes. The tone of the Russian reporting did not differ much from that of the world’s media. Most of the Russian commentators sounded moderately optimistic prior to the two-day summit, expecting that at least something would come out of it. That the second Kim-Trump rendezvous failed to produce any deliverables came as a somewhat disappointing surprise to most Russian observers. Still, the general mood remained cautiously optimistic even after Hanoi’s apparent failure, with the prevailing majority of Russia’s Korea watchers believing diplomacy between Pyongyang and Washington would continue and might eventually succeed. The Russian commentary on the Vladivostok summit was generally positive, hailing the symbolism of Moscow’s return to the major leagues of Korean Peninsula geopolitics. At the same time, many experts pointed out that, beyond displaying the decorum of the traditional Russia-DPRK friendship, the Kim-Putin summit produced modest outcomes.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, Asia, and North Korea

41. Japanese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Japanese coverage of the diplomacy between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un as well as the broader spectrum of international relations over North Korea has been intensive over the first months of 2019. Assessments of what to expect and then what really happened involve interpretations of North Korean intentions, the character of U.S. diplomacy, the role of South Korean diplomacy, the impact of China, and the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. Each development over this period has been scrutinized closely, often with an addendum: What does it mean for Japan? The fate of North Korea looms very large for a nation fearful of a missile attack from it, cognizant of the absence of any settlement after 1945 of its claims against Japan’s occupational conduct, and nervous about the regional balance of power and U.S. trustworthiness as an ally and nuclear umbrella, when the United States itself is quickly coming under threat from the North’s nuclear weapons. Below, the views on the political right range from Sankei Shimbun to the establishmentoriented Yomiuri Shimbun, and on the political left from Asahi Shimbun to Tokyo Shimbun. While editorials figure heavily into the analysis, much of the regular news coverage also serves to differentiate Japanese sources. What negative outcomes does Japan fear from the success or failure of ongoing diplomacy over North Korea? In recent coverage we can identify at least eight worrisome outcomes: 1) failure of the talks resulting in a war scare beyond what occurred in 2017; 2) suspension of U.S.-DPRK talks and China as well as Russia breaking with the UN sanctions regime, fueling prospects of three-way coordination with China taking the lead; 3) discord about how to proceed with damaging U.S.-ROK relations, weakening the U.S. military presence in South Korea at a cost to Japan’s defense; 4) South Korea splitting with the U.S. on the North and raising the specter of inter-Korean nationalism deemed hostile to Japan; 5) success of the talks based on “America First,” agreeing to a deal on denuclearization (as a process) that leaves Japan’s concerns about missiles and abductees aside, isolating Japan; 6) success of the talks leading toward reunification, also strengthening national identity versus Japan; 7) a new geopolitical framework replacing the talks, as the U.S. retreats from the region; and 8) a period of instability, where Trump only delays making decisions and Japan is left frustrated. Four general responses to the Hanoi Summit and its early aftermath could be discerned in Japanese publications: 1) Trump outfoxed Kim, has a strategy reassuring to Japan, and the outcome in sight is positive; 2) Trump erred in his diplomacy but has been brought to his senses and now will follow a course welcome in Japan, however uncertain the outcome; 3) the situation is growing more dangerous, Trump does not know what to do, and Japan has to keep its eyes on the other players; and 4) Trump will renew diplomacy, keeping Japan off balance in coordinating with the U.S. as Japan struggles with its isolation in this diplomacy. When anticipating what should come next, sources understandably suggest what their own government should do. Many in Japan emphasize the abductions issue and willingness to offer economic assistance when that along with denuclearization and missiles is addressed. One can discern how Abe Shinzo should proceed in diplomacy with each of the leaders active in the region. Of course, most attention centers on how he should deal with Trump or the alliance.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and North Korea

