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31. Wagner’s Head is Dead, Now Bury the Body

Author:
Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The core of Wagner leadership was effectively decapitated with the deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Uktin, but the group’s fingerprints won’t disappear quickly. Although the Kremlin may attempt to appoint new leadership, semi-nationalize Wagner, or attempt a full takeover, a Wagner descendant organization will continue causing problems for the West. The Wagner model of weaponizing private military companies to use as a foreign policy tool, will continue as well. U.S. and European authorities should avoid complacency by intensifying efforts to counter Wagner and its employees, so that Wagner members cannot slip into anonymity amidst Russian gray zone warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

32. The Eagle in the South Caucasus: Armenia Tests Alternative Geopolitical Waters

Author:
Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The US-Armenia “Eagle Partner” joint military exercise from September 11–20 may signal the beginning of a shift in the foreign policy direction of Armenia, historically a close ally to Russia. Armenia has been growing frustrated at the lackluster response of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to its appeals for assistance in the deepening conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it would be difficult to imagine a wholesale change in the geopolitical orientation in Yerevan, given the strong military, economic, energy, and cultural ties between Armenia and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, North America, South Caucasus, and United States of America

33. Why the West Should Stick with Conventional Arms Control in Europe for Now

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) formally enters into force on November 7, 2023, the remaining twenty-nine member states need to decide whether they want to keep the Treaty or dissolve it for good. The CFE Treaty no longer corresponds to the present state of European security, but its transparency and verification regime can still provide limited security advantages for NATO members and strengthen deterrence. A formal dissolution of the Treaty would undermine Western normative commitments to military transparency. In the long run, it could lead to a loss of expertise on how to conduct inspections and information exchange, which might become relevant again in the context of ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. Russia’s Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military spending by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. Russia’s total military expenditure has increased since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgeted military spending in 2023 can be estimated at 6648 billion roubles. This represents 4.4 per cent of forecast Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any unusual surge. The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to minimize the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of policy goals set before the invasion. The Russian economy can afford this level of spending notwithstanding severe sanctions, while leaving open the possibility of increased war-related funding if the government considers it necessary in the future.
Topic:
War, Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

36. Assessing Realist and Liberal Explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Many commentators have claimed that the Russo-Ukrainian War invalidates or refutes core aspects of realist international relations (IR) theory. However, the opposite is the case: many realists correctly predicted the war, and realism offers a compelling explanation for its causes, while explanations based on liberal IR theory are weak and often inconsistent with the evidence. By focusing on factors like the balance of power and the security dilemma, the realist explanation for the Russo-Ukrainian War emphasizes Russian security concerns in the face of NATO expansion and Western-sponsored regime change. Liberal explanations, by focusing on the internal attributes of states and their decision-makers, instead attribute the war to the pathologies of the Russian government. The dominant liberal narratives regarding the causes of the war are that Russian President Vladimir Putin has always been intent on reincorporating Ukraine into Russia and/or that the democratic example set by post-Maidan Ukraine would threaten President Putin’s own autocratic rule at home. Neither of these explanations stand up to scrutiny. For decades, a long list of policymakers, diplomats, and scholars warned against Western encroachment on Russia’s borders and cautioned that a crisis like the current war could erupt due to continued NATO enlargement. These predictions are consistent with realist theory and the explanations for the war offered by realists. Liberal IR theory encourages a crusading, messianic, and highly militarized foreign policy that consistently produces outcomes inimical to U.S. interests. Realist IR theory offers a better framework through which to understand international politics and encourages a more prudent foreign policy that defends fundamental U.S. security interests while avoiding unnecessary conflicts with other powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Realism, Liberalism, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

38. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

39. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

40. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America