42. South Korean Print Media on Why the Hanoi Summit Failed and What Comes Next

Author:: Kimberly Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Since the first historic summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last June in Singapore yielded a two-page joint agreement without a clear definition of or a timeline for denuclearization, expectations and misgivings further escalated for the second U.S.-DPRK summit, which was officially announced during Trump’s State of the Union address to be held on February 27 and 28 in Vietnam. As the dates approached, a hailstorm of news reports from Seoul hinted at the possibility of a “small deal” to be signed in Hanoi; North Korea would make progress on denuclearization, which would likely involve dismantling its Yongbyon nuclear facility and/or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, in return, the U.S. would offer economic aid by easing sanctions, probably along with officially ending the Korean War and building liaison offices. This forecast partially stemmed from the political plight Trump faced in Washington due to the impending Mueller report with a Democrat-controlled House and the 2020 election nearing, meaning that he would have to show some progress in nuclear negotiations with Kim so as to break through the ongoing domestic challenge. Against this backdrop, Stephen Biegun, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, said at Stanford University1 in late January, “President Trump is ready to end this war [the Korean War]. It is over. It is done.” This was followed by remarks from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during an interview2 with CBS in mid-February, “It’s our full intention of getting a good outcome in exchange for relieving those sanctions [economic sanctions.]” Such comments hailed the possibility of a deal quite favorable to Kim. News delivered just prior to the summit, that South Korean president Moon Jae-in and Trump shared a positive outlook for the meeting over the phone, hyped the likelihood of a promising result in Hanoi between Washington and Pyongyang. Moon, during the phone conversation3 with Trump, suggested his vision of inter-Korean economic cooperation as one of the “corresponding measures” that could be awarded to Kim, lessening the burden on Washington’s shoulders, if North Korea gives up its nuclear program and, according to the Blue House, Trump gave a positive response. Moon reportedly said that South Korea is “ready to take over the role of undertaking anything from reconnecting railways and roads between Seoul and Pyongyang to other inter-Korean economic projects.”4 Such an approach was brought up earlier during an interview which the special adviser to the South Korean president, Moon Chung-in, had with Joongang in January,5 right after Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address came out; he proposed incremental economic exchanges, limited to only between Seoul and Pyongyang, to bring about the North’s denuclearization, and said, “economic exchanges between the two Koreas can exceptionally be exempted from the target of UN sanctions as the two Koreas of the same ethnic group have a special relationship with each other.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

43. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? Coverage in Four Countries

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The summit on February 27-28 in Hanoi between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un ended on a sour note, casting doubt on the one-year old diplomatic process that had produced an upbeat summit between the two in Singapore the previous June. Much speculation followed on what had gone wrong, who was to blame, and how diplomacy could be put back on track. Given the importance of the four countries caught between the U.S. and North Korea in setting the course for addressing the North Korean challenge, their media and journal coverage of the state of diplomacy after the Hanoi summit merits close attention, which is provided below. The following chapters examine how the South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian media and journal articles have covered the Hanoi summit and its immediate aftermath. They tell us about the hopes and concerns of four countries and point to differences in thinking about the nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea and the expectations for what will follow. Coverage ranges from anticipation of the summit in the first two months of 2019 to immediate reporting on what transpired on February 27-28 to interpretations over the next month or longer of the impact of the summit for U.S. and North Korean policy and for the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, specifically, the foreign policies of each of the four countries. Each chapter pays special heed to the apprehensions related to the talks or how they could leave one’s country in dire straits, and to the range of responses to what is transpiring. Close attention is given to what one’s own country should do either if progress is made in diplomacy or if a breakdown occurs. Also of interest is whether coordination with other states is sought.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

44. China's Sharp Power and South Korea's Peace Initiative

Author:: Kim Tae-Hwan
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: If we understand geopolitics as “representations of space” as well as “spatial practices,” then the Indo-Pacific region can be understood as a newly emerging geopolitical hotspot in which major powers are not only vying for the control of spaces, but also waging a war of discourse on values and worldviews, reconstructing geographical spaces in their own interest. Discourse on a nation’s visions and strategies are increasingly employed as a soft power instrument of foreign policy to persuade the international audience, both state and non-state actors. Sharp power is gaining ground in this peculiar context of geopolitical competition combined with the battle for values and ideas. China is at center stage in this geopolitics-cum-discourse game in the Indo-Pacific region. “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative and better communicate China’s messages to the world,” Xi Jinping exhorted his comrades in 2014, underscoring the importance of international discourse as a type of communicative soft power. But it is hard to distinguish sharp power from soft power solely in terms of the assets employed, as both utilize similar assets. The differences between the two are revealed only by looking into how those assets are mobilized in the real world. When actually put to use, sharp power is often mingled with soft and hard power, easily stretching into the realm of conventional security. This chapter delves into how Beijing has been creatively capitalizing on a hybrid approach, using both hard and sharp power in disseminating its message in narrative form. By putting a special focus on Beijing’s strategic moves made against the backdrop of the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea, I examine the ways China combines its sharp and hard power in tackling security issues that its leadership considers as serving “core national interests.” I also address South Korea’s response to China’s sharp power offensive through the lens of inclusionary identity politics, which underscores the need for constructing a shared identity based upon a common vision, even on such critical issues as security. China’s sharp power certainly poses grave challenges to the liberal international order, but what makes Beijing’s value-based offensive sharpedged is essentially not the discourse per se, but the methods it employs in propagating its narrative. Amidst the contending blocs of values between liberalism and counter-liberalism, South Korea, resorting to peace diplomacy as a non-great middle power, should play the role of a reconciler to avoid the clash of values and ideas, if not civilizations. Below, I argue that South Korea’s peace diplomacy should be ultimately aimed at designing its diplomatic trajectory of advancing counter-geopolitics in order to mitigate geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

45. Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect?

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: An intensifying backlash against Xi Jinping’s makeover of China and Donald Trump’s makeover of the United States has muddied thinking about the national identity struggle recently building between the world’s top two powers. What was heralded as the “China Dream,” benefitting from earlier touting of “harmonious” themes, became tarnished as the “China nightmare” of stooping to any means to steal secrets and undermine other states. The long-admired “beacon on the hill” had become sullied as the valueless and selfish “America First” unable to champion democracy or even truth, which was dismissed as “fake news.” The clash in national identities between the two dominant powers on opposite sides of the Pacific is now taking an idiosyncratic form, which challenges us to separate the essence of the struggle likely to be unavoidable for decades ahead from its specific manifestations under the exceptional circumstances of today. Whereas Trump is seen as sui generis, an anomaly that is unlikely to put U.S. values diplomacy at long-run risk, Xi Jinping’s shift from soft power to sharp power appears more sustainable even if there is reason to assume that another effort will be made to raise the profile of Chinese soft power at some point. If 2017 was the year of mounting obsession with Russian sharp power, 2018 proved to be the year of increasing attention to Chinese sharp power. As the focus expanded from Russia to China, a similar set of questions was being asked: 1) how was sharp power manifested? 2) what are the comparisons between Chinese and Russian sharp power? and 3) what was the United States, cognizant of the experiences of other targets of sharp power, doing in response? The suggested answers have pointed not only to developments in Sino-U.S. relations, but also to some wider implications for the Indo-Pacific region of an ever-deepening values confrontation. As many anticipate a prolonged struggle ahead between the United States and China, steeped in different and clashing national identities, the prospects for Chinese usage of sharp power and of U.S. effectiveness in the advance of values diplomacy should be on people’s minds, but there has been a shift of attention as Trump refused to acknowledge the blatant use of Russian sharp power on the minds of many Americans, let alone to make Chinese sharp power his concern. In the absence of such concern, others have raised alarm about China’s sharp power and warned that Trump’s indifference to advancing U.S. values diplomacy is resulting in a dangerous vacuum.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. Power Analysis and Geopolitical Codes of South China Sea States in the Context of Contemporary Geopolitics

Author:: Marek Musiol
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The analysis in this article provides an overview of the research on the current relations among countries of the South China Sea basin. For this purpose, I have decided to apply the geopolitical research workshop, focusing on its contemporary approach. On the one hand, this work uses the available indicators and index to gauge the level of development, economic and demographic potential, and military expenditure of these states. On the other hand, an effort was made to analyze and measure power, taking into account the changing geopolitical status of countries in this sub-region. Contemporary geopolitics in this context allows to verify the scale of the impact on permanent environmental and geographic factors (e.g. publicized investments carried out by the People’s Republic of China in Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross, Subi Reef and Woody Island) and the elaboration of proposals going beyond the classical, geopolitical framework (morphological, political and military factors). Therefore, this article also includes the use of geopolitical codes to assess the current strategies of these countries and to describe potential scenarios of actors’ behaviour in the sub-region.
Topic:: Power Politics, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South China Sea

47. National Security Strategy of Iran and North Korea

Author:: Muhammad Faisal and Rana Eijaz Ahmad
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: In the contemporary phase of international politics, national security strategy (NSC) is considered as a primary factor in the process of state-crafting. It addresses the key concerns; such as domestic, regional and global threats. It also focuses on the policy framework for the security of the state. In this age of uncertain geo-political environment, every nation-state has adopted a particular strategy in a certain strategic environment to minimize their strategic threats. Thus, the NSC is very important for enhancing the national security of the state. It also very helpful in maintaining the regional and global strategic balance. Contemporary formation of nation-state has defined some certain parameters for the formation of national security. These parameters are very important for achieving several particular objectives such as global strategic stability, regional hegemony and the survival of the political regime in the domestic political domain. The development of NSC has become more complex in the modern politico-strategic than the past ages. This research article finds the parameters of national security strategy which have been adopted by Iran and North Korea to maintain the strategic balance in the regional and global arena. The article concludes that Iran and North Korea must find an independent decision-making syndrome to accelerate the process of national security in the existing strategic domain.
Topic:: National Security, Geopolitics, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

48. The evolution of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: from a revisionist to status-seeking agenda

Author:: Jeffrey D. Wilson
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:: Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:: China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a controversial addition to both the global and Asian economic architectures. Western critics have alleged it is a vehicle designed to achieve China’s geostrategic goals, while scholars have argued it marks China’s adoption of a ‘revisionist’ foreign policy strategy. This article argues that such interpretations are incorrect, as they fail to account for the evolution of China’s AIIB agenda. To secure a broad membership and international legitimacy for the AIIB, China compromised with partners during governance negotiations in 2015. Western country demands saw several controversial initial proposals dropped, the governance practices of existing multilateral development banks were adopted, and cooperative partnerships were developed with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. This transition from a revisionist to status-seeking AIIB agenda reveals the flexibility of Chinese economic statecraft, and its willingness to compromise strategic goals to boost the legitimacy of its international leadership claims.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Banks
Political Geography:: China and Asia

49. China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China has great power over both Koreas, but its influence looks to be at its peak. There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the two Koreas are moving closer together and in the process shutting out outsiders. Moreover, the U.S., as it seeks to disarm North Korea, is pursuing policies undercutting Beijing’s role on the peninsula. And to make matters worse, China is beginning to limit its own effectiveness.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

50. The Sea as Catalyst of Geopolitics: from Mahan to the Chinese Boom / El mar como catalizador de la geopolítica: de Mahan al auge chino

Author:: Josep Baqués Quesada
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: China is the State that has grown the most economically and militarily in the past decades. Although its armed forces are still far from the US, the enormous Chinese commercial projection and its policy of providing facilities in ports on all continents, together with the creation of a powerful fleet of the high seas, recall the path traveled years ago by other great powers. But China, unlike the United Kingdom of the nineteenth century or the USA in the twentieth century, is rather a Rimland´s power with one foot in the Heartland. Precisely for this reason, this analysis tests the Chinese capacity from the theoretical framework least favorable for her, that is, the maritime power of Mahan. The conclusion is that, despite certain deficits in purely geographical issues, many of the parameters once defined by Mahan endorse the Chinese candidacy.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Navy, Economic Growth, and Maritime
Political Geography:: China and Asia

51. Challenges for the Republic of China: Diplomatic Relations within Latin America after the Regime Rotation in 2016

Author:: Elisa Hsiu-chi Wang
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Due to the policy of “diplomatic truce” during the presidency of Ma Ying-Jeou, and the good will of mainland China, from 2008 to 2016, generally speaking, the number of ROC’s diplomatic allies remained stable, except in November 2013, when Gambia cut its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in May 20, 2016, some changes are expected in cross-Strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, given the reluctance of President Tsai to express her support to the 1992 Consensus, and the previous reactions of Mainland China. Nowadays, among the 20 ROC diplomatic allies, 11 are located in Latin America. This article tries to respond to the following questions: Is it possible to go back to the bilateral diplomatic competition for recognition by different ally countries, like that maintained during the governments of Lee Tenghui and Chen Sui-bian? Will Mainland China intend to seize more countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to press Tsai for closer cross-Strait relations? Will the Taiwan´ diplomatic allies in Latin America turn to Mainland China, accepting its offers and incentives?
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and Latin America

52. Reintroducing friendship to international relations: relational ontologies from China to the West

Author:: Astrid H. M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:: Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:: Chinese government representatives and scholars have attempted to ameliorate fears about China’s rise by portraying China as a new and friendlier kind of great power. It is claimed that this represents a new way of relating which transcends problematic Western understandings of Self–Other relations and their tendency to slip into domination and enmity. This article takes such claims as a point of departure, and analyses them with focus on the explicit discussions of friendship in international relations theory. Paying attention to current Chinese thinking which emphasizes guanxi relationships, friendship can contribute to the development of genuinely relational international relations thinking and move beyond a focus on ossified forms of friendship and enmity centred on the anxious self. The vantage point of friendship suggests a way out of the dangers of theorizing Self in contrast to Other, and reopens the possibility to conceptualize Self with Other.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

53. South Korea’s Strategic Approach to China (or Lack of It)

Author:: Chung Jae Ho
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Pertinent literature abounds on how East Asian states have struggled to position themselves vis-à-vis a rising China over the past two decades. Due to its geographical proximity and cultural similarities with China, as well as its strategic importance to both the United States and China, South Korea’s tightrope-walking has been more pronounced than anyone else’s.1 Given the crucial strategic issues regarding U.S.-China relations and the North Korean conundrum, how the Seoul-Beijing relationship is to evolve undoubtedly constitutes a key variable in regional security dynamics. This chapter asks what is Seoul’s recipe for dealing with a China that is becoming more “assertive,” examining its changing strategic and diplomatic stance over the years of the Park Geun-hye administration and the first year of the Moon Jae-in government. Of the six sections, the first offers a brief overview of the complex relationship since diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second outlines key features of an era of overoptimism during the first three years of the Park administration (2013-15). The third delves into the issue of THAAD (terminal high-altitude area defense) deployment and how that utterly shattered the Park-Xi honeymoon in 2016. The fourth offers a discussion on China’s narrowly-focused sanctions during 2016-17. The fifth is devoted to the first year of the Moon administration, focusing on envoy politics, the “three-noes controversy,” and Moon’s state visit to China. The final section provides concluding assessments of the factors critical in shaping Moon’s policy toward China and where the room for mending relations remains.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Planning, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

54. Chinese and Indian Competition in Space Heats Up

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the height of the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union used money and weapons to build satellite states; today China and India are using satellites in space to win influence and secure their geo-political and economic interests. They see each other as competition in the global satellite launch business. So how do the Indian and Chinese space programs compare? In which areas is competition likely to be most intense?
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Space
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Sri Lanka

55. China Pakistan Economic Corridor – A geo-economic masterstroke of China

Author:: Inayat Kalim
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Development of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with all its associated projects, favorably influences the geo-strategic and geo-economic prospects of China. Geo-strategic location of Gwadar further facilitates China to capture transit trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East and influence this regional accessibility with a viable and secured corridor for further expansion of regional economic cooperation. Since the emergence of China as an energy importer in late 90s, it has adopted a „go out‟ strategy to secure energy assets through procurement and long term energy investment in the energy rich countries, mostly in the Persian Gulf states and convert historical routes into a modern grid of energy pipelines, roads and railways for its energy supplies. The strategy aims at using financial means such as building new seaports, infrastructure development and military and hydrocarbon cooperation between regional countries to establish an artery for ensuring uninterrupted crude oil supply to its territory. This Chinese approach has been referred by many intellects around the globe as the revitalization of the Silk Road Strategy to link China with surrounding regions to generate immense economic dividends.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, Asia, and Punjab

56. Changing Energy Geopolitics: What is the Role of Sustainability in the Global Energy Geopolitics

Author:: Maria Candida Arrais de Miranda Mousinho, Ednildo Andrade Torres, and Silvo Alexandre Beisi Vieira de Melo
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The act of dominating energy resources undoubtedly permeates the conquest of territories and their respective societies. Energy and geopolitics have always walked conjointly in the process of economic and social development in which societies have been based over the time. The multiplicity of issues that geopolitics gathered helped broaden the spectrum of analysis of geopolitical turning it more complex. This paper has the main objective to contribute for a discussion about the transition from the geopolitics based on the physical space to the geopolitics based on sustainability in which renewable energy has consolidated in the international scenario. The final considerations highlight the quest for energy security requires more than the quest for energy self-sufficiency itself. In addition, the sustainable paradigm introduced in the geopolitics of energy new challenges as the insertion of renewable energy in a context dominated by traditional sources of energy that provokes a reflection on how the challenges related to geopolitics will be dealt with. In that way, China and India appears as a global players. The choice of cooperative dialogues appears as an essential element in the balance of the energy system.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

57. Beyond the Central Eurasian Pivot?

Author:: Michael Tierney
Publication Date:: 08-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Central Eurasia has long been an area that occupies utmost geostrategic importance inthe international system. Scholars throughout the 20th century identified Central Eurasia as the singlemost pivotal area for powerful states to gain influence and control. Their theories were based upon the fact that the region contained vast natural resources, a large population, high economic potential, and was geographically situated in a location strategically important for all world powers. As aresult, Central Eurasia’s importance in international affairs influenced geostrategic thinking during the inter-war years into WWII, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era. Yet the shift in power that has occurred globally in recent years has caused scholars to signal the emergence of a new multipolar world. Some scholars have additionally hypothesized that there will be new geostrategic pivot states and regions located outside of Central Eurasia as a result. This study uses both historical and contemporary literature from the field of geopolitics to construct a list of potential pivots in the current international system. It then compares potential new pivot areas to the traditional Central Eurasian region using the variables listed above. The study finds that there are in fact comparable geostrategic pivots located outside of the Central Eurasian region in the contemporary international system. The implications of these findings are then discussed in the context of geostrategy and international security.
Topic:: Cold War, International Affairs, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and World War II
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Asia, and Central Eurasia

58. IMS-Growth Triangle, SADC and APEC: A Brief Analysis of Regional Integration and Transborder Relations from Critical Geopolitical Perspectives

Author:: Iqbal Shailo
Publication Date:: 07-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This study briefly discusses three case studies of regional integration, namely the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to critically examine contemporary integration project as a phenomenon in which sovereignty, identity and boundary/territory are constructed and confirmed. Poststructuralist approaches reconsider regional communities as pre-given institutes, practices and actors, and inspire to focus on how these categories are constructed and implemented. I am concerned with two important questions: what are the central theoretical dilemmas concerning the concept of regional integration; and how can critical geopolitics employ the integration project and constructive discourses to form a broader view of regional integration?
Topic:: Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Borders, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Asia

59. Fletcher Opening Arctic Conference

Author:: Rabia Altaf, Molly Douglas, and Drew Yerkes
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Many Western leaders point to the Arctic as a zone of cooperation—and we have observed such cooperation with the formulation of the Arctic Council, joint scientific endeavors, Search and Rescue agreements, and the very recent Arctic Coast Guard Forum—but disputes between Russia and other Arctic nations in regions to the south have raised concerns in certain quarters. While an ongoing struggle for dominance over the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage and competing continental shelf claims may reflect these tensions, tit-for-tat military exercises and plans for expanded military infrastructure in the Arctic certainly do. The Russian government recently announced completion of a new military base in Franz Josef Land capable of supporting 150 soldiers, as well as its intention to rebuild six existing airfields. While such a nominal increase in military personnel posted to the Arctic may merely be seen as a posturing act, taken in context with Russia’s recent actions in Europe and the Middle East, it might also be seen as a bold move to project power from a previously overlooked region.
Topic:: Security, Economics, International Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

60. Security ties or electoral connections? The US Congress and the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement, 2007–2011

Author:: Jungkun Seo
Publication Date:: 05-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:: Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:: Conventional wisdom is that trade policy is often guided by geopolitical security considerations. A growing body of research addresses the security–trade linkage as a plausible cause for executive negotiations over the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in 2007. Yet, the approval of a trade deal with the Asian ally by America's legislature in 2011 features not only ‘security ties’ but also ‘electoral connections’. This paper seeks to examine the question of whether alliance relationships would inevitably translate into domestic commitments. Bringing domestic politics into consideration, this article also fills the gap in the literature on Congress-focused research of the KORUS FTA and sheds light on how lawmakers strike a balance between the principle of US foreign policy and the reality of conflicting domestic interests.
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, and Free Trade
Political Geography:: Asia, North America, Korea, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS